on the basis of Art. 56(2) of the 1982 Constitution (also Art. 3(a), Environment
Act), and particularly by those affecting the process directly – legislators,
policy-makers and executives.
Given the current stalemate in the full EU membership process, although the
EU-induced learning processes can still be driving force for Turkey, as mentioned
above, the EU’s conditionality strategy has lost its influence, and it is not anticipated that Turkey will get involved in more ambitious and better coordinated
environmental policies which will be able to provide this internalization in the near
future.
The limits on Turkish civil society – referring to the Taksim Square demonstrations of 2013 (known as the Gezi Park protests) – combined with post-failed
coup attempt measures are regarded as one of the key reasons for this situation
(Werz, 2017). Yet, as mentioned above, due to both sides’ acts and decisions, the
stagnation of EU-Turkey relations had already begun more than a decade ago at the
start of accession negotiations in 2005. Indeed, while Turkey was cooperating with
the EU to be in line with the EU harmonization process, the EU continued to
support Turkish accession in a limited way and failed to give a clear commitment to
its accession.
In the current period, on the EU’s side, the ongoing unclear position of the EU
on Turkey’s membership and the multiple challenges faced by the EU in itself, such
as the Brexit process, the rise of right wing politics, authoritarian tendencies in
some member states (e.g. Hungary and Poland), and the economic crisis, make it
complicated for the EU to develop a good strategy which will be acceptable to both
sides. On Turkey’s side, the EU accession process is not on the country’s agenda
due to other previously mentioned priorities; sometimes the suspension of relations
with the EU and alternatively getting engaged with other regions can even be
suggested by the ruling party. Moreover, because the change in Turkey’s governmental system from a parliamentary to a presidential system, with constitutional
changes approved in the referendum of 16 April 2017, came into effect with the
presidential election held on 24 June 2018, and because the effects of this on the
legal and institutional structure and processes of the country are still in the
development stage, it is not possible to predict their effects on Turkey’s environmental law and politics with any certainty. However, due to security concerns and
political and economic fluctuations in the country, it is unlikely that environmental
issues will be one of Turkey’s priority areas in the near future.
References
Akgündüz, Ahmet (2009). İslam ve Osmanlı Çevre Hukuku [Islam and Ottoman Environmental
Law], Osmanlı Araşt (Istanbul: Vakfı).
Aydın-Düzgit, S.; Kaliber, A. (2016). “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and
International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?”, in: South European
Society and Politics, 21, 1: 1–14.
24
Z. Savaşan
Act), and particularly by those affecting the process directly – legislators,
policy-makers and executives.
Given the current stalemate in the full EU membership process, although the
EU-induced learning processes can still be driving force for Turkey, as mentioned
above, the EU’s conditionality strategy has lost its influence, and it is not anticipated that Turkey will get involved in more ambitious and better coordinated
environmental policies which will be able to provide this internalization in the near
future.
The limits on Turkish civil society – referring to the Taksim Square demonstrations of 2013 (known as the Gezi Park protests) – combined with post-failed
coup attempt measures are regarded as one of the key reasons for this situation
(Werz, 2017). Yet, as mentioned above, due to both sides’ acts and decisions, the
stagnation of EU-Turkey relations had already begun more than a decade ago at the
start of accession negotiations in 2005. Indeed, while Turkey was cooperating with
the EU to be in line with the EU harmonization process, the EU continued to
support Turkish accession in a limited way and failed to give a clear commitment to
its accession.
In the current period, on the EU’s side, the ongoing unclear position of the EU
on Turkey’s membership and the multiple challenges faced by the EU in itself, such
as the Brexit process, the rise of right wing politics, authoritarian tendencies in
some member states (e.g. Hungary and Poland), and the economic crisis, make it
complicated for the EU to develop a good strategy which will be acceptable to both
sides. On Turkey’s side, the EU accession process is not on the country’s agenda
due to other previously mentioned priorities; sometimes the suspension of relations
with the EU and alternatively getting engaged with other regions can even be
suggested by the ruling party. Moreover, because the change in Turkey’s governmental system from a parliamentary to a presidential system, with constitutional
changes approved in the referendum of 16 April 2017, came into effect with the
presidential election held on 24 June 2018, and because the effects of this on the
legal and institutional structure and processes of the country are still in the
development stage, it is not possible to predict their effects on Turkey’s environmental law and politics with any certainty. However, due to security concerns and
political and economic fluctuations in the country, it is unlikely that environmental
issues will be one of Turkey’s priority areas in the near future.
References
Akgündüz, Ahmet (2009). İslam ve Osmanlı Çevre Hukuku [Islam and Ottoman Environmental
Law], Osmanlı Araşt (Istanbul: Vakfı).
Aydın-Düzgit, S.; Kaliber, A. (2016). “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and
International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?”, in: South European
Society and Politics, 21, 1: 1–14.
24
Z. Savaşan