The Legal Heritage of the Atom 153
Ukrainian culture of remembrance: in 1992, a national Chernobyl museum
opened in the capital Kyiv and monuments were erected in several cities of
Ukraine.
In Russia, a comprehensive law on the “social protection of citizens, who
were exposed to radiation as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe” was
passed a few months later in May 1991 by Boris Yeltsin, reacting to the
Ukrainian and Belarusian laws. The number of Russian citizens affected by
the Chernobyl catastrophe was considerably smaller. Moreover, the Russian
law used different semantics, “exposure to radiation” instead of “suffering
from radiation” or the rather blurred designation of “influence zone of unfavorable factors” (zona vliianiia neblagopriiatnykh faktorov), but it also declared a
right of all Russian citizens to receive compensation for their damage (health
and property) as well as measures of social support. 63
The Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian laws classified four to five different zones of radioactive risk and contamination, using similar threshold values and connecting these zones to state evacuation and resettlement policies:
compulsory resettlement was foreseen if the annual dose exceeded 5 millisievert (mSv). If the annual dose exceeded 1 mSv, there was a general right
to resettle for the inhabitants. 64 Only the Russian law also provided for a zone
with “privileged socio-economic status,” where the dose was below 1 mSv.
At the same time, Russia initially found it difficult to recognize the claims
of victims of nuclear accidents that took place on Russian territory long before
Chernobyl, such as the nuclear waste accident of 1957 in the closed city of
Chelyabinsk-40. 65 It was thanks to the efforts of Chelyabinsk environmental
activists that a law was passed in Russia in 1993 under President Yeltsin that
extended the scope of the Chernobyl law to the victims of Chelyabinsk-40. 66
One of the peculiarities of the situation in Russia was that victim groups
from three different contexts of radioactive contamination had to be considered. Therefore, in post-Soviet Russia, the recognition of the rights of
victims of radioactive accidents took place in several stages: starting with the
Chernobyl laws (1991), followed by the Chelyabinsk laws (1993, 1998), and
concluding with the Semipalatinsk laws (1995, 2002). 67
The practical implementations of the laws, however, still encounter problems today, partly because the conditions of the three cases of radioactive
contamination differ so greatly. Thus, for example, the Chelyabinsk law,
which was strongly oriented toward the Chernobyl law, did not take into
account the specificities of the social and environmental situation in the
Chelyabinsk region, which meant that some of the victims were not taken
into account. The Chernobyl law defined the radioactively contaminated
areas according to the degree of their contamination with caesium-137, but
in the Mayak accident, the contamination was mainly caused by strontium-90. In addition, the health risk in Chelyabinsk was the long duration
of exposure of the population to radiation in the contaminated regions. This
meant that the total dose had to be calculated over the whole period since
the late 1940s. 68
Ukrainian culture of remembrance: in 1992, a national Chernobyl museum
opened in the capital Kyiv and monuments were erected in several cities of
Ukraine.
In Russia, a comprehensive law on the “social protection of citizens, who
were exposed to radiation as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe” was
passed a few months later in May 1991 by Boris Yeltsin, reacting to the
Ukrainian and Belarusian laws. The number of Russian citizens affected by
the Chernobyl catastrophe was considerably smaller. Moreover, the Russian
law used different semantics, “exposure to radiation” instead of “suffering
from radiation” or the rather blurred designation of “influence zone of unfavorable factors” (zona vliianiia neblagopriiatnykh faktorov), but it also declared a
right of all Russian citizens to receive compensation for their damage (health
and property) as well as measures of social support. 63
The Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian laws classified four to five different zones of radioactive risk and contamination, using similar threshold values and connecting these zones to state evacuation and resettlement policies:
compulsory resettlement was foreseen if the annual dose exceeded 5 millisievert (mSv). If the annual dose exceeded 1 mSv, there was a general right
to resettle for the inhabitants. 64 Only the Russian law also provided for a zone
with “privileged socio-economic status,” where the dose was below 1 mSv.
At the same time, Russia initially found it difficult to recognize the claims
of victims of nuclear accidents that took place on Russian territory long before
Chernobyl, such as the nuclear waste accident of 1957 in the closed city of
Chelyabinsk-40. 65 It was thanks to the efforts of Chelyabinsk environmental
activists that a law was passed in Russia in 1993 under President Yeltsin that
extended the scope of the Chernobyl law to the victims of Chelyabinsk-40. 66
One of the peculiarities of the situation in Russia was that victim groups
from three different contexts of radioactive contamination had to be considered. Therefore, in post-Soviet Russia, the recognition of the rights of
victims of radioactive accidents took place in several stages: starting with the
Chernobyl laws (1991), followed by the Chelyabinsk laws (1993, 1998), and
concluding with the Semipalatinsk laws (1995, 2002). 67
The practical implementations of the laws, however, still encounter problems today, partly because the conditions of the three cases of radioactive
contamination differ so greatly. Thus, for example, the Chelyabinsk law,
which was strongly oriented toward the Chernobyl law, did not take into
account the specificities of the social and environmental situation in the
Chelyabinsk region, which meant that some of the victims were not taken
into account. The Chernobyl law defined the radioactively contaminated
areas according to the degree of their contamination with caesium-137, but
in the Mayak accident, the contamination was mainly caused by strontium-90. In addition, the health risk in Chelyabinsk was the long duration
of exposure of the population to radiation in the contaminated regions. This
meant that the total dose had to be calculated over the whole period since
the late 1940s. 68