6.6 Synthesis of the Forensic Analyses, Public Opinion, Institutional Reports
79
Table 6.1 (continued)
Management specs
Risk evaluation specs
Physical inspections, regulatory compliance
and owner’s dam safety programs would
benefit from a risk-based approach to support
and guide these activities. They would
definitely add value in terms of developing and
effective surveillance and monitoring program
and providing the basis for corporate and
government oversight of the critical issues
Risk assessments, allow the design of sensible
business continuity plans and emergency
response plans
These need to be tested in order to ensure the
system works as planned under duress
Always start testing and drilling with a
table-top exercise and then keep increasing the
difficulty until you reach the “surprise” test
level
The dominant risks to be managed in dam
safety derive not from unique events but from
adverse combination of more usual events
No risk assessment should ever be performed
(even of administrative processes) without
covering natural hazards (including of course,
climate), man-made hazards, cyber and
technical hazards
Provide a thorough understanding of the wide
scope of human factors that may detract from
the degree of risk protection with particular
attention to their impact on activities such as
judgments, decisions, actions, inactions,
influencing situational factors, and interactions
Talking about resiliency increase without first
performing a comprehensive convergent risk
assessment is like shooting in the dark. Lots of
money will be wasted
Require a detailed understanding of the
systems to be managed based on periodic
comprehensive reviews as the basis for reliable
and quantified input to a risk assessment
process. This would require more in-depth
reviews than usually mandated and would
include: Current standards and states of
practice; A review of all available data;
Critical and independent thinking; Completed
by people with appropriate technical expertise,
experience, and qualifications to cover all
aspects of design, construction, maintenance,
repair, and failure modes of the assets under
consideration
Avoid incestuous risk assessments, use third
party competent and not “project-interested”
expertise
Gather wide spectrum data beyond the
traditional monitoring data the owner may
provide
Utilize expanded risk assessment approaches
that would address: Difficulties in properly
characterizing risks for large or complex
systems, including accounting for human and
operational aspects in failures; The tendency
to oversimplify complex failure modes
involving multiple interactions of system
components by defining failure modes as a
linear chain of events; The need to consider
how broader organizational factors, such as
culture and decision-making authority and
practices, can contribute to failure
These are the subjects treated in PART II and
PART III of this present publication
79
Table 6.1 (continued)
Management specs
Risk evaluation specs
Physical inspections, regulatory compliance
and owner’s dam safety programs would
benefit from a risk-based approach to support
and guide these activities. They would
definitely add value in terms of developing and
effective surveillance and monitoring program
and providing the basis for corporate and
government oversight of the critical issues
Risk assessments, allow the design of sensible
business continuity plans and emergency
response plans
These need to be tested in order to ensure the
system works as planned under duress
Always start testing and drilling with a
table-top exercise and then keep increasing the
difficulty until you reach the “surprise” test
level
The dominant risks to be managed in dam
safety derive not from unique events but from
adverse combination of more usual events
No risk assessment should ever be performed
(even of administrative processes) without
covering natural hazards (including of course,
climate), man-made hazards, cyber and
technical hazards
Provide a thorough understanding of the wide
scope of human factors that may detract from
the degree of risk protection with particular
attention to their impact on activities such as
judgments, decisions, actions, inactions,
influencing situational factors, and interactions
Talking about resiliency increase without first
performing a comprehensive convergent risk
assessment is like shooting in the dark. Lots of
money will be wasted
Require a detailed understanding of the
systems to be managed based on periodic
comprehensive reviews as the basis for reliable
and quantified input to a risk assessment
process. This would require more in-depth
reviews than usually mandated and would
include: Current standards and states of
practice; A review of all available data;
Critical and independent thinking; Completed
by people with appropriate technical expertise,
experience, and qualifications to cover all
aspects of design, construction, maintenance,
repair, and failure modes of the assets under
consideration
Avoid incestuous risk assessments, use third
party competent and not “project-interested”
expertise
Gather wide spectrum data beyond the
traditional monitoring data the owner may
provide
Utilize expanded risk assessment approaches
that would address: Difficulties in properly
characterizing risks for large or complex
systems, including accounting for human and
operational aspects in failures; The tendency
to oversimplify complex failure modes
involving multiple interactions of system
components by defining failure modes as a
linear chain of events; The need to consider
how broader organizational factors, such as
culture and decision-making authority and
practices, can contribute to failure
These are the subjects treated in PART II and
PART III of this present publication