Radiation Expertise 61
the director of the FIB-1 in Chelyabinsk-40. However, their paper, “Two
cases of acute radiation sickness in man,” was not presented by Gus’kova
or Baisogolov themselves but by Moisei P. Domshlak. Neither Gus’kova
nor Baisogolov became a member of the Soviet delegation. 66 From other
research, it is known that the Soviet Union refrained from sending specialists
abroad if they were considered either disloyal or if the danger of kidnapping
was assessed to be too risky. 67
In this case of the two representatives of a closed research institute in the
Soviet atomic program in the Southern Urals, prevailing secrecy about both,
the nuclear “object” and the radioactive contamination of the environment
was probably the main reason that specialists were denied traveling abroad.
Nonetheless, the knowledge produced in the nuclear landscapes was too
crucial to not be presented on the international stage of scientific contest:
mocked by the western countries for their low-quality products and living
standards, the Soviet Union was eager to present themselve at an equal level
to the United States. Even if this was not (always) the case, at least the CIA
conceded in 1959:
While many of the claims advanced by the Soviets in this field [relative
biological effectiveness of various types of radiation] are lacking support and are presently questionable, it seems quite certain that there are
definite central nervous effects from irradiation, perhaps more than was
thought previously in the West. 68
In fact, Gus’kova specialized in the study of the effects of (low-dose) radiation on the nervous system. 69 This indicates that the medical treatment and
research conducted in the Southern Urals were a crucial part of the nuclear
knowledge production in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, research findings
that stemmed from the contaminated areas in the Southern Urals could be
published within another context.
Gedeonov, the author of an article that was submitted to the newly founded
journal Atomnaia Energiia, referred to an unpublished work by Kurchatov and
Klechkovskii as well as to an article by Dmitrii I. Il’in 70 and Moskalev in an
earlier volume of the same journal 71 to suggest that current research showed
the dangers of agriculture and livestock farming in radioactive contaminated areas. 72 However, Gedeonov’s article dealt with fallout in the course of
nuclear tests.
Conclusion
The radioactive contamination of vast territories in the Southern Urals that
took place since the late 1940s was unpreceded as was the disaster relief
measures to cope with the evolving disaster. Part of the measures was the
establishment of sanitary-medical units in the contaminated and in the bordering areas. The facilities were to monitor the health status of the villagers,
the director of the FIB-1 in Chelyabinsk-40. However, their paper, “Two
cases of acute radiation sickness in man,” was not presented by Gus’kova
or Baisogolov themselves but by Moisei P. Domshlak. Neither Gus’kova
nor Baisogolov became a member of the Soviet delegation. 66 From other
research, it is known that the Soviet Union refrained from sending specialists
abroad if they were considered either disloyal or if the danger of kidnapping
was assessed to be too risky. 67
In this case of the two representatives of a closed research institute in the
Soviet atomic program in the Southern Urals, prevailing secrecy about both,
the nuclear “object” and the radioactive contamination of the environment
was probably the main reason that specialists were denied traveling abroad.
Nonetheless, the knowledge produced in the nuclear landscapes was too
crucial to not be presented on the international stage of scientific contest:
mocked by the western countries for their low-quality products and living
standards, the Soviet Union was eager to present themselve at an equal level
to the United States. Even if this was not (always) the case, at least the CIA
conceded in 1959:
While many of the claims advanced by the Soviets in this field [relative
biological effectiveness of various types of radiation] are lacking support and are presently questionable, it seems quite certain that there are
definite central nervous effects from irradiation, perhaps more than was
thought previously in the West. 68
In fact, Gus’kova specialized in the study of the effects of (low-dose) radiation on the nervous system. 69 This indicates that the medical treatment and
research conducted in the Southern Urals were a crucial part of the nuclear
knowledge production in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, research findings
that stemmed from the contaminated areas in the Southern Urals could be
published within another context.
Gedeonov, the author of an article that was submitted to the newly founded
journal Atomnaia Energiia, referred to an unpublished work by Kurchatov and
Klechkovskii as well as to an article by Dmitrii I. Il’in 70 and Moskalev in an
earlier volume of the same journal 71 to suggest that current research showed
the dangers of agriculture and livestock farming in radioactive contaminated areas. 72 However, Gedeonov’s article dealt with fallout in the course of
nuclear tests.
Conclusion
The radioactive contamination of vast territories in the Southern Urals that
took place since the late 1940s was unpreceded as was the disaster relief
measures to cope with the evolving disaster. Part of the measures was the
establishment of sanitary-medical units in the contaminated and in the bordering areas. The facilities were to monitor the health status of the villagers,