4
1 Introduction
on Risk Assessment, 1997). Actually we have kept that glossary alive, expanded it to
be applicable to other fields of business and industries. It is available for everyone to
download (https://www.riskope.com/knowledge-centre/tool-box/glossary/).
Using a well-defined glossary is paramount in any field, but especially so in the
area of risk. As we will see, the use of fuzzy definitions has created significant confusion and has been identified as a cause of incidents and accidents. We strongly
recommend readers to familiarize themselves with terms such as “risk” and “consequences”, to cite only two examples, before going any further.
According to Eq. (1.1), risk R can be expressed, in its simplest form as the product of
the probability of occurrence of an undesirable event P f and the damages it potentially
causes D (Kaplan and Garrick 1981; Lowrance 1976; Haimes 2009):
R = P f · D
(1.1)
However, there is no universal consensus on the definition of risk, and in recent years
the focus has shifted to cover the whole spectrum of probabilities, consequences and
uncertainties (Aven 2012). In this book we will use R = p f *C where C represents the
consequences (not necessarily only the damages).
As a matter of fact, both UNEP and Henry Brehaut have discussed qualitatively
what mining companies need to know and do to achieve a significantly higher level
of performance. They also presented a number of forward-looking leading practices
necessary to significantly advance the level of care required by the mining industry.
Both present important principles and leading practice goals but no methodological
suggestions.
Further along this line of discussion, in a recent lecture Prof. Morgenstern stated
(Morgenstern 2018) stated that the dominant cause of dams’ failures arises from deficiencies in engineering practice associated with the spectrum of activities embraced
by design, construction, quality control, quality assurance, and related matters. It is
no surprise that the absence (or inadequacy) of peer review is considered a limiting
factor in reducing the incidence of tailings facility failures (Morgenstern 2010; Caldwell 2011). However, in the aftermath of the recent Corrego do Feijao Dam failure
near Brumadinho in Brazil (2019) we read in the media coverage of the event that
a third-party inspection occurred and that, as in many other historic tailings dams
failures, the dam apparently showed no signs of significant distress shortly before
the failure. This indicates that peer review and traditional monitoring and inspections
cannot be seen as universal panacea. Limited engineer involvement and an alarming
1 Introduction
on Risk Assessment, 1997). Actually we have kept that glossary alive, expanded it to
be applicable to other fields of business and industries. It is available for everyone to
download (https://www.riskope.com/knowledge-centre/tool-box/glossary/).
Using a well-defined glossary is paramount in any field, but especially so in the
area of risk. As we will see, the use of fuzzy definitions has created significant confusion and has been identified as a cause of incidents and accidents. We strongly
recommend readers to familiarize themselves with terms such as “risk” and “consequences”, to cite only two examples, before going any further.
According to Eq. (1.1), risk R can be expressed, in its simplest form as the product of
the probability of occurrence of an undesirable event P f and the damages it potentially
causes D (Kaplan and Garrick 1981; Lowrance 1976; Haimes 2009):
R = P f · D
(1.1)
However, there is no universal consensus on the definition of risk, and in recent years
the focus has shifted to cover the whole spectrum of probabilities, consequences and
uncertainties (Aven 2012). In this book we will use R = p f *C where C represents the
consequences (not necessarily only the damages).
As a matter of fact, both UNEP and Henry Brehaut have discussed qualitatively
what mining companies need to know and do to achieve a significantly higher level
of performance. They also presented a number of forward-looking leading practices
necessary to significantly advance the level of care required by the mining industry.
Both present important principles and leading practice goals but no methodological
suggestions.
Further along this line of discussion, in a recent lecture Prof. Morgenstern stated
(Morgenstern 2018) stated that the dominant cause of dams’ failures arises from deficiencies in engineering practice associated with the spectrum of activities embraced
by design, construction, quality control, quality assurance, and related matters. It is
no surprise that the absence (or inadequacy) of peer review is considered a limiting
factor in reducing the incidence of tailings facility failures (Morgenstern 2010; Caldwell 2011). However, in the aftermath of the recent Corrego do Feijao Dam failure
near Brumadinho in Brazil (2019) we read in the media coverage of the event that
a third-party inspection occurred and that, as in many other historic tailings dams
failures, the dam apparently showed no signs of significant distress shortly before
the failure. This indicates that peer review and traditional monitoring and inspections
cannot be seen as universal panacea. Limited engineer involvement and an alarming