The Legal Heritage of the Atom 159
2000s were more significant. At that time, approximately 256,000 former
forced laborers and Nazi victims received compensation payments in Russia,
471,000 in Ukraine, and 129,000 in Belarus. The total amount paid out was
1.638 million euros. 95
While in Belarus, the compensation of former Nazi victims, especially
Nazi forced laborers, became a showcase project of the Lukashenka government and was also of great importance for the Ukrainian governments, it
had only marginal relevance in Russia under the Yeltsin government and,
since 2000, under President Vladimir Putin’s rule. 96 Under the first German
payment program 1993–1999, over 40 million euro had been lost in Russia
due to mismanagement of the Russian foundation “Understanding and
Reconciliation” (vzaimoponimanie i primirenie) during the 1998 financial crisis,
so that almost 100,000 Nazi victims were unable to receive their payment at
all or only partially. 97
Some of the post-Soviet states also passed their own legislation in the 1990s
for the social protection of Nazi victims. While in Ukraine, a general law
was introduced for all victims of Nazi crimes, the legal regulations in Russia
and Belarus only referred to individual groups. 98 The political significance
of different groups of Nazi victims varied greatly in the post-Soviet states,
which was reflected not only in the legal regulations but also in the states’
history policies. 99
In addition to pension allowances, the benefits for Nazi victims were (quite
similar as in the case of the environmental victims) mainly reductions on
electricity, gas, water, and telephone costs, free local transport, free medication, and stays in sanatoria. For many seniors, who were often particularly
needy, this aid was vital for survival.
The German compensation programs in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus thus
overlapped with domestic legislations that were based on different principles,
partly considering different groups of victims and requiring different types
of evidence. The granting of compensation from Germany did not automatically entail legal recognition as Nazi victims (with corresponding privileges)
in the home country and vice versa. The German Foundation Act thus came
into conflict with national legislation in various areas, much to the disappointment and incomprehension of the people concerned. At the same time,
German compensation programs for Nazi victims as well as international aid
programs for Chernobyl victims subsidized the state social systems, which
was particularly evident in the case of Belarus. Belarusian authorities had
even temporarily switched over to offsetting foreign payments and aid against
regular state benefits. 100
Under conditions of the harsh market transition, the victims’ claims for
compensation and social supply privileges became a tool for them to participate in the (however limited) state-protected post-Soviet social welfare
system. Kompensatsija was not just payment for past damages but also an
instrument for survival under the brutal market transition (compensating for
state deficits or dysfunctional public health-care systems). 101 This connection
2000s were more significant. At that time, approximately 256,000 former
forced laborers and Nazi victims received compensation payments in Russia,
471,000 in Ukraine, and 129,000 in Belarus. The total amount paid out was
1.638 million euros. 95
While in Belarus, the compensation of former Nazi victims, especially
Nazi forced laborers, became a showcase project of the Lukashenka government and was also of great importance for the Ukrainian governments, it
had only marginal relevance in Russia under the Yeltsin government and,
since 2000, under President Vladimir Putin’s rule. 96 Under the first German
payment program 1993–1999, over 40 million euro had been lost in Russia
due to mismanagement of the Russian foundation “Understanding and
Reconciliation” (vzaimoponimanie i primirenie) during the 1998 financial crisis,
so that almost 100,000 Nazi victims were unable to receive their payment at
all or only partially. 97
Some of the post-Soviet states also passed their own legislation in the 1990s
for the social protection of Nazi victims. While in Ukraine, a general law
was introduced for all victims of Nazi crimes, the legal regulations in Russia
and Belarus only referred to individual groups. 98 The political significance
of different groups of Nazi victims varied greatly in the post-Soviet states,
which was reflected not only in the legal regulations but also in the states’
history policies. 99
In addition to pension allowances, the benefits for Nazi victims were (quite
similar as in the case of the environmental victims) mainly reductions on
electricity, gas, water, and telephone costs, free local transport, free medication, and stays in sanatoria. For many seniors, who were often particularly
needy, this aid was vital for survival.
The German compensation programs in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus thus
overlapped with domestic legislations that were based on different principles,
partly considering different groups of victims and requiring different types
of evidence. The granting of compensation from Germany did not automatically entail legal recognition as Nazi victims (with corresponding privileges)
in the home country and vice versa. The German Foundation Act thus came
into conflict with national legislation in various areas, much to the disappointment and incomprehension of the people concerned. At the same time,
German compensation programs for Nazi victims as well as international aid
programs for Chernobyl victims subsidized the state social systems, which
was particularly evident in the case of Belarus. Belarusian authorities had
even temporarily switched over to offsetting foreign payments and aid against
regular state benefits. 100
Under conditions of the harsh market transition, the victims’ claims for
compensation and social supply privileges became a tool for them to participate in the (however limited) state-protected post-Soviet social welfare
system. Kompensatsija was not just payment for past damages but also an
instrument for survival under the brutal market transition (compensating for
state deficits or dysfunctional public health-care systems). 101 This connection