106
adjustment of the interests of the community to those of the individual’ (Wiredu
2008). While nature may sometimes need to take precedence over the interests of
some individuals, this does not imply an unconditional primacy of the biotic community over individual interests. Sometimes humans may be morally obliged to give
priority to, say, the preservation of an endangered species, perhaps by not using part
of its habitat for agriculture, but this does not imply that human interests must always
defer to those of the biosphere. An African sense of relationality respects both the
interests of individuals and those of the community of nature, giving ultimate primacy
to neither, a controversial claim that deserves to be taken seriously.
5 Implementing African Eco Relationalism
for Ecological Integrity
Protecting the interests of one element of the natural community to the detriment of
others will be counterproductive to achieving ecological integrity. Contemporary
writers such as Jennifer Nedelsky (Nedelsky 1993, 1998, 2008) and Joseph William
Singer (Singer 2000) have progressed the relational view of rights and interests.
Nedelsky, for example,
1
argues that rights should not be viewed as clashing of individual interests or as absolute power within predefined spheres. Instead she situates
rights within a broad web of relationships, limited by their impact on others She
notes, ‘what rights in fact do and have always done is construct relationships—of
power, of responsibility, of trust and obligation’ (Nedelsky 1993, p. 13). From this
perspective, rights create a setting in which individuals and communities live their
lives and interact with others. This setting consists partly of rules requiring individuals to respect the legitimate interests of others. Other rules are designed to
ensure that the comprehensive Earth community functions well.
Rights and interests should thus be understood as socially constructed, involving
not only relations between people, but also between people and things. While some
might view relationships with nature as a limitation on human autonomy, Nedelsky
points out that individuals achieve autonomy not in isolation, but by a combination
of independence and dependence. She argues that this approach shifts the focus
from protection against others to structuring relationships so that they foster autonomy; this makes some of the most basic presuppositions about autonomy to change:
dependence will no longer be seen as the antithesis of autonomy but a precondition
in the relationships. Consequently, interdependence becomes the central fact of
political life (Nedelsky 1993, p. 8).
Placing interests of members of the natural community in a relational context has
an important consequence for environmental preservation because it contextualises
1 Although Nedelsky’s argument refers to human relationships, the term ‘relationship’ will be
extended in this thesis to include nature, having established above that non-human entities can be
right holders.
N. F. Unuigbe
adjustment of the interests of the community to those of the individual’ (Wiredu
2008). While nature may sometimes need to take precedence over the interests of
some individuals, this does not imply an unconditional primacy of the biotic community over individual interests. Sometimes humans may be morally obliged to give
priority to, say, the preservation of an endangered species, perhaps by not using part
of its habitat for agriculture, but this does not imply that human interests must always
defer to those of the biosphere. An African sense of relationality respects both the
interests of individuals and those of the community of nature, giving ultimate primacy
to neither, a controversial claim that deserves to be taken seriously.
5 Implementing African Eco Relationalism
for Ecological Integrity
Protecting the interests of one element of the natural community to the detriment of
others will be counterproductive to achieving ecological integrity. Contemporary
writers such as Jennifer Nedelsky (Nedelsky 1993, 1998, 2008) and Joseph William
Singer (Singer 2000) have progressed the relational view of rights and interests.
Nedelsky, for example,
1
argues that rights should not be viewed as clashing of individual interests or as absolute power within predefined spheres. Instead she situates
rights within a broad web of relationships, limited by their impact on others She
notes, ‘what rights in fact do and have always done is construct relationships—of
power, of responsibility, of trust and obligation’ (Nedelsky 1993, p. 13). From this
perspective, rights create a setting in which individuals and communities live their
lives and interact with others. This setting consists partly of rules requiring individuals to respect the legitimate interests of others. Other rules are designed to
ensure that the comprehensive Earth community functions well.
Rights and interests should thus be understood as socially constructed, involving
not only relations between people, but also between people and things. While some
might view relationships with nature as a limitation on human autonomy, Nedelsky
points out that individuals achieve autonomy not in isolation, but by a combination
of independence and dependence. She argues that this approach shifts the focus
from protection against others to structuring relationships so that they foster autonomy; this makes some of the most basic presuppositions about autonomy to change:
dependence will no longer be seen as the antithesis of autonomy but a precondition
in the relationships. Consequently, interdependence becomes the central fact of
political life (Nedelsky 1993, p. 8).
Placing interests of members of the natural community in a relational context has
an important consequence for environmental preservation because it contextualises
1 Although Nedelsky’s argument refers to human relationships, the term ‘relationship’ will be
extended in this thesis to include nature, having established above that non-human entities can be
right holders.
N. F. Unuigbe