19
three elements of the general rule of interpretation contained in that provision, and
courts or other interpreting bodies are required to take all of them into account along
with their interplay.
23
Ultimately, good faith must guide the entire process of interpretation.
24
and “the result obtained must be appreciated in good faith”
25
as well.
3 The Interplay Between the Interpretative Criteria
Under Article 31(1) VCLT
If it is true that
[p]ursuant to article 31 of the [1969] Vienna Convention, [UNCLOS] is to be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose,
26
then international judges should verify which of the alternative criteria set out in
the “general rule of interpretation” actually apply in a particular case and, rather
than choosing one among them, assess the possible interplay of the applicable criterion or criteria with other approaches.
That remains true even for the literal interpretation criterion, which, more than
any other method reflects a preference for an objectivist approach to the interpretation of the text of a treaty—an approach on which, as is well known, the VCLT is
based.
This is because, to begin with, ‘ordinary meaning’ cannot be extracted from the
text through linguistic analysis alone, especially when finding that meaning
“requires a choice from a range of possible meanings”
27
that the parties did not
expressly intend, either originally or subsequently.
28
Rather, “the true meaning of a
text has to be arrived at by taking into account all the consequences which normally
and reasonably flow from that text”.
29
An example of this can be found in the case of the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Bay of Bengal, where ITLOS examined the notion of “natural prolongation” contained in Article 76 (1) UNCLOS, as well as its possible applicability
to a coastal State’s request to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
23 Salerno (2017), p. 197; Dörr (2018), p. 580.
24 Capotorti (1984), p. 37.
25 Sinclair (1984), p. 121.
26 ITLOS, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, 14 March 2012, para. 372.
27 Gardiner (2015), p. 222.
28 Indeed, it should be recalled that, under Art. 31(4) VCLT, “[a] special meaning shall be given to
a term if it is established that the parties so intended”.
29 Sinclair (1984), p. 121.
The ‘General Rule of Interpretation’ in the International Jurisprudence Relating…
three elements of the general rule of interpretation contained in that provision, and
courts or other interpreting bodies are required to take all of them into account along
with their interplay.
23
Ultimately, good faith must guide the entire process of interpretation.
24
and “the result obtained must be appreciated in good faith”
25
as well.
3 The Interplay Between the Interpretative Criteria
Under Article 31(1) VCLT
If it is true that
[p]ursuant to article 31 of the [1969] Vienna Convention, [UNCLOS] is to be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose,
26
then international judges should verify which of the alternative criteria set out in
the “general rule of interpretation” actually apply in a particular case and, rather
than choosing one among them, assess the possible interplay of the applicable criterion or criteria with other approaches.
That remains true even for the literal interpretation criterion, which, more than
any other method reflects a preference for an objectivist approach to the interpretation of the text of a treaty—an approach on which, as is well known, the VCLT is
based.
This is because, to begin with, ‘ordinary meaning’ cannot be extracted from the
text through linguistic analysis alone, especially when finding that meaning
“requires a choice from a range of possible meanings”
27
that the parties did not
expressly intend, either originally or subsequently.
28
Rather, “the true meaning of a
text has to be arrived at by taking into account all the consequences which normally
and reasonably flow from that text”.
29
An example of this can be found in the case of the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Bay of Bengal, where ITLOS examined the notion of “natural prolongation” contained in Article 76 (1) UNCLOS, as well as its possible applicability
to a coastal State’s request to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
23 Salerno (2017), p. 197; Dörr (2018), p. 580.
24 Capotorti (1984), p. 37.
25 Sinclair (1984), p. 121.
26 ITLOS, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, 14 March 2012, para. 372.
27 Gardiner (2015), p. 222.
28 Indeed, it should be recalled that, under Art. 31(4) VCLT, “[a] special meaning shall be given to
a term if it is established that the parties so intended”.
29 Sinclair (1984), p. 121.
The ‘General Rule of Interpretation’ in the International Jurisprudence Relating…