48
5 Institutions of Transboundary Water Governance
In Latin America transboundary cooperation is ensured through RBOs, if such
cooperation exists at all. Many basins however have no (e.g. the Orinoco basin) or
relatively basic joint governance schemes in place. Where joint management regimes
do exist, their scope, however, tend to be limited, with some exceptions such as the
La Plata, Amazon or the Titicaca basins (Del Castillo Laborde 2015).
RBOs in Asia show vast variations in terms of mandate, coverage and effectiveness. While most of the largest international water systems (Amur, Aral, GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna, Indus, Jordan, Mekong) are covered by some kind of formal
cooperation body, many of these suffer from insufficient political mandate, geographical coverage, resources, etc. The most notable exception is the Mekong River Commission, a robust intergovernmental entity of the riparian states of the lower section
of the Mekong river which is widely seen as one of the most successful examples of
institutionalised multilateral water cooperation outside Europe (Schmeier 2013).
5.2.3 Effectiveness of River Basin Organisations
Institutionalist scholars consider the presence of an RBO as an important indicator of
hydropolitical stability (see Sect. 6.4.2). Empirical research, however, suggests that
institutionalisation on its own does not necessarily deliver effective basin governance.
RBOs can act as effective players only if their activity is based on strong legal
foundations, broad political mandate, solid financing and extensive cooperation with
all involved stakeholders. These conditions do not assume the existence of supersized
and omnipotent RBOs. Experience shows that the growing level of institutionalisation
(or the size of an institution) does not always yield in additional or proportionate
governance gains. Overgrown, bureaucratic RBOs with very extensive mandates are
likely to fail on some of the core river basin governance functions and tend to display
a declining problem-solving impact. On the other hand, basin commissions with a
limited, but clear mandate, lean administration and sufficient budget can be important
drivers of improved cooperation and joint basin development (Schmeier 2013).
These empirical findings have, recently, received political endorsement in the context of the UNECE Water Convention: in 2015 the Meeting of the Parties adopted
a decision promoting the efficiency of joint bodies of transboundary water cooperation. The decision lays down a number of principles that “aim to synthesize valuable
lessons from the collective experience of joint bodies for transboundary water cooperation” with a view to “generally increas[ing] the efficiency of joint bodies for
transboundary water cooperation and contribut[ing] to reaching a higher level of
cooperation between riparian States”. To that end, the document sets out a number of
basic conditions that underpin RBO efficiency regarding their establishment, structure, functions and operation from a procedural, technical and financial and human
resource management perspective, etc. (UNECE 2015).
5 Institutions of Transboundary Water Governance
In Latin America transboundary cooperation is ensured through RBOs, if such
cooperation exists at all. Many basins however have no (e.g. the Orinoco basin) or
relatively basic joint governance schemes in place. Where joint management regimes
do exist, their scope, however, tend to be limited, with some exceptions such as the
La Plata, Amazon or the Titicaca basins (Del Castillo Laborde 2015).
RBOs in Asia show vast variations in terms of mandate, coverage and effectiveness. While most of the largest international water systems (Amur, Aral, GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna, Indus, Jordan, Mekong) are covered by some kind of formal
cooperation body, many of these suffer from insufficient political mandate, geographical coverage, resources, etc. The most notable exception is the Mekong River Commission, a robust intergovernmental entity of the riparian states of the lower section
of the Mekong river which is widely seen as one of the most successful examples of
institutionalised multilateral water cooperation outside Europe (Schmeier 2013).
5.2.3 Effectiveness of River Basin Organisations
Institutionalist scholars consider the presence of an RBO as an important indicator of
hydropolitical stability (see Sect. 6.4.2). Empirical research, however, suggests that
institutionalisation on its own does not necessarily deliver effective basin governance.
RBOs can act as effective players only if their activity is based on strong legal
foundations, broad political mandate, solid financing and extensive cooperation with
all involved stakeholders. These conditions do not assume the existence of supersized
and omnipotent RBOs. Experience shows that the growing level of institutionalisation
(or the size of an institution) does not always yield in additional or proportionate
governance gains. Overgrown, bureaucratic RBOs with very extensive mandates are
likely to fail on some of the core river basin governance functions and tend to display
a declining problem-solving impact. On the other hand, basin commissions with a
limited, but clear mandate, lean administration and sufficient budget can be important
drivers of improved cooperation and joint basin development (Schmeier 2013).
These empirical findings have, recently, received political endorsement in the context of the UNECE Water Convention: in 2015 the Meeting of the Parties adopted
a decision promoting the efficiency of joint bodies of transboundary water cooperation. The decision lays down a number of principles that “aim to synthesize valuable
lessons from the collective experience of joint bodies for transboundary water cooperation” with a view to “generally increas[ing] the efficiency of joint bodies for
transboundary water cooperation and contribut[ing] to reaching a higher level of
cooperation between riparian States”. To that end, the document sets out a number of
basic conditions that underpin RBO efficiency regarding their establishment, structure, functions and operation from a procedural, technical and financial and human
resource management perspective, etc. (UNECE 2015).