2
1 Introduction
– in recent history shared water resources have been a driving force of cooperation,
rather than conflict. Thus water tends to connect nations more than it divides them;
– the stability of co-riparian relations is not determined by one single hydrological
or political factor, such as scarcity in the basin or the ambitions of a downstream
hegemon. Rather, it is defined by the legal and institutional arrangements riparian
states put in place to manage the shared resource;
– if a given legal and institutional arrangement is sufficiently robust and flexible, it
may absorb even very significant changes in the basin without negatively affecting
the efficiency of cooperation among riparian states;
– the chance of serious conflict usually emerges where the magnitude and/or the
speed of change (be it physical or political or both) in the basin exceeds the
absorption capacity of a given governance regime. The absorption capacity of a
governance scheme is thus not a stationary condition, riparian states can always
adapt it to changing hydrological or political circumstances.
The fact that the stability of co-riparian relations is, to a large extent, a function
of certain legal and institutional variables makes it possible to subject it to systematic measurement. Consequently, an impressive array of hydopolitical assessments
has been conducted in the past decade or so at various depths and geographical
scales. Most of these studies seem to suggest that Europe, and most prominently the
European Union (EU), is a true paradise of water cooperation. The intricate web of
multi- and bilateral water conventions and, most importantly, the crown jewel of the
EU’s indigenous water policy: the Water Framework Directive, create a comprehensive transboundary water governance regime that will save Europe from the evil of
inter-state water conflicts.
Not surprisingly these positive but somewhat unsophisticated conclusions have led
to a loss of political and scientific interest in the study of the EU’s own affairs. While
EU institutions, governments, think tanks and NGOs travel the world to preach the
European model of prudent transboundary water cooperation elsewhere, very little
attention is being paid to the future political stability of shared river basins inside the
European Union.
This complacency, however, seems grossly unjustified on several grounds.
Although the relevant hydropolitical assessments confirm the relative stability of the
cooperation frameworks in the EU, many of them also pinpoint to emerging risks.
These risks are of multiple origins. The most obvious is the fact that much of EU’s
relevant legal and institutional apparatus was laid down in the well-watered, densely
populated and heavily industrialised north-western Europe in the 1980s and early
1990s. Naturally, these frameworks reflect the hydrological challenges prevailing at
the time and place of their births. Also, existing governance regimes are based on
a dominant technocratic water management paradigm that presumes the stationarity
of the underlying hydrological conditions. Yet, the “age of man”, the Anthropocene
brings about new challenges that are likely to alter the natural hydrological cycle
beyond recognition (Rockström et al. 2009). With stationarity being declared dead
by science, the policy and governance frameworks must move on too.
1 Introduction
– in recent history shared water resources have been a driving force of cooperation,
rather than conflict. Thus water tends to connect nations more than it divides them;
– the stability of co-riparian relations is not determined by one single hydrological
or political factor, such as scarcity in the basin or the ambitions of a downstream
hegemon. Rather, it is defined by the legal and institutional arrangements riparian
states put in place to manage the shared resource;
– if a given legal and institutional arrangement is sufficiently robust and flexible, it
may absorb even very significant changes in the basin without negatively affecting
the efficiency of cooperation among riparian states;
– the chance of serious conflict usually emerges where the magnitude and/or the
speed of change (be it physical or political or both) in the basin exceeds the
absorption capacity of a given governance regime. The absorption capacity of a
governance scheme is thus not a stationary condition, riparian states can always
adapt it to changing hydrological or political circumstances.
The fact that the stability of co-riparian relations is, to a large extent, a function
of certain legal and institutional variables makes it possible to subject it to systematic measurement. Consequently, an impressive array of hydopolitical assessments
has been conducted in the past decade or so at various depths and geographical
scales. Most of these studies seem to suggest that Europe, and most prominently the
European Union (EU), is a true paradise of water cooperation. The intricate web of
multi- and bilateral water conventions and, most importantly, the crown jewel of the
EU’s indigenous water policy: the Water Framework Directive, create a comprehensive transboundary water governance regime that will save Europe from the evil of
inter-state water conflicts.
Not surprisingly these positive but somewhat unsophisticated conclusions have led
to a loss of political and scientific interest in the study of the EU’s own affairs. While
EU institutions, governments, think tanks and NGOs travel the world to preach the
European model of prudent transboundary water cooperation elsewhere, very little
attention is being paid to the future political stability of shared river basins inside the
European Union.
This complacency, however, seems grossly unjustified on several grounds.
Although the relevant hydropolitical assessments confirm the relative stability of the
cooperation frameworks in the EU, many of them also pinpoint to emerging risks.
These risks are of multiple origins. The most obvious is the fact that much of EU’s
relevant legal and institutional apparatus was laid down in the well-watered, densely
populated and heavily industrialised north-western Europe in the 1980s and early
1990s. Naturally, these frameworks reflect the hydrological challenges prevailing at
the time and place of their births. Also, existing governance regimes are based on
a dominant technocratic water management paradigm that presumes the stationarity
of the underlying hydrological conditions. Yet, the “age of man”, the Anthropocene
brings about new challenges that are likely to alter the natural hydrological cycle
beyond recognition (Rockström et al. 2009). With stationarity being declared dead
by science, the policy and governance frameworks must move on too.