12 Conclusions
183
to provide effective mechanisms for the resolution of a potentially very wide
spectrum of transboundary legal disputes between EU member states.
– The analysis of the adaptive capacity of the EU’s water governance systems has
shown that the above vulnerabilities are likely to persist in the long term for the
following reasons:
• weak horizontal coordination among the different actors of transboundary
water governance: horizontal coordination and flow of information between
the two major multilateral blocks of transboundary governance—the UNECE
and the EU—is insufficient, preventing the mutually beneficial optimisation of
the two regimes. In fact, the EU’s relevant legal instruments, in particular the
Water Framework Directive, dominate contemporary co-riparian relations in the
Union to such extent that it has the tendency to side-line all other issues. This
legal-political asymmetry is also reflected in the attitude of the relevant water
governance institutions, especially that of the European Commission, vis-à-vis
other regimes;
• fragmented horizontal flow of information and feedback: the shortcomings of coordination imply that the horizontal flow of information between the
UNECE and the EU also remains fragmented, unbalanced and somewhat occasional. The European Union, although a party to the UNECE Water Convention,
remains exempt from the reporting obligations under the UNECE Water Convention. The same applies in the opposite direction: the UNECE has no access to
any established formal channels of information exchange with EU institutions;
• limited authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving:
the rigid legal framework of the EU, coupled with a number of political and
cultural obstacles, does not allow the flexible adaptation of EU water policy to
changes in basin hydrology and co-riparian politics. This applies particularly
to the quantitative aspects of transboundary water management that is not only
absent from contemporary EU water policy, but powerful legal constrains suggest that it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Even more limited
is the EU’s adaptive capacity to properly handle interstate water disputes, an
important precondition of hydropolitical stability. The current formulation of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as interpreted by the
European Court of Justice, suggests that the inability of member states to have
recourse to international tribunals to adjudicate bilateral water issues is likely
to persist indefinitely.
183
to provide effective mechanisms for the resolution of a potentially very wide
spectrum of transboundary legal disputes between EU member states.
– The analysis of the adaptive capacity of the EU’s water governance systems has
shown that the above vulnerabilities are likely to persist in the long term for the
following reasons:
• weak horizontal coordination among the different actors of transboundary
water governance: horizontal coordination and flow of information between
the two major multilateral blocks of transboundary governance—the UNECE
and the EU—is insufficient, preventing the mutually beneficial optimisation of
the two regimes. In fact, the EU’s relevant legal instruments, in particular the
Water Framework Directive, dominate contemporary co-riparian relations in the
Union to such extent that it has the tendency to side-line all other issues. This
legal-political asymmetry is also reflected in the attitude of the relevant water
governance institutions, especially that of the European Commission, vis-à-vis
other regimes;
• fragmented horizontal flow of information and feedback: the shortcomings of coordination imply that the horizontal flow of information between the
UNECE and the EU also remains fragmented, unbalanced and somewhat occasional. The European Union, although a party to the UNECE Water Convention,
remains exempt from the reporting obligations under the UNECE Water Convention. The same applies in the opposite direction: the UNECE has no access to
any established formal channels of information exchange with EU institutions;
• limited authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving:
the rigid legal framework of the EU, coupled with a number of political and
cultural obstacles, does not allow the flexible adaptation of EU water policy to
changes in basin hydrology and co-riparian politics. This applies particularly
to the quantitative aspects of transboundary water management that is not only
absent from contemporary EU water policy, but powerful legal constrains suggest that it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Even more limited
is the EU’s adaptive capacity to properly handle interstate water disputes, an
important precondition of hydropolitical stability. The current formulation of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as interpreted by the
European Court of Justice, suggests that the inability of member states to have
recourse to international tribunals to adjudicate bilateral water issues is likely
to persist indefinitely.