The Legal Heritage of the Atom 145
1957 to 1960, were also deployed in the radioactively contaminated area.
Aleksander Fedorovich participated in the mapping of the boundaries of the
contaminated zone and took topographical photographs along the Techa
River, which were needed for the construction of dams. In his 1993 letter
to the director of the Combine, he aptly summarized the spirit of the times
and the mood of the workforce by saying: “In those not-so-distant times of
secrecy, we were simply sent to these places. There were no dosimeters, and
no one checked our clothing, there was no limit to the amount of time we
could work. Yes, and somehow nobody thought about it either. It was necessary, so we did it.” 26
Several people mention in their letters the forced evacuation of the civilian
population after the accident in 1957, for example, former military officer
Yuri Evgenevich L. reported in his letter to the mayor of Chelyabinsk on
the evacuation of two Bashkir villages. He mentioned that the people could
initially only be provisionally accommodated in emergency military shelters
and had to leave behind most of their personal belongings. The entire livestock of the villages was destroyed by the soldiers:
On the shore of the lake, trenches were dug with bulldozers and then
everything living, except the people, was driven to this place. Then
machine guns were fired and then everything was covered with earth.
[…] Nobody thought about themselves at that time, because this ‘plague’
did not smell and was not visible. Only a dosimeter could determine the
degree of contamination, but we paid little attention to this. Only at the
entrance to the barracks stood a soldier with a dosimeter, and if the shoes
shone, we had to clean them ourselves several times. 27
In 1991, 58-year-old Yuri Evgenevich was recognized as an invalid of the
second group due to serious health problems. Thus, he received free medication. He hoped that the new compensation law would lead to a small
increase in his pension and other social benefits. In order to be able to apply
for these, however, he urgently needed a corresponding confirmation from
the Chelyabinsk authorities.
These letters to the authorities also provide interesting insights into the
question of the information available at the time and the level of knowledge
of the Soviet apparatus about the dangers of radioactive radiation. In some of
these sources, it becomes quite clear that the regional political and economic
administration was aware of the dangers for the workers but only passed on
information and warnings to a limited extent. A civilian worker who was
involved in building the dam on the lake with the cooling water from the
reactor in Chelyabinsk-40 remembered: “Time and time again a commission
travelled to the site and said that the place is contaminated, that we should not
pick mushrooms and berries, catch fish, not drink the water. They checked
the radioactivity and left again in silence, telling us nothing, but they must
have told someone from the higher leadership.” 28
1957 to 1960, were also deployed in the radioactively contaminated area.
Aleksander Fedorovich participated in the mapping of the boundaries of the
contaminated zone and took topographical photographs along the Techa
River, which were needed for the construction of dams. In his 1993 letter
to the director of the Combine, he aptly summarized the spirit of the times
and the mood of the workforce by saying: “In those not-so-distant times of
secrecy, we were simply sent to these places. There were no dosimeters, and
no one checked our clothing, there was no limit to the amount of time we
could work. Yes, and somehow nobody thought about it either. It was necessary, so we did it.” 26
Several people mention in their letters the forced evacuation of the civilian
population after the accident in 1957, for example, former military officer
Yuri Evgenevich L. reported in his letter to the mayor of Chelyabinsk on
the evacuation of two Bashkir villages. He mentioned that the people could
initially only be provisionally accommodated in emergency military shelters
and had to leave behind most of their personal belongings. The entire livestock of the villages was destroyed by the soldiers:
On the shore of the lake, trenches were dug with bulldozers and then
everything living, except the people, was driven to this place. Then
machine guns were fired and then everything was covered with earth.
[…] Nobody thought about themselves at that time, because this ‘plague’
did not smell and was not visible. Only a dosimeter could determine the
degree of contamination, but we paid little attention to this. Only at the
entrance to the barracks stood a soldier with a dosimeter, and if the shoes
shone, we had to clean them ourselves several times. 27
In 1991, 58-year-old Yuri Evgenevich was recognized as an invalid of the
second group due to serious health problems. Thus, he received free medication. He hoped that the new compensation law would lead to a small
increase in his pension and other social benefits. In order to be able to apply
for these, however, he urgently needed a corresponding confirmation from
the Chelyabinsk authorities.
These letters to the authorities also provide interesting insights into the
question of the information available at the time and the level of knowledge
of the Soviet apparatus about the dangers of radioactive radiation. In some of
these sources, it becomes quite clear that the regional political and economic
administration was aware of the dangers for the workers but only passed on
information and warnings to a limited extent. A civilian worker who was
involved in building the dam on the lake with the cooling water from the
reactor in Chelyabinsk-40 remembered: “Time and time again a commission
travelled to the site and said that the place is contaminated, that we should not
pick mushrooms and berries, catch fish, not drink the water. They checked
the radioactivity and left again in silence, telling us nothing, but they must
have told someone from the higher leadership.” 28