24 Stefan Guth
in a region that Soviet planners had hitherto deemed all but uninhabitable
due to its scarcity of freshwater. 23 On the parched peninsula, the utopian
vision of turning deserts into gardens thus acquired a rational quality, as the
humanization of hostile nature appeared a necessary prerequisite for its purposeful exploitation. 24 Furthermore, the multi-industrial development of the
region also required lifting the veil of secrecy that had hitherto concealed
Sredmash’s activities in the region, thereby opening up the opportunity of
exploiting the nuclear oasis as a showpiece of Soviet technological prowess.
Sara Pritchard has described the transformation of the Rhône into a complex envirotechnical system used for electricity generation, irrigation, and
transportation as a literal process of “nation-building,” which “cemented”
progress into the fibers of the country. 25 The same undoubtedly applies to
the Soviet “construction of communism” and its exemplary enactment in
Mangyshlak. Over the course of a decade, the vision of atomic-powered
communism became “concrete” in the double sense of the word, as dozens of
the country’s foremost research institutes, industrial enterprises, and building
trusts participated in designing and building the reactor-cum-desalination
batteries, a modernist model city and industrial cluster, plus the necessary
energy transmission, water distribution, and transportation infrastructure. 26
In 1972, the reactor reached criticality, and in 1973, the Mangyshlak Atomic
Energy Combine (MAEK) started providing electricity (150 MW electrical)
and desalinated water (up to 120 000 m 3 /day) to the city and its industries.
Triumphantly, exponents of Soviet nuclear technopolitics claimed an unmitigated success: Shevchenko’s nuclear complex, they affirmed, pioneered the
“unlimited” provision of mankind’s two most crucial resources, energy and
freshwater. Producing more nuclear fuel, in the shape of plutonium, than it
consumed, the BN-350 was said to demonstrate FBRs’ capacity to “solve the
energy crises for millennia to come,” 27 and the successful application of its
power to the purpose of large-scale desalination allegedly provided a technical solution to a “national challenge” – the supply of drinking water to the
arid regions of the country. 28
Invariably, Shevchenko was cast as a triumph over nature. Pravda celebrated the city as proof of Soviet man’s unbending will “to create better
conditions for life on earth than what mother nature provided us with,” 29
and in 1975, the Union internationale des architectes awarded the city with its
Sir-Patrick-Abercrombie Prize for the “humanization” of a “hostile natural
environment.” 30 At the same time, Shevchenko’s authors took care to stress
that nature was not so much defeated as improved upon through the project.
As Pritchard points out, not only does the creation of envirotechnical systems involve technologizing nature – at the same time, their legitimation often
implies naturalizing technology. 31 This was particularly true for the Shevchenko
project, of which nature improvement formed an integral part. Significant
efforts were therefore invested in rendering visible the beneficial effects of
technology on nature, beginning with the transformation of the nuclear
oasis into a showcase garden city. Harmoniously inscribing the city layout
in a region that Soviet planners had hitherto deemed all but uninhabitable
due to its scarcity of freshwater. 23 On the parched peninsula, the utopian
vision of turning deserts into gardens thus acquired a rational quality, as the
humanization of hostile nature appeared a necessary prerequisite for its purposeful exploitation. 24 Furthermore, the multi-industrial development of the
region also required lifting the veil of secrecy that had hitherto concealed
Sredmash’s activities in the region, thereby opening up the opportunity of
exploiting the nuclear oasis as a showpiece of Soviet technological prowess.
Sara Pritchard has described the transformation of the Rhône into a complex envirotechnical system used for electricity generation, irrigation, and
transportation as a literal process of “nation-building,” which “cemented”
progress into the fibers of the country. 25 The same undoubtedly applies to
the Soviet “construction of communism” and its exemplary enactment in
Mangyshlak. Over the course of a decade, the vision of atomic-powered
communism became “concrete” in the double sense of the word, as dozens of
the country’s foremost research institutes, industrial enterprises, and building
trusts participated in designing and building the reactor-cum-desalination
batteries, a modernist model city and industrial cluster, plus the necessary
energy transmission, water distribution, and transportation infrastructure. 26
In 1972, the reactor reached criticality, and in 1973, the Mangyshlak Atomic
Energy Combine (MAEK) started providing electricity (150 MW electrical)
and desalinated water (up to 120 000 m 3 /day) to the city and its industries.
Triumphantly, exponents of Soviet nuclear technopolitics claimed an unmitigated success: Shevchenko’s nuclear complex, they affirmed, pioneered the
“unlimited” provision of mankind’s two most crucial resources, energy and
freshwater. Producing more nuclear fuel, in the shape of plutonium, than it
consumed, the BN-350 was said to demonstrate FBRs’ capacity to “solve the
energy crises for millennia to come,” 27 and the successful application of its
power to the purpose of large-scale desalination allegedly provided a technical solution to a “national challenge” – the supply of drinking water to the
arid regions of the country. 28
Invariably, Shevchenko was cast as a triumph over nature. Pravda celebrated the city as proof of Soviet man’s unbending will “to create better
conditions for life on earth than what mother nature provided us with,” 29
and in 1975, the Union internationale des architectes awarded the city with its
Sir-Patrick-Abercrombie Prize for the “humanization” of a “hostile natural
environment.” 30 At the same time, Shevchenko’s authors took care to stress
that nature was not so much defeated as improved upon through the project.
As Pritchard points out, not only does the creation of envirotechnical systems involve technologizing nature – at the same time, their legitimation often
implies naturalizing technology. 31 This was particularly true for the Shevchenko
project, of which nature improvement formed an integral part. Significant
efforts were therefore invested in rendering visible the beneficial effects of
technology on nature, beginning with the transformation of the nuclear
oasis into a showcase garden city. Harmoniously inscribing the city layout