102 Sophie Roche
dealing with pollution and now blame their inaction on missing finances. 56
Hence, this is not the beginning of a critical discussion, but rather the politics of nuclearity. They do, however, have plans for further mining in the
region: Qaiyomjon Kahmudov, the leader of the state enterprise “Zarya
Vostoka” told Ozodi that in Tabashar, specialists from Tajikistan and Russia
are discussing the revival of this enterprise and its production of various
materials for the Tajik and Russian markets. “Now we are negotiating with
Russian companies so that they will help us with technology and specialists. Tajikistan is looking for possibilities to provide the raw material, at
least 50 percent.” 57
A blog comment below the chapter remarks that even if they received
external help, only twenty percent of financial support would finally
reach the fields, whereas the other eighty percent would simply disappear.
The commentators in the blogs do not raise environmental concerns, nor
have news agencies such as Ozodi promoted environmental discussions in
Tajikistan. All discussions remain on financial issues (and corruption) and
relationships to Russia (no longer the center of Soviet power, but rather
the suspicious neighbor). This discussion preceded the law on radioactive
waste, a step toward the integration of Tajikistan into international treaties. The critical environmental discussion was not the factor that required
Tajikistan’s integration into international treaties, but simply the need for
cash to deal with the waste. One reason for the absence of environmental
activism in and around Khujand until now, I maintain, is the hierarchical
integration of the natural environment and the people who work in it.
Thus, Russia is blamed for exploitation and corruption, but not for pollution, whereas it is “naturally” expected that the rural population work to
improve urban centers.
Conclusion
In this contribution, I have suggested to contextualize uranium mining
into the wider relationship between the urban center and its natural and
rural environment. Against such a background, the idea that people adapt
to their environment is understood as a constant interplay, whereas people
do not necessarily ignore the pollution that nuclear waste causes but situate
themselves into a geographical landscape in which pollution is secondary to
the progress and advancement of nuclear power. Pollution, I have argued, is
developed through experience and integrated through available – and hierarchical – discourses. This process of engaging with natural environments
along with politics of invisibility, to use the terminology of Kuchinskaya,
explains the lack of environmental activism that has taken place in Tajikistan
(rather than the civil war argument). Knowledge exists about the advantages
of a nuclear reactor for research, but not about its side effect, that is, the production of waste.
dealing with pollution and now blame their inaction on missing finances. 56
Hence, this is not the beginning of a critical discussion, but rather the politics of nuclearity. They do, however, have plans for further mining in the
region: Qaiyomjon Kahmudov, the leader of the state enterprise “Zarya
Vostoka” told Ozodi that in Tabashar, specialists from Tajikistan and Russia
are discussing the revival of this enterprise and its production of various
materials for the Tajik and Russian markets. “Now we are negotiating with
Russian companies so that they will help us with technology and specialists. Tajikistan is looking for possibilities to provide the raw material, at
least 50 percent.” 57
A blog comment below the chapter remarks that even if they received
external help, only twenty percent of financial support would finally
reach the fields, whereas the other eighty percent would simply disappear.
The commentators in the blogs do not raise environmental concerns, nor
have news agencies such as Ozodi promoted environmental discussions in
Tajikistan. All discussions remain on financial issues (and corruption) and
relationships to Russia (no longer the center of Soviet power, but rather
the suspicious neighbor). This discussion preceded the law on radioactive
waste, a step toward the integration of Tajikistan into international treaties. The critical environmental discussion was not the factor that required
Tajikistan’s integration into international treaties, but simply the need for
cash to deal with the waste. One reason for the absence of environmental
activism in and around Khujand until now, I maintain, is the hierarchical
integration of the natural environment and the people who work in it.
Thus, Russia is blamed for exploitation and corruption, but not for pollution, whereas it is “naturally” expected that the rural population work to
improve urban centers.
Conclusion
In this contribution, I have suggested to contextualize uranium mining
into the wider relationship between the urban center and its natural and
rural environment. Against such a background, the idea that people adapt
to their environment is understood as a constant interplay, whereas people
do not necessarily ignore the pollution that nuclear waste causes but situate
themselves into a geographical landscape in which pollution is secondary to
the progress and advancement of nuclear power. Pollution, I have argued, is
developed through experience and integrated through available – and hierarchical – discourses. This process of engaging with natural environments
along with politics of invisibility, to use the terminology of Kuchinskaya,
explains the lack of environmental activism that has taken place in Tajikistan
(rather than the civil war argument). Knowledge exists about the advantages
of a nuclear reactor for research, but not about its side effect, that is, the production of waste.