the strategy that lead to reconsidering the choices already
made.
There is a close link between the lasting economic
equilibrium (monetarily weighed by the “market”) and the
distribution of sacrifices and benefits for those who are the
players of production in the most diverse forms. Players can
participate with capital, work, or in other ways. In general,
anyone can participate by supporting sacrifices or considering that they can enjoy direct and/or indirect benefits (even
if they have not participated in the creation of the company).
If we change the type of involvement of the players and the
forms of the fruition of the results, the conditions of the
balance are also changed. An enterprise may end (or managers may be replaced) not only because the durable economic balance has ceased to exist, but also because it no
longer satisfies the purposes (and expectations) for which it
was established (even if it fulfills the requirement weighed
by the “market”).
Let us focus on these aspects.
The production process—much wider than the borders of
markets—is always a corporate process. In practice, the
company examined in the production process appears to be a
phenomenon without clear boundaries which, however,
naturally exist in its formal management. The crucial point,
therefore, concerns how to achieve the unanimity of production decisions oriented toward the creation of value (not
only considered as financial value).
The principles of the social contract must be contextualized. In this context productions are carried out and, therefore, alternative forms of governance can be imagined
according to the way of mixing sacrifices and benefits.
The governance—that is the realization of the social
contract—determines the formal and real involvement of
some players in defining the choices of the company which,
however, also depends on the behavior of other players
formally excluded from the decision-making processes. The
excluded players are only formally and not even in substance. On the contrary, it may happen that they are also
officially involved—this will depend on the context—due to
higher standards than those concerning governance.
Practical solutions to the problem of the social contract
can be very numerous, although there are currently a limited
number of governance models, some of which clearly prevail over others. The difficulty lies in identifying and
weighing the principles on which to base the “effective
contracts” for the startup of new productions.
Many guiding principles can be imagined determining
governance. Among the most common principles (which can
also coexist also with different weight) on which the governance models of the organizations are based are the following: properties; democratic (at different levels of
extension); realization idea; critical resource; risk tolerance;
prevailing sacrifice; honesty and competence. We can certainly imagine other principles, each of which can be applied
according to different criteria, also made operational by
imagining various parameters.
The empirical problem of the substantial representativeness of governance arises. The sharing of choices of governance must be assessed in relation to the need for timely
decision-making. The freedom to manage the production
process determines some practical problems of considerable
humanistic–environmental importance that must also be
dealt with in legal terms.
Given the constraints that the past choices make to future
decisions (which basically concern the modification of the
structural scenarios of the territories) and the consequences
that the latter will produce on future social equilibriums, the
production models embody the humanistic–environmental
connotations of the communities.
The going concern is based on the ability to conceive and
implement a production program that ensures—bearing
sacrifices—the expected monetary rewards, an essential
condition for all formal players to remain (even if they can
be replaced) voluntarily and durably present as a unit (even
if they are many) in the production process.
The elaboration of the most appropriate activity program
is always relevant, although the issue has often been
addressed by focusing on the producers. Economic processes
are fueled by revenues (usually monetary) provided freely by
customers who use production output.
A reasonable level of investment (in terms of quantity,
quality, prices, places, and times) depends on the expectation
of a balanced satisfaction of the formal players in
production.
Investments must be included in the program of activities
to be carried out, carefully detailed in the overall scenario (in
terms of time, place, price, quantity and quality of production outcomes) and in the methods of covering the capital
requirements generated by them. The going concern is
assured by the virtuous balance also of informal factors.
Considering the main elements of the problem of the size
of the company, overall scenarios can be observed in which
the uncertainty of the going concern may vary according to
the choices made. The most important choices relate particularly to the ability to claim capital and customers, as well
as decisions that give flexibility to the business program.
Flexibility can be achieved through the sharing of resources
with other producers, to reduce the sacrifice (which must
then be remunerated in some way) through collaborations (of
various kinds) that can help reduce the financial needs
associated with the autonomous acquisition of resources.
In short, the size of the company relates to the rational
conception of the overall scenario among the many possible
ones. Each scenario is characterized by uncertainty and risk
208
F. Manni and A. Faccia
made.
