237
The GPE includes preambular references to the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
1982 World Charter for Nature, and 1992 Rio Declaration. Some text uses language
from the Earth Charter (e.g.; ecological integrity and community of life). However,
the primary reference document appears to be the Rio Declaration, which is consistent with the Pact’s codification objective. What it does not do is address the critical
normative issue of shifting understanding of state sovereignty, by drawing explicitly
on relevant precedents such as the Earth Charter, IUCN Draft Covenant, a growing
list of responsibility declarations and emerging trusteeship jurisprudence. To be fair,
the proponents never claimed this level of normative ambition for the Pact. This is
clear from the very conservative principles on the ‘duty of care of the environment’
(Article 2) and the requirement to ‘cooperate in good faith’ to implement the Pact
(Article 18). The one exception is Article 1: “Every person has the right to live in an
ecologically sound environment …”. This does represent a normative development,
but it is not explicitly linked to important legal precedents including national constitutions (Boyd 2012).
The failure to use precedents in support of normative development certainly
deprived states and others of an important opportunity to rethink state sovereignty
in an age of ecological crisis.
4.5 Norm Entrepreneurs, Brokers and Champions
The success for R2P is closely linked to the presence of norm entrepreneurs, brokers
and champions. The first is a person/s who identifies a normative gap and then organises a process to fill this gap. Brokers find solutions and champions actively support the emerging norm and defend it. R2P had norm entrepreneurs from within the
UN system including Kofi Annan, assisted by states people from Canada, Algeria,
Australia, India and the Sudan. The ICISS performed the role of norm broker
through its report and engagement process. UNSG Moon became a powerful norm
champion, defending R2P and actively developing mechanisms for its implementation (Thakur 2019). He is considered pivotal to the success of the 2009 UNGA
Resolution (Madokoro 2015).
In the case of the GPE, the norm entrepreneurs (Le Club de Juristes and Fabius)
were from outside the UN system and primarily associated with only one nation,
France. The French government performed the role of broker by fast-tracking or
pushing the GPE into the UN system via the UNGA resolution mandating the working group process. France was also the norm champion as it held extensive bilateral
consultations during the working group process. However, France was not prominent during the formal negotiations because it was represented by the EU (ENB
2019c). In short, the GPE did not have diverse, prominent and influential normative
leadership.
Opportunity Within Failure: Can the Global Pact for the Environment Learn…
The GPE includes preambular references to the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
1982 World Charter for Nature, and 1992 Rio Declaration. Some text uses language
from the Earth Charter (e.g.; ecological integrity and community of life). However,
the primary reference document appears to be the Rio Declaration, which is consistent with the Pact’s codification objective. What it does not do is address the critical
normative issue of shifting understanding of state sovereignty, by drawing explicitly
on relevant precedents such as the Earth Charter, IUCN Draft Covenant, a growing
list of responsibility declarations and emerging trusteeship jurisprudence. To be fair,
the proponents never claimed this level of normative ambition for the Pact. This is
clear from the very conservative principles on the ‘duty of care of the environment’
(Article 2) and the requirement to ‘cooperate in good faith’ to implement the Pact
(Article 18). The one exception is Article 1: “Every person has the right to live in an
ecologically sound environment …”. This does represent a normative development,
but it is not explicitly linked to important legal precedents including national constitutions (Boyd 2012).
The failure to use precedents in support of normative development certainly
deprived states and others of an important opportunity to rethink state sovereignty
in an age of ecological crisis.
4.5 Norm Entrepreneurs, Brokers and Champions
The success for R2P is closely linked to the presence of norm entrepreneurs, brokers
and champions. The first is a person/s who identifies a normative gap and then organises a process to fill this gap. Brokers find solutions and champions actively support the emerging norm and defend it. R2P had norm entrepreneurs from within the
UN system including Kofi Annan, assisted by states people from Canada, Algeria,
Australia, India and the Sudan. The ICISS performed the role of norm broker
through its report and engagement process. UNSG Moon became a powerful norm
champion, defending R2P and actively developing mechanisms for its implementation (Thakur 2019). He is considered pivotal to the success of the 2009 UNGA
Resolution (Madokoro 2015).
In the case of the GPE, the norm entrepreneurs (Le Club de Juristes and Fabius)
were from outside the UN system and primarily associated with only one nation,
France. The French government performed the role of broker by fast-tracking or
pushing the GPE into the UN system via the UNGA resolution mandating the working group process. France was also the norm champion as it held extensive bilateral
consultations during the working group process. However, France was not prominent during the formal negotiations because it was represented by the EU (ENB
2019c). In short, the GPE did not have diverse, prominent and influential normative
leadership.
Opportunity Within Failure: Can the Global Pact for the Environment Learn…