88
budget in US dollars. As of 2005, the budgets are in euros and cover 2-year periods.
22
It is for ITLOS to propose a budget. Most of the details of the proposed budget are discussed in the ‘Open-ended working group on financial and budgetary
matters’ of SPLOS. Following this discussion SPLOS adopts the budget by
consensus, either as it was proposed or with certain reductions. At times, individual
delegations have claimed that the ‘zero growth’ principle should apply. But when
ITLOS needed an increase it was mostly able to convince delegations, explaining
specifically why this was necessary. Often certain increases were beyond the control
of ITLOS: for instance the depreciation of the dollar, or because salaries of the
judges are partly linked to the salary of the judges of the ICJ. Generally the Tribunal
has received the necessary support for its budget proposals.
An exception was the discussion in 2012 about the budget for 2013–2014. The
budget increase proposed by ITLOS was largely beyond the control of the Tribunal.
However, against the background of domestic financial constraints this was not convincing for some state parties, as the Registrar of ITLOS has observed with barely
concealed frustration.
23
In this case SPLOS reduced the proposed budget, by 3%,
but did not reach consensus on the specific activities that should be affected by these
reductions. As a result, this was left to the Tribunal.
24
Nevertheless, overall, it seems that SPLOS has fulfilled this task reasonably well.
There has been no major crisis related to the ITLOS budget. Of course there has
been criticism by individual states, in particular in times of financial crises. But this
criticism was not often shared by other state parties; the Tribunal could also further
explain the background of certain proposals, and in the end, a spirit of compromise
has generally prevailed.
If there is one issue that could in the future lead to difficulties in this area, it is
perhaps something that is familiar to other INJUGOVINS: the tension between the
‘zero growth culture’ of the administrators, prompted by the ministries of finance of
the state parties, and the fact of judicial life that it cannot be planned in advance
when and how often a case will be brought before court. This uncertainty affects the
ITLOS budget in particular, since ITLOS judges are not fulltime and two-thirds of
their remuneration depends on the workload of the Tribunal. More cases automatically lead to a considerable increase in the budget.
Thirdly, SPLOS as the accountability forum for ITLOS. Here it is important to
distinguish between on the one hand the judicial work of the Tribunal (its raison
d’être), and on the other hand the administrative and financial aspects of its work.
This distinction is fundamental, since it is clear that the Tribunal must be fully independent in the performance of its judicial functions. Its judgments are final (res
judicata) and are not subject to revision by SPLOS. On the other hand, it is clear
that state parties may have a say in the administration and the finances of the tribunal. However, while the judicial functions and the administrative/financial operation
may be separated in theory, in practice this distinction is less clear-cut. By not
22 See Gautier (2005), in particular p. 186.
23 Gautier (2013), in particular pp. 613–616.
24 Ibidem, p. 616.
N. M. Blokker
budget in US dollars. As of 2005, the budgets are in euros and cover 2-year periods.
22
It is for ITLOS to propose a budget. Most of the details of the proposed budget are discussed in the ‘Open-ended working group on financial and budgetary
matters’ of SPLOS. Following this discussion SPLOS adopts the budget by
consensus, either as it was proposed or with certain reductions. At times, individual
delegations have claimed that the ‘zero growth’ principle should apply. But when
ITLOS needed an increase it was mostly able to convince delegations, explaining
specifically why this was necessary. Often certain increases were beyond the control
of ITLOS: for instance the depreciation of the dollar, or because salaries of the
judges are partly linked to the salary of the judges of the ICJ. Generally the Tribunal
has received the necessary support for its budget proposals.
An exception was the discussion in 2012 about the budget for 2013–2014. The
budget increase proposed by ITLOS was largely beyond the control of the Tribunal.
However, against the background of domestic financial constraints this was not convincing for some state parties, as the Registrar of ITLOS has observed with barely
concealed frustration.
23
In this case SPLOS reduced the proposed budget, by 3%,
but did not reach consensus on the specific activities that should be affected by these
reductions. As a result, this was left to the Tribunal.
24
Nevertheless, overall, it seems that SPLOS has fulfilled this task reasonably well.
There has been no major crisis related to the ITLOS budget. Of course there has
been criticism by individual states, in particular in times of financial crises. But this
criticism was not often shared by other state parties; the Tribunal could also further
explain the background of certain proposals, and in the end, a spirit of compromise
has generally prevailed.
If there is one issue that could in the future lead to difficulties in this area, it is
perhaps something that is familiar to other INJUGOVINS: the tension between the
‘zero growth culture’ of the administrators, prompted by the ministries of finance of
the state parties, and the fact of judicial life that it cannot be planned in advance
when and how often a case will be brought before court. This uncertainty affects the
ITLOS budget in particular, since ITLOS judges are not fulltime and two-thirds of
their remuneration depends on the workload of the Tribunal. More cases automatically lead to a considerable increase in the budget.
Thirdly, SPLOS as the accountability forum for ITLOS. Here it is important to
distinguish between on the one hand the judicial work of the Tribunal (its raison
d’être), and on the other hand the administrative and financial aspects of its work.
This distinction is fundamental, since it is clear that the Tribunal must be fully independent in the performance of its judicial functions. Its judgments are final (res
judicata) and are not subject to revision by SPLOS. On the other hand, it is clear
that state parties may have a say in the administration and the finances of the tribunal. However, while the judicial functions and the administrative/financial operation
may be separated in theory, in practice this distinction is less clear-cut. By not
22 See Gautier (2005), in particular p. 186.
23 Gautier (2013), in particular pp. 613–616.
24 Ibidem, p. 616.
N. M. Blokker