It is clear from the above scientific findings that
international air traffic cannot be excluded from
climate policy making, although it managed to
remain largely unaffected so far.
Why Did International Air Traffic So Far
Escape from an Emission Reduction
Policy?
When the Kyoto Protocol has been formulated in
December 1997 the following sentence in its Article 2.2: “Parties included in Annex 1 (these are
the industrialized countries with emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol) shall
pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels,
working through the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), respectively” started
it. In other words: The reduction of emissions
from international air traffic and international
shipping has to be handled by two United Nations
bodies often said to be closer to the respective
industries than to the responsibility for entire society. Hence, about 6% of global emissions from the
use of fossil fuels or up to 15% of all transport
emissions factually escaped from any regulation
by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Nineteen
years after the signature under UNFCCC at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro we are still without a global legal instrument for any mitigation
measure to reduce aviation fuel’s climate impact.
Why is it so? The following lines use a historical
account given by EFTE [9]. At the first Conference
of the Parties (COP 1) to UNFCCC in Berlin 1995
its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical
Advice (SBSTA) was requested to examine the
allocation and control of emissions from international bunker fuels, the term used for shipping first
and then also for aviation. COP 1 had identified
eight options for SBSTA to be considered prior to
COP 2. SBSTA rejected three options: first, allocation in proportion to national greenhouse gas emissions; second, allocation according to the country of
origin of the passenger/cargo; and third, according
to the actual location of the emission. No agreement
could be reached for the remaining five. There was
no progress at COP 2 in Geneva. At COP 3 in Kyoto
at least the domestic part of aviation and shipping
was integrated into national reduction targets, and
for international flights the above mentioned responsibility of ICAO was decided. Although SBSTA
continued to discuss methodologies to allocate
emissions, it was without any agreement so far.
ICAO often reported about progress in its deliberations, but never presented a real proposal to SBSTA
that could have been tabled at the next COP. Already
in 1996 ICAO had requested that IPCC should
prepare a report on the impact of aircraft engines
on the atmosphere. In 1999, this first report on a
specific industry sector named Aviation and the
Global Atmosphere had been published [17] that
clearly stated:
• Since 1960, aviation passenger traffic had
grown rapidly by 9% per year and was estimated to grow by 5% per year between 1990
and 2015.
• Already in 1992, chosen as the base year for
the report, aviation accounted for 2% of total
anthropogenic CO 2 emissions.
• Including other effects of aviation on the atmosphere, e.g., contrails and contrail cirrus, about
3.5% of the total anthropogenic radiative forcing in the base year 1992 of the report were due
to aviation.
Policy options were given as well including
more stringent engine regulations, removal of subsidies, environmental levies, and emission trading
schemes. IPCC also acknowledged that ICAO had
already started to assess the need for aircraft emission standards at cruising altitude in addition to the
already existing standards for nitrogen oxides. To
make a long story short: At present, 12 years later,
international air traffic is not included in any binding measure for climate protection policy, i.e.,
ICAO was unsuccessful to perform as requested
by the international community.
The European Directive to Include Air
Traffic into the Emission Trading Scheme
At least for the European Union the time for an
escape of the international air traffic from an
340
Aviation and Atmosphere
international air traffic cannot be excluded from
climate policy making, although it managed to
remain largely unaffected so far.
Why Did International Air Traffic So Far
Escape from an Emission Reduction
Policy?
When the Kyoto Protocol has been formulated in
December 1997 the following sentence in its Article 2.2: “Parties included in Annex 1 (these are
the industrialized countries with emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol) shall
pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels,
working through the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), respectively” started
it. In other words: The reduction of emissions
from international air traffic and international
shipping has to be handled by two United Nations
bodies often said to be closer to the respective
industries than to the responsibility for entire society. Hence, about 6% of global emissions from the
use of fossil fuels or up to 15% of all transport
emissions factually escaped from any regulation
by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Nineteen
years after the signature under UNFCCC at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro we are still without a global legal instrument for any mitigation
measure to reduce aviation fuel’s climate impact.
Why is it so? The following lines use a historical
account given by EFTE [9]. At the first Conference
of the Parties (COP 1) to UNFCCC in Berlin 1995
its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical
Advice (SBSTA) was requested to examine the
allocation and control of emissions from international bunker fuels, the term used for shipping first
and then also for aviation. COP 1 had identified
eight options for SBSTA to be considered prior to
COP 2. SBSTA rejected three options: first, allocation in proportion to national greenhouse gas emissions; second, allocation according to the country of
origin of the passenger/cargo; and third, according
to the actual location of the emission. No agreement
could be reached for the remaining five. There was
no progress at COP 2 in Geneva. At COP 3 in Kyoto
at least the domestic part of aviation and shipping
was integrated into national reduction targets, and
for international flights the above mentioned responsibility of ICAO was decided. Although SBSTA
continued to discuss methodologies to allocate
emissions, it was without any agreement so far.
ICAO often reported about progress in its deliberations, but never presented a real proposal to SBSTA
that could have been tabled at the next COP. Already
in 1996 ICAO had requested that IPCC should
prepare a report on the impact of aircraft engines
on the atmosphere. In 1999, this first report on a
specific industry sector named Aviation and the
Global Atmosphere had been published [17] that
clearly stated:
• Since 1960, aviation passenger traffic had
grown rapidly by 9% per year and was estimated to grow by 5% per year between 1990
and 2015.
• Already in 1992, chosen as the base year for
the report, aviation accounted for 2% of total
anthropogenic CO 2 emissions.
• Including other effects of aviation on the atmosphere, e.g., contrails and contrail cirrus, about
3.5% of the total anthropogenic radiative forcing in the base year 1992 of the report were due
to aviation.
Policy options were given as well including
more stringent engine regulations, removal of subsidies, environmental levies, and emission trading
schemes. IPCC also acknowledged that ICAO had
already started to assess the need for aircraft emission standards at cruising altitude in addition to the
already existing standards for nitrogen oxides. To
make a long story short: At present, 12 years later,
international air traffic is not included in any binding measure for climate protection policy, i.e.,
ICAO was unsuccessful to perform as requested
by the international community.
The European Directive to Include Air
Traffic into the Emission Trading Scheme
At least for the European Union the time for an
escape of the international air traffic from an
340
Aviation and Atmosphere