6.4 The Global Water Crisis in a Transboundary Context …
63
or geo-physical parameters (external water dependency, ratio of external to total
renewable water) (e.g. Milman et al. 2012).
The Oregon School uses similar indicators to map the potential political vulnerability of transboundary river basins. De Stefano et al. identified the following
minimum core normative elements of multi- or bilateral water cooperation mechanisms that seem necessary to provide sufficient flexibility for riparians to manage
changing hydropolitical conditions (De Stefano et al. 2012):
– presence of a water treaty: any formal agreement among sovereign states that
substantively covers water management issues. These may be basin treaties, frontier water treaties, bilateral cooperation treaties that cover water, etc.,
1
– mechanisms for water allocation: treaty stipulations on methods and/or processes for the allocation of river flow quantities between riparians. These can be
direct allocation rules (i.e. an amount of water fixed) as well as indirect allocation
methods (principles of water sharing, prioritisation of uses) and procedures (see
Sect. 10.1.1),
– mechanisms for variability management: mechanisms designed to deal with
climatic extremes, such as droughts, floods or other specific variations. Variability
management can include substantive obligations and procedures alike. The former includes water allocation adjustments, stricter irrigation procedures, specific
reservoir releases, etc. The relevant procedures include immediate consultations,
data sharing, transboundary warning systems, risk management planning, etc. (see
Sect. 10.4.1),
– conflict resolution mechanisms: mechanisms to address disagreements among
signatories, including consultations, engagement of third parties, compliance
mechanisms, arbitration or the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, etc. (see Sect. 10.5.1),
– presence of a river basin organisation: these include joint commissions, governing councils, directorates, joint basin authorities, etc., i.e. any bilateral or multilateral body comprised by the representatives of riparian governments with a
competence over water issues (see Sect. 5.2).
Thus, according to this matrix, institutional resilience is determined in a significant way by treaty design. If a given treaty framework is sufficiently robust, yet
flexible enough to accommodate changing hydro-climatic realities, it is likely to
ensure resilience even in the face of increased water variability. Naturally, no assessment based exclusively on such normative indicators can provide a nuanced picture
of the resilience of a particular cooperation regime without an in-depth analysis of
its actual operation. Recent mathematical analyses carried out by Shlomi Dinar and
colleagues found that, for example, that the lack of an allocation mechanism does not
automatically bode lower hydropolitical resilience as it may also reflect the fact that
the basin is sufficiently and evenly watered (i.e. the need for allocation mechanisms
1 Under the system of SDG 6 (see Sect. 5.3.1) this includes any “arrangement for water cooperation
[in the form of] a bilateral or multilateral treaty, convention, agreement or other formal arrangement
between riparian countries that provides a framework for cooperation”. http://www.sdg6monitoring.
org/indicators/target-65/indicators652/ (accessed 12 February 2019).
63
or geo-physical parameters (external water dependency, ratio of external to total
renewable water) (e.g. Milman et al. 2012).
The Oregon School uses similar indicators to map the potential political vulnerability of transboundary river basins. De Stefano et al. identified the following
minimum core normative elements of multi- or bilateral water cooperation mechanisms that seem necessary to provide sufficient flexibility for riparians to manage
changing hydropolitical conditions (De Stefano et al. 2012):
– presence of a water treaty: any formal agreement among sovereign states that
substantively covers water management issues. These may be basin treaties, frontier water treaties, bilateral cooperation treaties that cover water, etc.,
1
– mechanisms for water allocation: treaty stipulations on methods and/or processes for the allocation of river flow quantities between riparians. These can be
direct allocation rules (i.e. an amount of water fixed) as well as indirect allocation
methods (principles of water sharing, prioritisation of uses) and procedures (see
Sect. 10.1.1),
– mechanisms for variability management: mechanisms designed to deal with
climatic extremes, such as droughts, floods or other specific variations. Variability
management can include substantive obligations and procedures alike. The former includes water allocation adjustments, stricter irrigation procedures, specific
reservoir releases, etc. The relevant procedures include immediate consultations,
data sharing, transboundary warning systems, risk management planning, etc. (see
Sect. 10.4.1),
– conflict resolution mechanisms: mechanisms to address disagreements among
signatories, including consultations, engagement of third parties, compliance
mechanisms, arbitration or the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, etc. (see Sect. 10.5.1),
– presence of a river basin organisation: these include joint commissions, governing councils, directorates, joint basin authorities, etc., i.e. any bilateral or multilateral body comprised by the representatives of riparian governments with a
competence over water issues (see Sect. 5.2).
Thus, according to this matrix, institutional resilience is determined in a significant way by treaty design. If a given treaty framework is sufficiently robust, yet
flexible enough to accommodate changing hydro-climatic realities, it is likely to
ensure resilience even in the face of increased water variability. Naturally, no assessment based exclusively on such normative indicators can provide a nuanced picture
of the resilience of a particular cooperation regime without an in-depth analysis of
its actual operation. Recent mathematical analyses carried out by Shlomi Dinar and
colleagues found that, for example, that the lack of an allocation mechanism does not
automatically bode lower hydropolitical resilience as it may also reflect the fact that
the basin is sufficiently and evenly watered (i.e. the need for allocation mechanisms
1 Under the system of SDG 6 (see Sect. 5.3.1) this includes any “arrangement for water cooperation
[in the form of] a bilateral or multilateral treaty, convention, agreement or other formal arrangement
between riparian countries that provides a framework for cooperation”. http://www.sdg6monitoring.
org/indicators/target-65/indicators652/ (accessed 12 February 2019).