Overall, it could be argued that the rise of environmental awareness and sensitivity to environmental problems in Turkey reached its highest levels in the 2000s
because of the impact of the EU accession process. The EU conditionality strategy
arising from the accession process indeed played the most important role in
developing environmental law and policies up to the opening of accession negotiations in October 2005.
30 Although its influence began to decrease after that, the
EU-style of policy-making is still partly implemented in practice,
31 and there are at
least some minor changes which can be traced. However, Turkey’s recent situation,
which is mostly dominated by hotly disputed political, economic and security
issues,
32 has the potential to create an obstacle to environmental issues being a
priority on the country’s agenda.
30
The stagnation after October 2005 results from both sides due to the following reasons:
On the EU’s side: Opposition of some member states to Turkish EU membership (see
Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016; Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, 2012; Kubicek, 2011; Yılmaz,
2014; Parker, 2009), enlargement fatigue in the EU (see Szolucha, 2010), the world/EU financial
crisis (see Braun and Tausendfund, 2014), and the rise of Islamophobia in Europe (Saz, 2011).
On Turkey’s side: Perception of unfair treatment/decline in support for EU membership (see
Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, 2012), the domestic context in Turkey (see Kalaycıoğlu, 2011),
decreasing governmental interest in EU membership (see Özbudun, 2014; Kaliber, 2014), granting
a more crucial role to the alternative economic and geostrategic options than to Western ties (see
Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009).
31
This is because of the impact of a number of high-level visits, Leaders’ meetings in May 2017
and March 2018 and a High Level Political Dialogue in July 2017, with dialogue opportunities on
foreign and security policy, notably on Syria, Libya and Iraq, and a counter-terrorism dialogue
held in November 2017, with cooperation in the areas of energy, transport and economy and trade,
supported by high level dialogues (European Commission, 2018: 3); and because of the long-term
effects of the projects of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) “result[ing] in new
institutional constraints, or stipulating social learning processes…” (Bürgin, 2016: 106).
32
E.g. there are very critical security challenges specifically in the south-east part of the country. In
fact, Turkey has been struck by several deadly terrorist attacks by PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
and Da’esh (Arabic acronym: Dawlat al-Islamiyah f’al-Iraq wa al-Sham) in the recent period,
specifically just before the failed coup attempt period; there is an ongoing Syrian civil war and
asylum problem resulting from that war on Turkey’s borders, leading to an EU-Turkey Joint
Action Plan to halt irregular bulk refugee flow into the EU (European Commission, 2015);
cross-border/counter-terrorist operations (such as Operation Euphrates Shield, launched in August
2016; Operation Sinjar, launched in April 2017; Operation Idlib Shield, launched in October 2017;
and Olive Branch Operation [Operation Afrin], launched in March 2018) were conducted by the
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to fight against terrorism and to prevent a terror corridor forming
along its southern borderline by PKK – listed as a terrorist organization not just by Turkey, by also
the USA and the EU – its Syrian offshoot, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its armed wing,
the People’s Protection Units (YPG); Turkey’s new agenda was mostly dominated by security
issues and political debate over the new governmental system adopted after a hotly disputed
referendum on 16 April 2017, the presidential election on 24 June 2018, local elections on 31
March 2019, and, after that, by the economic troubles which escalated soon after the presidential
elections and were still going on at the time of writing.
22
Z. Savaşan
because of the impact of the EU accession process. The EU conditionality strategy
arising from the accession process indeed played the most important role in
developing environmental law and policies up to the opening of accession negotiations in October 2005.
30 Although its influence began to decrease after that, the
EU-style of policy-making is still partly implemented in practice,
31 and there are at
least some minor changes which can be traced. However, Turkey’s recent situation,
which is mostly dominated by hotly disputed political, economic and security
issues,
32 has the potential to create an obstacle to environmental issues being a
priority on the country’s agenda.
30
The stagnation after October 2005 results from both sides due to the following reasons:
On the EU’s side: Opposition of some member states to Turkish EU membership (see
Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016; Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, 2012; Kubicek, 2011; Yılmaz,
2014; Parker, 2009), enlargement fatigue in the EU (see Szolucha, 2010), the world/EU financial
crisis (see Braun and Tausendfund, 2014), and the rise of Islamophobia in Europe (Saz, 2011).
On Turkey’s side: Perception of unfair treatment/decline in support for EU membership (see
Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, 2012), the domestic context in Turkey (see Kalaycıoğlu, 2011),
decreasing governmental interest in EU membership (see Özbudun, 2014; Kaliber, 2014), granting
a more crucial role to the alternative economic and geostrategic options than to Western ties (see
Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009).
31
This is because of the impact of a number of high-level visits, Leaders’ meetings in May 2017
and March 2018 and a High Level Political Dialogue in July 2017, with dialogue opportunities on
foreign and security policy, notably on Syria, Libya and Iraq, and a counter-terrorism dialogue
held in November 2017, with cooperation in the areas of energy, transport and economy and trade,
supported by high level dialogues (European Commission, 2018: 3); and because of the long-term
effects of the projects of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) “result[ing] in new
institutional constraints, or stipulating social learning processes…” (Bürgin, 2016: 106).
32
E.g. there are very critical security challenges specifically in the south-east part of the country. In
fact, Turkey has been struck by several deadly terrorist attacks by PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
and Da’esh (Arabic acronym: Dawlat al-Islamiyah f’al-Iraq wa al-Sham) in the recent period,
specifically just before the failed coup attempt period; there is an ongoing Syrian civil war and
asylum problem resulting from that war on Turkey’s borders, leading to an EU-Turkey Joint
Action Plan to halt irregular bulk refugee flow into the EU (European Commission, 2015);
cross-border/counter-terrorist operations (such as Operation Euphrates Shield, launched in August
2016; Operation Sinjar, launched in April 2017; Operation Idlib Shield, launched in October 2017;
and Olive Branch Operation [Operation Afrin], launched in March 2018) were conducted by the
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to fight against terrorism and to prevent a terror corridor forming
along its southern borderline by PKK – listed as a terrorist organization not just by Turkey, by also
the USA and the EU – its Syrian offshoot, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its armed wing,
the People’s Protection Units (YPG); Turkey’s new agenda was mostly dominated by security
issues and political debate over the new governmental system adopted after a hotly disputed
referendum on 16 April 2017, the presidential election on 24 June 2018, local elections on 31
March 2019, and, after that, by the economic troubles which escalated soon after the presidential
elections and were still going on at the time of writing.
22
Z. Savaşan