90
Statute of the Tribunal contained in its Annex VI, did not expressly provide for any
advisory jurisdiction beyond that bestowed upon the Seabed Disputes Chamber”.
32
It appears that in this way an acceptable balance is found between the need for
the Tribunal to explain what and how it is doing, and the wish of states parties and
observers to give their views on the work of the Tribunal without affecting its
independence.
3 Some Concluding Observations
Not much research has been done into international judicial governance institutions,
INJUGOVINS. Their functioning demonstrates that the relationship between international courts or tribunals and their INJUGOVINS is often troublesome. It is somewhat like a forced marriage. The two must live together and they need each other,
but it is far from a love story. INJUGOVINS find it difficult to always and fully
respect the independence of international courts and tribunals. International courts
and tribunals often find it difficult to always and fully be accountable.
33
Against this general background SPLOS seems to be a positive exception to the
rule, a relative success story. It is true that there have been differences and disagreements, hassle and squabbles. However, this is inherent in the work of any
INJUGOVIN, a political institution, usually composed of representatives of sovereign states with diverging views and interests. What is important is that generally an
atmosphere of trust has prevailed in the relationship between ITLOS and
SPLOS. There have been no major clashes, such as those between the ICJ, the ICC,
the SADC Tribunal on the one hand, and their INJUGOVINS on the other. ITLOS
seems to be transparent, sends proposed budgets well in advance, is open to discussing them, explains why proposals are made and why certain budget increases are
simply beyond the control of the Tribunal, etc. SPLOS mostly follows the budget
proposals, sometimes with small adjustments. In the annual SPLOS meetings, states
have regularly voiced support for the functioning of ITLOS. For example, in 2017
several delegations referred to “the scope of activities of the Tribunal, as well as its
increasing and complex workload and the growing recognition and confidence of
States parties in entrusting the Tribunal with the settlement of their maritime
disputes”.
34
Finally, if this is indeed true, how to explain the relatively positive record of
SPLOS? It is difficult to answer this question. Certainly it is not true that law of the
sea issues are only technical and not as political as, for example, many international
criminal justice issues. Does it matter that the budget and staff of ITLOS are relatively small, for example much smaller than those of the ICC? Perhaps this may
play a role, but then again the budgets and staff of the ICJ and SADC Tribunal are
32 Ibidem.
33 See in more detail Blokker (2018).
34 Doc. SPLOS/316, at p. 6 (para. 24).
N. M. Blokker
Statute of the Tribunal contained in its Annex VI, did not expressly provide for any
advisory jurisdiction beyond that bestowed upon the Seabed Disputes Chamber”.
32
It appears that in this way an acceptable balance is found between the need for
the Tribunal to explain what and how it is doing, and the wish of states parties and
observers to give their views on the work of the Tribunal without affecting its
independence.
3 Some Concluding Observations
Not much research has been done into international judicial governance institutions,
INJUGOVINS. Their functioning demonstrates that the relationship between international courts or tribunals and their INJUGOVINS is often troublesome. It is somewhat like a forced marriage. The two must live together and they need each other,
but it is far from a love story. INJUGOVINS find it difficult to always and fully
respect the independence of international courts and tribunals. International courts
and tribunals often find it difficult to always and fully be accountable.
33
Against this general background SPLOS seems to be a positive exception to the
rule, a relative success story. It is true that there have been differences and disagreements, hassle and squabbles. However, this is inherent in the work of any
INJUGOVIN, a political institution, usually composed of representatives of sovereign states with diverging views and interests. What is important is that generally an
atmosphere of trust has prevailed in the relationship between ITLOS and
SPLOS. There have been no major clashes, such as those between the ICJ, the ICC,
the SADC Tribunal on the one hand, and their INJUGOVINS on the other. ITLOS
seems to be transparent, sends proposed budgets well in advance, is open to discussing them, explains why proposals are made and why certain budget increases are
simply beyond the control of the Tribunal, etc. SPLOS mostly follows the budget
proposals, sometimes with small adjustments. In the annual SPLOS meetings, states
have regularly voiced support for the functioning of ITLOS. For example, in 2017
several delegations referred to “the scope of activities of the Tribunal, as well as its
increasing and complex workload and the growing recognition and confidence of
States parties in entrusting the Tribunal with the settlement of their maritime
disputes”.
34
Finally, if this is indeed true, how to explain the relatively positive record of
SPLOS? It is difficult to answer this question. Certainly it is not true that law of the
sea issues are only technical and not as political as, for example, many international
criminal justice issues. Does it matter that the budget and staff of ITLOS are relatively small, for example much smaller than those of the ICC? Perhaps this may
play a role, but then again the budgets and staff of the ICJ and SADC Tribunal are
32 Ibidem.
33 See in more detail Blokker (2018).
34 Doc. SPLOS/316, at p. 6 (para. 24).
N. M. Blokker