7.5 Do Not Jump to Risks: Hazards Come First!
89
tem. Natural hazards such as earthquakes and meteorological events are important
but they may also be created due to a wide range of actions and decisions throughout
the mining cycle related to technical, management and regulatory factors.
Technical hazards may be related to inadequacies in the geotechnical body of
knowledge, unresolved uncertainties in the design process, lack of an appropriate
level of engineering experience and judgment and unprofessional conduct. Management related hazards can stem from weak corporate commitment to the oversight
of material issues, inadequate management systems, cost and production pressures,
lack of adherence to key operating parameters and poor management. Regulatory
hazards can be introduced as a result of design approvals and amendments being
given without an adequate focus on risk tolerance, the lack of strict permit operating
and construction conditions and the absence of an enforcement culture.
Human factors can also result in hazards not being recognized or addressed adequately (see Chap. 9). As stated earlier (see Sect. 6.4.1), the underlying drivers of
failure that may lead to inadequate risk management are primarily due to: (1) Ignorance—not being sufficiently aware of risks; (2) Complacency—being sufficiently
aware of risks but being overly risk tolerant; and/or (3) Overconfidence—being sufficiently aware of risks, over estimating ability to deal with them.
If the focus is not, at all times, on the identification and reduction of hazardous situations root causes, they may go unrecognised, uncertainties may not be understood,
and resulting risks may not be properly managed. Here is an example: if, when asked
to approve the development of a new mine, a company’s board of directors is told
that the design has been declared safe by their professional geotechnical consultants
and it has been approved by the appropriate regulator, the corporate board members
have little reason to probe further. If, however, the board members are told that:
(1) tailings management has been identified as a material/corporate risk, and the
tailings system represents an intolerable but manageable risk exposure, with the
intolerable risk being, for example, the fourth largest corporate risk;
(2) the consequence classification of the proposed dam location and deposition
method evaluated in terms of lives, direct costs, environmental damages, share
capital loss, reputation is the third within the corporate portfolio; and
(3) that a risk-based approach to mitigation has identified a road-map reducing risks
to a corporate and societal tolerable level,
then a significant set of dynamics are put into play.
Back in 1955 the psychologists Joseph Luft and Harrington Ingham developed a tool
called the Johari window (Luft and Ingham 1955). It splits the self-perception and
public perception space in four areas. The Johari window became world-renowned
when the then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld quoted parts of it. You
probably remember the known unknowns and the unknowns you do not know you
don’t know in an “intelligence” talk. There are interesting applications of the Johari
window in risk management (https://www.riskope.com/2017/06/21/johari-windowapplication-risk-management/).
89
tem. Natural hazards such as earthquakes and meteorological events are important
but they may also be created due to a wide range of actions and decisions throughout
the mining cycle related to technical, management and regulatory factors.
Technical hazards may be related to inadequacies in the geotechnical body of
knowledge, unresolved uncertainties in the design process, lack of an appropriate
level of engineering experience and judgment and unprofessional conduct. Management related hazards can stem from weak corporate commitment to the oversight
of material issues, inadequate management systems, cost and production pressures,
lack of adherence to key operating parameters and poor management. Regulatory
hazards can be introduced as a result of design approvals and amendments being
given without an adequate focus on risk tolerance, the lack of strict permit operating
and construction conditions and the absence of an enforcement culture.
Human factors can also result in hazards not being recognized or addressed adequately (see Chap. 9). As stated earlier (see Sect. 6.4.1), the underlying drivers of
failure that may lead to inadequate risk management are primarily due to: (1) Ignorance—not being sufficiently aware of risks; (2) Complacency—being sufficiently
aware of risks but being overly risk tolerant; and/or (3) Overconfidence—being sufficiently aware of risks, over estimating ability to deal with them.
If the focus is not, at all times, on the identification and reduction of hazardous situations root causes, they may go unrecognised, uncertainties may not be understood,
and resulting risks may not be properly managed. Here is an example: if, when asked
to approve the development of a new mine, a company’s board of directors is told
that the design has been declared safe by their professional geotechnical consultants
and it has been approved by the appropriate regulator, the corporate board members
have little reason to probe further. If, however, the board members are told that:
(1) tailings management has been identified as a material/corporate risk, and the
tailings system represents an intolerable but manageable risk exposure, with the
intolerable risk being, for example, the fourth largest corporate risk;
(2) the consequence classification of the proposed dam location and deposition
method evaluated in terms of lives, direct costs, environmental damages, share
capital loss, reputation is the third within the corporate portfolio; and
(3) that a risk-based approach to mitigation has identified a road-map reducing risks
to a corporate and societal tolerable level,
then a significant set of dynamics are put into play.
Back in 1955 the psychologists Joseph Luft and Harrington Ingham developed a tool
called the Johari window (Luft and Ingham 1955). It splits the self-perception and
public perception space in four areas. The Johari window became world-renowned
when the then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld quoted parts of it. You
probably remember the known unknowns and the unknowns you do not know you
don’t know in an “intelligence” talk. There are interesting applications of the Johari
window in risk management (https://www.riskope.com/2017/06/21/johari-windowapplication-risk-management/).