There is a close link between the lasting economic
equilibrium (monetarily weighed by the “market”) and the
distribution of sacrifices and benefits for those who are the
players of production in the most diverse forms. Players can
participate with capital, work, or in other ways. In general,
anyone can participate by supporting sacrifices or considering that they can enjoy direct and/or indirect benefits (even
if they have not participated in the creation of the company).
If we change the type of involvement of the players and the
forms of the fruition of the results, the conditions of the
balance are also changed. An enterprise may end (or managers may be replaced) not only because the durable economic balance has ceased to exist, but also because it no
longer satisfies the purposes (and expectations) for which it
was established (even if it fulfills the requirement weighed
by the “market”).
Let us focus on these aspects.
The production process—much wider than the borders of
markets—is always a corporate process. In practice, the
company examined in the production process appears to be a
phenomenon without clear boundaries which, however,
naturally exist in its formal management. The crucial point,
therefore, concerns how to achieve the unanimity of production decisions oriented toward the creation of value (not
only considered as financial value).
The principles of the social contract must be contextualized. In this context productions are carried out and, therefore, alternative forms of governance can be imagined
according to the way of mixing sacrifices and benefits.
The governance—that is the realization of the social
contract—determines the formal and real involvement of
some players in defining the choices of the company which,
however, also depends on the behavior of other players
formally excluded from the decision-making processes. The
excluded players are only formally and not even in substance. On the contrary, it may happen that they are also
officially involved—this will depend on the context—due to
higher standards than those concerning governance.
Practical solutions to the problem of the social contract
can be very numerous, although there are currently a limited
number of governance models, some of which clearly prevail over others. The difficulty lies in identifying and
weighing the principles on which to base the “effective
contracts” for the startup of new productions.
Many guiding principles can be imagined determining
governance. Among the most common principles (which can
also coexist also with different weight) on which the governance models of the organizations are based are the following: properties; democratic (at different levels of
extension); realization idea; critical resource; risk tolerance;
prevailing sacrifice; honesty and competence. We can certainly imagine other principles, each of which can be applied
according to different criteria, also made operational by
imagining various parameters.
The empirical problem of the substantial representativeness of governance arises. The sharing of choices of governance must be assessed in relation to the need for timely
decision-making. The freedom to manage the production
process determines some practical problems of considerable
humanistic–environmental importance that must also be
dealt with in legal terms.
Given the constraints that the past choices make to future
decisions (which basically concern the modification of the
structural scenarios of the territories) and the consequences
that the latter will produce on future social equilibriums, the
production models embody the humanistic–environmental
connotations of the communities.
The going concern is based on the ability to conceive and
implement a production program that ensures—bearing
sacrifices—the expected monetary rewards, an essential
condition for all formal players to remain (even if they can
be replaced) voluntarily and durably present as a unit (even
if they are many) in the production process.
The elaboration of the most appropriate activity program
is always relevant, although the issue has often been
addressed by focusing on the producers. Economic processes
are fueled by revenues (usually monetary) provided freely by
customers who use production output.
A reasonable level of investment (in terms of quantity,
quality, prices, places, and times) depends on the expectation
of a balanced satisfaction of the formal players in
production.
Investments must be included in the program of activities
to be carried out, carefully detailed in the overall scenario (in
terms of time, place, price, quantity and quality of production outcomes) and in the methods of covering the capital
requirements generated by them. The going concern is
assured by the virtuous balance also of informal factors.
Considering the main elements of the problem of the size
of the company, overall scenarios can be observed in which
the uncertainty of the going concern may vary according to
the choices made. The most important choices relate particularly to the ability to claim capital and customers, as well
as decisions that give flexibility to the business program.
Flexibility can be achieved through the sharing of resources
with other producers, to reduce the sacrifice (which must
then be remunerated in some way) through collaborations (of
various kinds) that can help reduce the financial needs
associated with the autonomous acquisition of resources.
In short, the size of the company relates to the rational
conception of the overall scenario among the many possible
ones. Each scenario is characterized by uncertainty and risk
208
F. Manni and A. Faccia