41
Being floodwater, OF water is inherently unreliable (Water Act 2000 (Qld) sch 4;
Bureau of Meteorology 2016). It can, in the relevant part of Queensland, be diverted
and stored (Condamine-Balonne Water Resource Plan 2019) but harvesting may be
limited by a moratorium, water resource plan (WRP) or a wild rivers declaration to
prevent harm to ecosystems and communities relying on such water (Bureau of
Meteorology 2016). As a result of DoA’s $78 million purchase, the CEWH may
now harvest OF water and return it to the environment but if the OF water had not
been purchased by DoA and had not been harvested, it would have, in all likelihood,
been returned to the environment—for free.
Further, if OF licences are non-tradeable amongst irrigators, their value should
be lower than many other types of licences. Yet, the price paid by DoA for OF
licences represented 74% of the value of Kia-ora and Clyde properties (EAA Annual
Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2017 cited in Slattery and Campbell 2018, p. 8).
That neither storage nor land was included in the purchase price has led some commentators to question the wisdom of the purchase (Davies 2018)—a large outlay for
a rather limited gain. What motivated such seemingly profligate expenditure, particularly in light of the CEWH’s confirmation that the $79 million buy-backs ‘have
returned next to no water to the environment since they were purchased two years
ago’ (Middleton 2019a), has not been established.
This buy-back also raises potential conflicts of interest. A former Energy Minister
was a co-founder and director of the vendor’s parent company, Eastern Australian
Irrigation (Davies 2019). He has denied receiving any benefit from the $78 million
EAA buy-back; a buy-back that proceeded without an open tender and arguably
tested the boundaries of procurement procedures (Public Governance, Performance
and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) and Commonwealth Procurement Rules (2017)).
Given that the CEWH allegedly provided general advice to DoA pointing out that
that ‘supplementary’ (including OF) water was the least attractive purchase option,
(Hasham 2019) one is led to ask, was such a purchase justifiable? It is perhaps
timely that the Northern Basin Commissioner has been examining connections
between political donations and buy-backs. He has made no findings but has
observed that where conflicts of interest exist ‘and they are not addressed, [conditions are] ripe for corruption’ (Keelty quoted in Middleton 2019a).
4.2 Tandou
The buy-back of Webster’s WALs for its Tandou property, south of Menindee
(NSW), at a price of $A80 million—almost double the price that the Commonwealth’s
own research agency considered the licences were worth (Davies 2017)—is another
contentious purchase. The Commonwealth’s purchase, vigorously encouraged by
the NSW government, involved no tender process, no cabinet approval and seemingly no advice (either sought or relied on) from other departments or agencies such
as CEWH (Davies 2017). Whilst the Commonwealth’s procurement rules make it
possible to avoid going to tender in cases where ‘exceptionally advantageous
‘Thieves, Shady Deals and Murder’: Water Theft, Buy-Backs and Fish Kills in…
Being floodwater, OF water is inherently unreliable (Water Act 2000 (Qld) sch 4;
Bureau of Meteorology 2016). It can, in the relevant part of Queensland, be diverted
and stored (Condamine-Balonne Water Resource Plan 2019) but harvesting may be
limited by a moratorium, water resource plan (WRP) or a wild rivers declaration to
prevent harm to ecosystems and communities relying on such water (Bureau of
Meteorology 2016). As a result of DoA’s $78 million purchase, the CEWH may
now harvest OF water and return it to the environment but if the OF water had not
been purchased by DoA and had not been harvested, it would have, in all likelihood,
been returned to the environment—for free.
Further, if OF licences are non-tradeable amongst irrigators, their value should
be lower than many other types of licences. Yet, the price paid by DoA for OF
licences represented 74% of the value of Kia-ora and Clyde properties (EAA Annual
Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2017 cited in Slattery and Campbell 2018, p. 8).
That neither storage nor land was included in the purchase price has led some commentators to question the wisdom of the purchase (Davies 2018)—a large outlay for
a rather limited gain. What motivated such seemingly profligate expenditure, particularly in light of the CEWH’s confirmation that the $79 million buy-backs ‘have
returned next to no water to the environment since they were purchased two years
ago’ (Middleton 2019a), has not been established.
This buy-back also raises potential conflicts of interest. A former Energy Minister
was a co-founder and director of the vendor’s parent company, Eastern Australian
Irrigation (Davies 2019). He has denied receiving any benefit from the $78 million
EAA buy-back; a buy-back that proceeded without an open tender and arguably
tested the boundaries of procurement procedures (Public Governance, Performance
and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) and Commonwealth Procurement Rules (2017)).
Given that the CEWH allegedly provided general advice to DoA pointing out that
that ‘supplementary’ (including OF) water was the least attractive purchase option,
(Hasham 2019) one is led to ask, was such a purchase justifiable? It is perhaps
timely that the Northern Basin Commissioner has been examining connections
between political donations and buy-backs. He has made no findings but has
observed that where conflicts of interest exist ‘and they are not addressed, [conditions are] ripe for corruption’ (Keelty quoted in Middleton 2019a).
4.2 Tandou
The buy-back of Webster’s WALs for its Tandou property, south of Menindee
(NSW), at a price of $A80 million—almost double the price that the Commonwealth’s
own research agency considered the licences were worth (Davies 2017)—is another
contentious purchase. The Commonwealth’s purchase, vigorously encouraged by
the NSW government, involved no tender process, no cabinet approval and seemingly no advice (either sought or relied on) from other departments or agencies such
as CEWH (Davies 2017). Whilst the Commonwealth’s procurement rules make it
possible to avoid going to tender in cases where ‘exceptionally advantageous
‘Thieves, Shady Deals and Murder’: Water Theft, Buy-Backs and Fish Kills in…