7.5 Do Not Jump to Risks: Hazards Come First!
93
complex metric including public safety, H&S, business interruption, environmental
damages, image and legal damages, and crisis potential as already discussed as well.
The ultimate goal should be that a future mining project will not approved by a
company’s board of directors or by a government unless the proponent can demonstrate to itself, the government and the public, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
proposed TSF can be managed in a manner that meets each party’s definition of
acceptable risk (see Chap. 13 for a discussion of risk tolerance).
For a company, its strategic vision should be to gain the confidence of the government and the public for its tailings management plans though the demonstration of a
transparent, unbiased risk assessment, commitment to strong policies and practices
that are capable of earning their trust and meeting their definition of acceptable risk.
Furthermore placing “safety first”, as often stated, is a vague objective as long
as it is not quantified. Hazardous industries and nuclear power plants clearly define
their safety objectives. Tailings do not.
Objectives have to be clearly stated and defined. They have to operable, considering
the real life portfolio of dams.
This is particularly true when looking at the world-wide portfolio of dams at
highly variable stages of lifecycle development. To be on the path of “zero-failure”
we have to consider possible “congenital problems”. These include, for example,
insufficient depth of geotechnical investigations, insufficient factors of safety, etc.
These problems will continue to affect the world-wide portfolio for decades unless
significant mitigations are implemented. Only rational risk assessment and the clear
definition of a safety/success criteria make it possible to prioritise those mitigations
through RIDM and finally increase societal safety. Mitigative funds must be allotted
rationally and sensibly, and, above all, sustainably, in order to correct the mid- and
long-term situation.
It is preposterous to find correlations with variables—for example, the price of copper—as some authors have claimed and use those to formulate predictions. That is
unless it is assumed that the selected variable, for example the price of copper, generates the “straw that breaks the camel’s back” situation. However, in that case the
reasoning should go toward the root causes and not toward the last element of the
chain.
Additionally, we note there is no definition of what a residual risk assessment
should entail, as pointed out in a case history in Sect. 5.2 (MVRB 2013: Appendix
D, June, 2013) and perpetual cost of waste storage facilities cannot be evaluated using
the classic (common practice) NPV because of its very well-known drawbacks. Here
too, solutions exist (see Sect. 15.10).
93
complex metric including public safety, H&S, business interruption, environmental
damages, image and legal damages, and crisis potential as already discussed as well.
The ultimate goal should be that a future mining project will not approved by a
company’s board of directors or by a government unless the proponent can demonstrate to itself, the government and the public, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
proposed TSF can be managed in a manner that meets each party’s definition of
acceptable risk (see Chap. 13 for a discussion of risk tolerance).
For a company, its strategic vision should be to gain the confidence of the government and the public for its tailings management plans though the demonstration of a
transparent, unbiased risk assessment, commitment to strong policies and practices
that are capable of earning their trust and meeting their definition of acceptable risk.
Furthermore placing “safety first”, as often stated, is a vague objective as long
as it is not quantified. Hazardous industries and nuclear power plants clearly define
their safety objectives. Tailings do not.
Objectives have to be clearly stated and defined. They have to operable, considering
the real life portfolio of dams.
This is particularly true when looking at the world-wide portfolio of dams at
highly variable stages of lifecycle development. To be on the path of “zero-failure”
we have to consider possible “congenital problems”. These include, for example,
insufficient depth of geotechnical investigations, insufficient factors of safety, etc.
These problems will continue to affect the world-wide portfolio for decades unless
significant mitigations are implemented. Only rational risk assessment and the clear
definition of a safety/success criteria make it possible to prioritise those mitigations
through RIDM and finally increase societal safety. Mitigative funds must be allotted
rationally and sensibly, and, above all, sustainably, in order to correct the mid- and
long-term situation.
It is preposterous to find correlations with variables—for example, the price of copper—as some authors have claimed and use those to formulate predictions. That is
unless it is assumed that the selected variable, for example the price of copper, generates the “straw that breaks the camel’s back” situation. However, in that case the
reasoning should go toward the root causes and not toward the last element of the
chain.
Additionally, we note there is no definition of what a residual risk assessment
should entail, as pointed out in a case history in Sect. 5.2 (MVRB 2013: Appendix
D, June, 2013) and perpetual cost of waste storage facilities cannot be evaluated using
the classic (common practice) NPV because of its very well-known drawbacks. Here
too, solutions exist (see Sect. 15.10).