53
2 Refugees in the Twentieth Century
The pattern of violent social revolutions generating refugee flows carried over into
the twentieth century with the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) (e.g., Pace 1974),
and the Russian Revolution (1917–1921) (e.g., Hassell 1991). The twentieth century also saw the culmination of industrialized warfare. Industrialized warfare had
arisen in the nineteenth century, generally without creating large refugee flows
either because the wars were geographically isolated (Crimea, 1853–1856;
Schleswig-Holstein, 1864; the Italo-Turkish War, 1911–1912), or because the wars
were brief (the Austro-Sardinian War, 1859; the Seven Weeks War, 1866; the
Franco-Prussian War, 1870).
The pattern of industrialized warfare changed in the mid-nineteenth century with
the American Civil War (1861–1865). This war, in the heart of a growing industrial
power, was not brief. Improved weapons made battles deadlier, yet improved transportation (the railroads) enabled both sides to replace their losses (Clark Jr. 2004). As a
result, armies on both sides took to “digging in”—trench warfare. This pattern repeated
itself in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and repeated itself with a vengeance World
War I, perhaps the most stupidly fought war in history (1914–1918) (Bull 2014). By
World War II (1937–1945), the militaries of the world (or at least some of them) had
learned to break the stalemates of World War I, exploiting new technologies of mobility (tanks and mechanized warfare), of means of bringing force to bear (airplanes and
self-propelled guns), and the oldest technique of all, surprise (shockingly neglected in
World War I) (Clark 2016). The result in each of these wars were unprecedented numbers of military casualties and also vastly increased numbers of civilian deaths.
The industrialized warfare of the twentieth century extended to the systematic
killing of civilians, sometimes only a few to make others flee, sometimes in an effort
to eliminate an entire people. This was not something new. Many of the colonial
enterprises had involved such “ethnic cleansing” (Hinton et al. 2014). But the scale
and efficiency of the industrialized killing eventually led to the invention of a new
word to describe the practice—genocide (Schabas 2000). Several notorious, largescale genocides occurred during the period of the World Wars: the Armenian
Genocide (1915–1918) (Kévorkian 2011); the Ukrainian Famine (1930–1933)
(Conquest 1986); and the “Holocaust” (1940–1945) (Laqueur 2001).
Ethnic cleansing could happen without mass killings, as it did (more or less) at
least twice: the Greco-Turkish population exchanges (1922–1923) (Clark 2009); and
the Nazi-Soviet population exchanges (1939–1940) (Schechtman 1947). There was
significant incidental killing, but in general they were well organized, successfully
moving unwanted people to new locations where they were, if not welcomed, as least
accepted. In the process, communities that had existed for hundreds (in the case of the
Greeks, thousands) of years were obliterated. Nor did the concept of genocide capture
all of the mass killings of the twentieth century: Stalin’s purges (1934–1940) (Conquest
1968); the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976) (Dikötter 2016); or
Pol Pot’s Cambodia (1974–1979) (Kiernan 2008), to name just the worst examples.
For each of these, the mass killing were done for purposes other than the elimination
of an ethnic, racial, or religious group (Genocide Convention 1948, art. II).
Refugees at Sea in a Hostile World
2 Refugees in the Twentieth Century
The pattern of violent social revolutions generating refugee flows carried over into
the twentieth century with the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) (e.g., Pace 1974),
and the Russian Revolution (1917–1921) (e.g., Hassell 1991). The twentieth century also saw the culmination of industrialized warfare. Industrialized warfare had
arisen in the nineteenth century, generally without creating large refugee flows
either because the wars were geographically isolated (Crimea, 1853–1856;
Schleswig-Holstein, 1864; the Italo-Turkish War, 1911–1912), or because the wars
were brief (the Austro-Sardinian War, 1859; the Seven Weeks War, 1866; the
Franco-Prussian War, 1870).
The pattern of industrialized warfare changed in the mid-nineteenth century with
the American Civil War (1861–1865). This war, in the heart of a growing industrial
power, was not brief. Improved weapons made battles deadlier, yet improved transportation (the railroads) enabled both sides to replace their losses (Clark Jr. 2004). As a
result, armies on both sides took to “digging in”—trench warfare. This pattern repeated
itself in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and repeated itself with a vengeance World
War I, perhaps the most stupidly fought war in history (1914–1918) (Bull 2014). By
World War II (1937–1945), the militaries of the world (or at least some of them) had
learned to break the stalemates of World War I, exploiting new technologies of mobility (tanks and mechanized warfare), of means of bringing force to bear (airplanes and
self-propelled guns), and the oldest technique of all, surprise (shockingly neglected in
World War I) (Clark 2016). The result in each of these wars were unprecedented numbers of military casualties and also vastly increased numbers of civilian deaths.
The industrialized warfare of the twentieth century extended to the systematic
killing of civilians, sometimes only a few to make others flee, sometimes in an effort
to eliminate an entire people. This was not something new. Many of the colonial
enterprises had involved such “ethnic cleansing” (Hinton et al. 2014). But the scale
and efficiency of the industrialized killing eventually led to the invention of a new
word to describe the practice—genocide (Schabas 2000). Several notorious, largescale genocides occurred during the period of the World Wars: the Armenian
Genocide (1915–1918) (Kévorkian 2011); the Ukrainian Famine (1930–1933)
(Conquest 1986); and the “Holocaust” (1940–1945) (Laqueur 2001).
Ethnic cleansing could happen without mass killings, as it did (more or less) at
least twice: the Greco-Turkish population exchanges (1922–1923) (Clark 2009); and
the Nazi-Soviet population exchanges (1939–1940) (Schechtman 1947). There was
significant incidental killing, but in general they were well organized, successfully
moving unwanted people to new locations where they were, if not welcomed, as least
accepted. In the process, communities that had existed for hundreds (in the case of the
Greeks, thousands) of years were obliterated. Nor did the concept of genocide capture
all of the mass killings of the twentieth century: Stalin’s purges (1934–1940) (Conquest
1968); the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976) (Dikötter 2016); or
Pol Pot’s Cambodia (1974–1979) (Kiernan 2008), to name just the worst examples.
For each of these, the mass killing were done for purposes other than the elimination
of an ethnic, racial, or religious group (Genocide Convention 1948, art. II).
Refugees at Sea in a Hostile World