231
143 states in favour, 6 abstentions and 6 (not 5) against. While a majority of states
were in favour, some notable states (USA and Russia) voted against. Furthermore,
a close reading of states recorded concerns reveals early dissatisfaction with the
processes adopted including a lack of consultation, concerns over sovereignty, inadequate consideration of views of states, text suggestions being ignored and the decision to begin a process toward the GPE being based on a vote, rather than consensus.
Second, reports from the working group sessions, particularly the third session,
reveal a broad array of concerns being expressed by a wide spectrum of states. This
suggests that Russia, Brazil and the USA were not entirely to blame as blockers of
the GPE initiative. Finally, negotiations were affected by changes in government.
Allies at the outset were no longer in favour and rejected a potential new agreement
(Tigre 2019, p. 2).
Another possible factor in the OEWG outcome was the influence of the UN
Secretary General’s “technical and evidence-based” report on “possible gaps in
international environmental law and environment related instruments” which guided
OEWG discussions (UNGA Res 72/277). This became known as the ‘gap report’
(Gap Report 2018). The need for this report may well have emerged from state’s
concerns regarding UNGA Res 72/277, that they were not being listened to and that
weaknesses in international environmental law resided elsewhere, including lack of
implementation and inequities in global governance (Kotzé and French 2018;
French and Kotzé 2019). Regardless of motivation, a commentator close to the
report opined that it had a critical role in building political support. States needed to
be convinced that the GPE ‘adds value’ (Voigt 2019). More fundamentally, the gap
report became a case of form following function. In this case, that function became
framed in a narrow, technical business as usual way.
3
Consultation reports reveal
that this framing created a significant distraction for states and others, with much
discussion around different understandings of what a ‘gap’ is or is not (ENB 2019a,
b). In short, substantive discussions that could have built stronger support for the
GPE in principle, did not receive sufficient attention. A related consideration was
the gap report’s potential chilling effect on the overall ambition of consultations
based on a “negative … assumption that what States do not want to hear they should
not in any case receive.”(French and Kotzé 2019, p. 31; Biniaz 2019).
Finally, a more substantive problem may well have been the Pact’s lack of innovation and normative ambition, creating a sense that it was not at all ‘fit for purpose’. In other words, it was an inadequate response for the global ecological crisis
confronting life on Earth. In a very insightful and thorough analysis Kotzé and
French interrogate the text from a variety of relevant perspectives including the
emergence of ecological integrity as a fundamental grundnorm, eco-centric ethical
paradigms, earth system science, and environmental/nature’s rights and find it inadequate. To take but one example of particular importance to this book, while the text
includes some references to ‘ecological integrity’ overall its use is weak, confusing
3 Voigt states that the report attempted to avoid this narrow framing by adopting a wide interpretation of its mandate. Some states suggested that report recommendations went beyond the UNGA
mandate (Voigt 2019, p. 17).
Opportunity Within Failure: Can the Global Pact for the Environment Learn…
143 states in favour, 6 abstentions and 6 (not 5) against. While a majority of states
were in favour, some notable states (USA and Russia) voted against. Furthermore,
a close reading of states recorded concerns reveals early dissatisfaction with the
processes adopted including a lack of consultation, concerns over sovereignty, inadequate consideration of views of states, text suggestions being ignored and the decision to begin a process toward the GPE being based on a vote, rather than consensus.
Second, reports from the working group sessions, particularly the third session,
reveal a broad array of concerns being expressed by a wide spectrum of states. This
suggests that Russia, Brazil and the USA were not entirely to blame as blockers of
the GPE initiative. Finally, negotiations were affected by changes in government.
Allies at the outset were no longer in favour and rejected a potential new agreement
(Tigre 2019, p. 2).
Another possible factor in the OEWG outcome was the influence of the UN
Secretary General’s “technical and evidence-based” report on “possible gaps in
international environmental law and environment related instruments” which guided
OEWG discussions (UNGA Res 72/277). This became known as the ‘gap report’
(Gap Report 2018). The need for this report may well have emerged from state’s
concerns regarding UNGA Res 72/277, that they were not being listened to and that
weaknesses in international environmental law resided elsewhere, including lack of
implementation and inequities in global governance (Kotzé and French 2018;
French and Kotzé 2019). Regardless of motivation, a commentator close to the
report opined that it had a critical role in building political support. States needed to
be convinced that the GPE ‘adds value’ (Voigt 2019). More fundamentally, the gap
report became a case of form following function. In this case, that function became
framed in a narrow, technical business as usual way.
3
Consultation reports reveal
that this framing created a significant distraction for states and others, with much
discussion around different understandings of what a ‘gap’ is or is not (ENB 2019a,
b). In short, substantive discussions that could have built stronger support for the
GPE in principle, did not receive sufficient attention. A related consideration was
the gap report’s potential chilling effect on the overall ambition of consultations
based on a “negative … assumption that what States do not want to hear they should
not in any case receive.”(French and Kotzé 2019, p. 31; Biniaz 2019).
Finally, a more substantive problem may well have been the Pact’s lack of innovation and normative ambition, creating a sense that it was not at all ‘fit for purpose’. In other words, it was an inadequate response for the global ecological crisis
confronting life on Earth. In a very insightful and thorough analysis Kotzé and
French interrogate the text from a variety of relevant perspectives including the
emergence of ecological integrity as a fundamental grundnorm, eco-centric ethical
paradigms, earth system science, and environmental/nature’s rights and find it inadequate. To take but one example of particular importance to this book, while the text
includes some references to ‘ecological integrity’ overall its use is weak, confusing
3 Voigt states that the report attempted to avoid this narrow framing by adopting a wide interpretation of its mandate. Some states suggested that report recommendations went beyond the UNGA
mandate (Voigt 2019, p. 17).
Opportunity Within Failure: Can the Global Pact for the Environment Learn…