48 – Reflection: asking questions and proposing answers
approach might be pressing the wrong buttons in Moscow
and became more conciliatory and diplomatic in his
approach.
r Developments in the Soviet Union, especially the rise to
power of Gorbachev: he perceived how the USSR was
economically and militarily over-extended, unable to keep
up with American arms spending.
r Developments in eastern Europe: Gorbachev gradually
reduced the dependence, economic and strategic, of eastern
European states on the Soviet Union and, unlike his
predecessors, refused to guarantee Soviet intervention if
these countries faced internal unrest, e.g. East Germany and
Poland.
r Developments in western Europe: the growing economic
strength and way of life of the then European Community
(EC) provided a constant enticement to east Europeans,
especially in Hungary and Poland, to once again become
part of the European economy – which west European
leaders actively encouraged. Another, quite different,
western European factor was the British PM Margaret
Thatcher’s influence on both Gorbachev and Reagan.
r The rest of the world: the Soviet economy became incapable
of supporting its client states in the rest of the world, e.g.
Afghanistan, Cuba and parts of Africa were cut out from
Moscow’s spheres of interest. [Perhaps this is not especially
relevant to the fall of the Berlin Wall and could be dropped.]
r Non-regional/geographic factors: the ‘internal’ decay of
Communist ideology in the Soviet Union and a growing
interest there in western Europe’s ‘social model’.
r Possible conclusion? When Reagan called on Gorbachev to
‘tear down this wall’ in 1987, it was mostly bellicose rhetoric
for public consumption. Reagan was already, probably quite
consciously, ‘pushing at an open door’ rather than engaging
in ‘hawkish’ policies.
approach might be pressing the wrong buttons in Moscow
and became more conciliatory and diplomatic in his
approach.
r Developments in the Soviet Union, especially the rise to
power of Gorbachev: he perceived how the USSR was
economically and militarily over-extended, unable to keep
up with American arms spending.
r Developments in eastern Europe: Gorbachev gradually
reduced the dependence, economic and strategic, of eastern
European states on the Soviet Union and, unlike his
predecessors, refused to guarantee Soviet intervention if
these countries faced internal unrest, e.g. East Germany and
Poland.
r Developments in western Europe: the growing economic
strength and way of life of the then European Community
(EC) provided a constant enticement to east Europeans,
especially in Hungary and Poland, to once again become
part of the European economy – which west European
leaders actively encouraged. Another, quite different,
western European factor was the British PM Margaret
Thatcher’s influence on both Gorbachev and Reagan.
r The rest of the world: the Soviet economy became incapable
of supporting its client states in the rest of the world, e.g.
Afghanistan, Cuba and parts of Africa were cut out from
Moscow’s spheres of interest. [Perhaps this is not especially
relevant to the fall of the Berlin Wall and could be dropped.]
r Non-regional/geographic factors: the ‘internal’ decay of
Communist ideology in the Soviet Union and a growing
interest there in western Europe’s ‘social model’.
r Possible conclusion? When Reagan called on Gorbachev to
‘tear down this wall’ in 1987, it was mostly bellicose rhetoric
for public consumption. Reagan was already, probably quite
consciously, ‘pushing at an open door’ rather than engaging
in ‘hawkish’ policies.