25
maritime zones mentioned in paragraph 3, if it satisfies both of the requirements
61
under that paragraph (i.e., human habitation and economic life).
62
Quite clearly, this is a restrictive interpretation of the requirements of Article
121(3) as regards the status of rocks without exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf—an interpretation reiterated several times in the Award, for
instance in the passage where the Tribunal clarified that the human habitation must
be stable (“a non-transient presence of persons who have chosen to stay and reside
on the feature in a settled manner”
63
), rather than “only possible through outside
support”,
64
as is the case with military personnel.
However, the Tribunal’s reticence to accept derogations from the requirements of
Article 121(3) and, therefore, increase the number of maritime features entitled to
an EEZ and/or a continental shelf, is also due to its purposive interpretation of the
provision. According to the Tribunal, “the purpose of Article 121(3) is to place limits on excessive and unfair claims by States”.
65
The expansion of a coastal State’s
jurisdiction into a wide maritime zone bordering its coasts is mainly intended, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, to support the needs of its maritime population. Therefore,
[a]s a counterpoint to the expanded jurisdiction of the exclusive economic zone Article
121(3) serves to prevent such expansion from going too far. It serves to disable tiny features
from unfairly and inequitably generating enormous entitlements to maritime spaces that
would serve not to benefit the local population, but to award a windfall to the (potentially
distant) State to have maintained a claim to such a feature.
66
Thus, in the eyes of the Tribunal Article 121(3) has the function of preventing
and restraining creeping coastal State jurisdiction, and this function is in turn linked
to the main purpose of the EEZ, which is to satisfy the needs of the coastal peoples,
rather than the interests of the States establishing it.
67
Moreover, since Article 121(3) is a provision of limitation also with respect to
the continental shelf, it has the additional, simultaneous purpose of “preventing
encroachment on the international seabed reserved for the common heritage of
mankind”.
68
Another example of the significant role that the “object and purpose” criterion
(teleological interpretation) plays when an international tribunal resorts to the combined application of VCLT interpretation rules is the final award rendered in the
Chagos Marine Protection Area Arbitration.
61 After all, according to the Tribunal “the term ‘economic life’ is linked to the requirement of
human habitation, and the two will in most instances go hand in hand”. Ibidem, para. 543.
62 In the same sense, see ICJ, Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 2 February 2018, para. 140.
63 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award, para. 489.
64 Ibidem, para. 550.
65 Ibidem.
66 Ibidem, para. 516.
67 Ibidem, para. 520.
68 Ibidem, para. 535.
The ‘General Rule of Interpretation’ in the International Jurisprudence Relating…
maritime zones mentioned in paragraph 3, if it satisfies both of the requirements
61
under that paragraph (i.e., human habitation and economic life).
62
Quite clearly, this is a restrictive interpretation of the requirements of Article
121(3) as regards the status of rocks without exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf—an interpretation reiterated several times in the Award, for
instance in the passage where the Tribunal clarified that the human habitation must
be stable (“a non-transient presence of persons who have chosen to stay and reside
on the feature in a settled manner”
63
), rather than “only possible through outside
support”,
64
as is the case with military personnel.
However, the Tribunal’s reticence to accept derogations from the requirements of
Article 121(3) and, therefore, increase the number of maritime features entitled to
an EEZ and/or a continental shelf, is also due to its purposive interpretation of the
provision. According to the Tribunal, “the purpose of Article 121(3) is to place limits on excessive and unfair claims by States”.
65
The expansion of a coastal State’s
jurisdiction into a wide maritime zone bordering its coasts is mainly intended, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, to support the needs of its maritime population. Therefore,
[a]s a counterpoint to the expanded jurisdiction of the exclusive economic zone Article
121(3) serves to prevent such expansion from going too far. It serves to disable tiny features
from unfairly and inequitably generating enormous entitlements to maritime spaces that
would serve not to benefit the local population, but to award a windfall to the (potentially
distant) State to have maintained a claim to such a feature.
66
Thus, in the eyes of the Tribunal Article 121(3) has the function of preventing
and restraining creeping coastal State jurisdiction, and this function is in turn linked
to the main purpose of the EEZ, which is to satisfy the needs of the coastal peoples,
rather than the interests of the States establishing it.
67
Moreover, since Article 121(3) is a provision of limitation also with respect to
the continental shelf, it has the additional, simultaneous purpose of “preventing
encroachment on the international seabed reserved for the common heritage of
mankind”.
68
Another example of the significant role that the “object and purpose” criterion
(teleological interpretation) plays when an international tribunal resorts to the combined application of VCLT interpretation rules is the final award rendered in the
Chagos Marine Protection Area Arbitration.
61 After all, according to the Tribunal “the term ‘economic life’ is linked to the requirement of
human habitation, and the two will in most instances go hand in hand”. Ibidem, para. 543.
62 In the same sense, see ICJ, Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 2 February 2018, para. 140.
63 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award, para. 489.
64 Ibidem, para. 550.
65 Ibidem.
66 Ibidem, para. 516.
67 Ibidem, para. 520.
68 Ibidem, para. 535.
The ‘General Rule of Interpretation’ in the International Jurisprudence Relating…