229
maritime border in the Bay and in the Dragonja river area, insisting that the delimitation be carried out using the equidistance method.
20
Three phases can be identified in the history of the dispute. An initial, essentially
bilateral, phase was followed by a second phase during which the dispute escalated—due to a breakdown in negotiations and to unilateral actions by both sides
that explicitly undermined the resumption of negotiations—and, then, a third phase
characterized by the mediation efforts of the European Commission, which led to
the ratification of the 2009 Arbitration Agreement. The first phase initially saw the
establishment of a Joint Diplomatic Commission and expert groups to develop solutions with respect to the land boundary between the two States. The Commission
operated throughout the 1990s, but failed to reach effective solutions; with the
Commission’s dissolution in 1998, the negotiating process moved to the political
level. This led to the signing in 2001 of the Račan-Drnovšek Agreement, which,
despite being an attempt to reach a compromise between the positions of the Parties,
it was clearly more favourable to Slovenia, which is probably why the Croatian
Parliament never ratified it.
21
The agreement was also the first real attempt to resolve
the question of Slovenia’s direct territorial access to the high seas. It did so by establishing a “high seas corridor” that, starting from two points located on the second
section of the boundary between the territorial seas of the two States, runs through
the territorial sea of Croatia up to Point T5 of the Osimo Treaty line, with the curious result of creating a “triangle” of Croatian territorial waters between the aforesaid corridor and the outer limit of Italy’s territorial sea as delineated by the Osimo
Treaty.
22
After the Račan-Drnovšek Agreement failed to be ratified, the efforts to reach a
negotiated solution came to a halt. In this period (2002–2007), the dispute escalated
due to a series of unilateral initiatives by the two States, which signaled a hardening
of their respective positions. First, in 2003, Slovenia declared its intention to succeed to Yugoslavia’s 1968 Continental Shelf Agreement with Italy. This was unjustified, considering that the Slovenian coast cannot project any continental shelf into
the area covered by the 1968 Agreement,
23
and the declaration probably needs to be
understood in the light of what had been envisaged in the 2001 Račan-Drnovšek
Agreement—in the sense that claiming a corridor to the high seas (such as the one
provided for in Article 4 of the 2001 Agreement) made it possible to also claim the
underlying continental shelf and, most likely, part of the continental shelf area cov20 Bickl (2017), p. 12. In 1999, Croatia outlined its position in greater detail in the Declaration on
the state of Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, see
Arnaut (2004), pp. 434–436.
21 Ibidem, pp. 436–440. The maritime boundary between the two States was not delimited using the
equidistance method invoked by Croatia. Moreover, it appears from the text of Agreement that the
Parties regarded the waters delimited by Art. 3(1) as their respective territorial seas (ibidem, p. 42).
For the text of the Agreement, see: http://www.vlada.si/en/projects/arbitration/history/.
22 Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Agreement.
23 See Charney and Alexander (1998), p. 2437.
The Law of Maritime Delimitation in the Croatia/Slovenia Final Award
maritime border in the Bay and in the Dragonja river area, insisting that the delimitation be carried out using the equidistance method.
20
Three phases can be identified in the history of the dispute. An initial, essentially
bilateral, phase was followed by a second phase during which the dispute escalated—due to a breakdown in negotiations and to unilateral actions by both sides
that explicitly undermined the resumption of negotiations—and, then, a third phase
characterized by the mediation efforts of the European Commission, which led to
the ratification of the 2009 Arbitration Agreement. The first phase initially saw the
establishment of a Joint Diplomatic Commission and expert groups to develop solutions with respect to the land boundary between the two States. The Commission
operated throughout the 1990s, but failed to reach effective solutions; with the
Commission’s dissolution in 1998, the negotiating process moved to the political
level. This led to the signing in 2001 of the Račan-Drnovšek Agreement, which,
despite being an attempt to reach a compromise between the positions of the Parties,
it was clearly more favourable to Slovenia, which is probably why the Croatian
Parliament never ratified it.
21
The agreement was also the first real attempt to resolve
the question of Slovenia’s direct territorial access to the high seas. It did so by establishing a “high seas corridor” that, starting from two points located on the second
section of the boundary between the territorial seas of the two States, runs through
the territorial sea of Croatia up to Point T5 of the Osimo Treaty line, with the curious result of creating a “triangle” of Croatian territorial waters between the aforesaid corridor and the outer limit of Italy’s territorial sea as delineated by the Osimo
Treaty.
22
After the Račan-Drnovšek Agreement failed to be ratified, the efforts to reach a
negotiated solution came to a halt. In this period (2002–2007), the dispute escalated
due to a series of unilateral initiatives by the two States, which signaled a hardening
of their respective positions. First, in 2003, Slovenia declared its intention to succeed to Yugoslavia’s 1968 Continental Shelf Agreement with Italy. This was unjustified, considering that the Slovenian coast cannot project any continental shelf into
the area covered by the 1968 Agreement,
23
and the declaration probably needs to be
understood in the light of what had been envisaged in the 2001 Račan-Drnovšek
Agreement—in the sense that claiming a corridor to the high seas (such as the one
provided for in Article 4 of the 2001 Agreement) made it possible to also claim the
underlying continental shelf and, most likely, part of the continental shelf area cov20 Bickl (2017), p. 12. In 1999, Croatia outlined its position in greater detail in the Declaration on
the state of Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, see
Arnaut (2004), pp. 434–436.
21 Ibidem, pp. 436–440. The maritime boundary between the two States was not delimited using the
equidistance method invoked by Croatia. Moreover, it appears from the text of Agreement that the
Parties regarded the waters delimited by Art. 3(1) as their respective territorial seas (ibidem, p. 42).
For the text of the Agreement, see: http://www.vlada.si/en/projects/arbitration/history/.
22 Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Agreement.
23 See Charney and Alexander (1998), p. 2437.
The Law of Maritime Delimitation in the Croatia/Slovenia Final Award