57
Many others sought entry into the EU, bringing in people very different in language,
culture, and habits, and perhaps religion. Some seeking entry from the periphery
were looking for economic opportunities; others were refugees fleeing wars, persecution, or natural disasters. There were wars enough, both within Europe and
nearby, to generate refugee flows in the millions (McPherson 2019).
The EU gained responsibility over refugee policy when the Treaty of Amsterdam
(entered into effect in 1999) gave the European Council of Ministers authority to
develop a common refugee policy (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, art. 73k). That policy
has several elements, each arguably consistent with the 1951 Convention (which had
been ratified by all EU member states). One feature could be termed the “outsourcing
of refugee processing” (Stephens 2019). Would-be refugees were required to apply
and be approved before they enter the EU, while various transit countries are subsidized by the EU to house them while their applications are pending (Oudejens et al.
2018; Stevis-Gridneff 2019). A number of states to the south of the EU became what
might be called “holding states” where growing numbers of would-be refugees or
other migrants were held in camps while their applications were considered. A second feature is the prohibition of “forum shopping” for asylum claims. Asylum seekers, if not processed before arrival, are required to apply for and be processed in the
EU state that they first enter, rather than traveling within the EU to find a more favorable forum (Dublin III Regulation 2013). Approval rates for asylum applications
vary widely from nation to nation within the EU (Eurostat 2018).
5 The Breakdown of the EU Asylum Regime in 2015
Migration, licit and illicit, into and within the European Union, had caused growing
resentment towards newcomers well before 2015 (Hall 2000). Intensifying violence
in Afghanistan and Syria, the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and droughts and other
problems across West and Central Africa, at first did not produce a major crisis for
Europe because “holding states” formed a barrier against political and economic
refugees reaching Europe. The “Arab Spring” caused the breakdown of Libya and
Tunisia as holding states, allowing a flood of migrants (refugees or otherwise) to
cross the Mediterranean, primarily to Italy and Malta (UNCHR 2015). Then Recep
Erdoğan decided to allow refugees held in Turkey to enter Europe as a means of
pressuring the EU on issues including, among others, funding for holding the refugees in Turkey (Winsor 2016). Europe was flooded with refugees from the Middle
East and Africa. The total number of persons applying for refuge in Europe jumped
from 300,000 in 2014, to 1,300,000 in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2016). Another
1,200,000 sought refuge in 2016 (BBC News 2018).
The EU migration policy collapsed under those numbers. Most eastern European
countries closed their borders to new refugees, ignoring their own not so distant
need for refugee protections for their citizens (Lyman 2015). In doing so, they violated their obligations under the 1951 Convention and under EU law, and when the
EU Council of Ministers sought to relieve the burden on any one state by creating
Refugees at Sea in a Hostile World
Many others sought entry into the EU, bringing in people very different in language,
culture, and habits, and perhaps religion. Some seeking entry from the periphery
were looking for economic opportunities; others were refugees fleeing wars, persecution, or natural disasters. There were wars enough, both within Europe and
nearby, to generate refugee flows in the millions (McPherson 2019).
The EU gained responsibility over refugee policy when the Treaty of Amsterdam
(entered into effect in 1999) gave the European Council of Ministers authority to
develop a common refugee policy (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, art. 73k). That policy
has several elements, each arguably consistent with the 1951 Convention (which had
been ratified by all EU member states). One feature could be termed the “outsourcing
of refugee processing” (Stephens 2019). Would-be refugees were required to apply
and be approved before they enter the EU, while various transit countries are subsidized by the EU to house them while their applications are pending (Oudejens et al.
2018; Stevis-Gridneff 2019). A number of states to the south of the EU became what
might be called “holding states” where growing numbers of would-be refugees or
other migrants were held in camps while their applications were considered. A second feature is the prohibition of “forum shopping” for asylum claims. Asylum seekers, if not processed before arrival, are required to apply for and be processed in the
EU state that they first enter, rather than traveling within the EU to find a more favorable forum (Dublin III Regulation 2013). Approval rates for asylum applications
vary widely from nation to nation within the EU (Eurostat 2018).
5 The Breakdown of the EU Asylum Regime in 2015
Migration, licit and illicit, into and within the European Union, had caused growing
resentment towards newcomers well before 2015 (Hall 2000). Intensifying violence
in Afghanistan and Syria, the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and droughts and other
problems across West and Central Africa, at first did not produce a major crisis for
Europe because “holding states” formed a barrier against political and economic
refugees reaching Europe. The “Arab Spring” caused the breakdown of Libya and
Tunisia as holding states, allowing a flood of migrants (refugees or otherwise) to
cross the Mediterranean, primarily to Italy and Malta (UNCHR 2015). Then Recep
Erdoğan decided to allow refugees held in Turkey to enter Europe as a means of
pressuring the EU on issues including, among others, funding for holding the refugees in Turkey (Winsor 2016). Europe was flooded with refugees from the Middle
East and Africa. The total number of persons applying for refuge in Europe jumped
from 300,000 in 2014, to 1,300,000 in 2015 (Pew Research Center 2016). Another
1,200,000 sought refuge in 2016 (BBC News 2018).
The EU migration policy collapsed under those numbers. Most eastern European
countries closed their borders to new refugees, ignoring their own not so distant
need for refugee protections for their citizens (Lyman 2015). In doing so, they violated their obligations under the 1951 Convention and under EU law, and when the
EU Council of Ministers sought to relieve the burden on any one state by creating
Refugees at Sea in a Hostile World