global, intergenerational, and interspecies collective action problem. According to Jamieson, our
old theories and models of morality are not
equipped to deal with such complicated ethical
problems. Therefore, ethics itself needs to be
advanced to develop new ethical systems
equipped to handle such complex ethical problems. Not all philosophers feel we need to go as
far as creating a new environmental ethic as
Jamieson suggests [79]. However, there is consensus that climate change poses a real moral
threat that demands resolution.
Global Justice
Global justice issues encompass the global reach
and scale of the ethical issues caused by anthropogenic climate change. There appears to be a worrying disconnect in how the acts of individuals are
transformed into the huge collective action problems often referred to the tragedy of the commons,
followed by the worrying political and social inertia needed to deal with such problems [83, 84].
One of the major ways that the global justice
issues are manifested is through the unethical and
unfair geographical distribution of harms caused
by climate change. In other words, poor people,
poor nations, and the ones most vulnerable are
often the ones that suffer the most, despite the
fact that they have often been the least responsible
for the emissions that have led to climate change.
Similar pattern of vulnerability is present with air
pollution and pollution in general [205]. This
imbalance could be framed as the rich “taking
advantage of the poor and more vulnerable, and
especially their vastly inferior bargaining position” [81]. The political branch of climate ethics
looks into these issues, on how the burdens and
obligations between different individuals, demographics, nations, and international justice as a
whole should be dealt with [85–88]. Philosophical
discussions are also focused on climate negotiations
and the role of justice in these negotiations [89].
Tragedy of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons arises when individual users, acting in their own self-interest, ruin a
common resource by their collective action. The
name comes from an essay written in 1833 by
British economist William Forster Lloyd, which
described the effect of individuals allowing their
livestock to graze in the village commons. The
problem of the tragedy of the commons was popularized and recast in a modern context by ecologist Garret Hardin in 1968 [90] (for other
discussions on the tragedy of the commons, see
Johnson 2003 [91]; Soroos 1997 [92]). Even
though Garret framed the concept to warn against
overpopulation, it is equally valid in describing
the problem of climate change. In classic ethical
problems, the consequence of an action is here
and now, but with climate change, the impact of,
e.g., burning a lump of coal is distributed, thinly,
over the entire globe, and it is not immediate but
rather spread out, thinly, over generations; the
burner does not, in most cases cannot, meet their
victim. The benefit of burning the coal, for heat or
to cook food, is immediate and local.
The tragedy of the commons describes situations where individuals acting in their own selfinterest overuse a shared common resource, such
as natural resources, fossil fuels, and natural sinks
for emissions, thereby depleting or spoiling the
resource altogether, thus acting against the common good of all users. The crux of the problem is
that it is in the individual’s interest to use the
shared resource and to get there first, despite this
leading to its despoiling. However, tragedy can be
avoided by group action such as privatization or
regulation. For instance, Elinor Ostrom [93]
famously argued that members of a community
are able to create mutually agreed governance
systems and moral sanctions, thereby guiding
individual use of the common resource to a sustainable level. From the perspective of climate
change, individual emissions produce a tricky
collective action problem, when a set of rational
actions by individuals all over the world cause
climate change, thereby creating a worse outcome
to everyone compared to a scenario where the
same individuals would have cooperated by introducing restraint to their actions.
Individual Action
Is it possible then to hold individuals morally
responsible for collective action problems such a
climate change? For example, philosopher Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong [94] has argued that individuals have no obligation to reduce their emissions;
310
Air Pollution and Climate Change: Sustainability, Restoration, and Ethical Implications
old theories and models of morality are not
equipped to deal with such complicated ethical
problems. Therefore, ethics itself needs to be
advanced to develop new ethical systems
equipped to handle such complex ethical problems. Not all philosophers feel we need to go as
far as creating a new environmental ethic as
Jamieson suggests [79]. However, there is consensus that climate change poses a real moral
threat that demands resolution.
Global Justice
Global justice issues encompass the global reach
and scale of the ethical issues caused by anthropogenic climate change. There appears to be a worrying disconnect in how the acts of individuals are
transformed into the huge collective action problems often referred to the tragedy of the commons,
followed by the worrying political and social inertia needed to deal with such problems [83, 84].
One of the major ways that the global justice
issues are manifested is through the unethical and
unfair geographical distribution of harms caused
by climate change. In other words, poor people,
poor nations, and the ones most vulnerable are
often the ones that suffer the most, despite the
fact that they have often been the least responsible
for the emissions that have led to climate change.
Similar pattern of vulnerability is present with air
pollution and pollution in general [205]. This
imbalance could be framed as the rich “taking
advantage of the poor and more vulnerable, and
especially their vastly inferior bargaining position” [81]. The political branch of climate ethics
looks into these issues, on how the burdens and
obligations between different individuals, demographics, nations, and international justice as a
whole should be dealt with [85–88]. Philosophical
discussions are also focused on climate negotiations
and the role of justice in these negotiations [89].
Tragedy of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons arises when individual users, acting in their own self-interest, ruin a
common resource by their collective action. The
name comes from an essay written in 1833 by
British economist William Forster Lloyd, which
described the effect of individuals allowing their
livestock to graze in the village commons. The
problem of the tragedy of the commons was popularized and recast in a modern context by ecologist Garret Hardin in 1968 [90] (for other
discussions on the tragedy of the commons, see
Johnson 2003 [91]; Soroos 1997 [92]). Even
though Garret framed the concept to warn against
overpopulation, it is equally valid in describing
the problem of climate change. In classic ethical
problems, the consequence of an action is here
and now, but with climate change, the impact of,
e.g., burning a lump of coal is distributed, thinly,
over the entire globe, and it is not immediate but
rather spread out, thinly, over generations; the
burner does not, in most cases cannot, meet their
victim. The benefit of burning the coal, for heat or
to cook food, is immediate and local.
The tragedy of the commons describes situations where individuals acting in their own selfinterest overuse a shared common resource, such
as natural resources, fossil fuels, and natural sinks
for emissions, thereby depleting or spoiling the
resource altogether, thus acting against the common good of all users. The crux of the problem is
that it is in the individual’s interest to use the
shared resource and to get there first, despite this
leading to its despoiling. However, tragedy can be
avoided by group action such as privatization or
regulation. For instance, Elinor Ostrom [93]
famously argued that members of a community
are able to create mutually agreed governance
systems and moral sanctions, thereby guiding
individual use of the common resource to a sustainable level. From the perspective of climate
change, individual emissions produce a tricky
collective action problem, when a set of rational
actions by individuals all over the world cause
climate change, thereby creating a worse outcome
to everyone compared to a scenario where the
same individuals would have cooperated by introducing restraint to their actions.
Individual Action
Is it possible then to hold individuals morally
responsible for collective action problems such a
climate change? For example, philosopher Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong [94] has argued that individuals have no obligation to reduce their emissions;
310
Air Pollution and Climate Change: Sustainability, Restoration, and Ethical Implications