143
The policy framework shown in Table 10.3 is supported by various institutional stakeholders. Policy analysis and field observations showed there is an
active involvement of key organizations such as the Geological Mining Service
(SERGEOMIN), the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), the National
Service for Minerals Commercialization’s Control and Registration
(SENARECOM), universities, and NGOs. Although miners have initiated collaborative processes with these institutions, they find it difficult to convey their
governance aspirations in a multi-stakeholder scenario. Despite a strong policy
framework, SSM governance is threatened mainly by lack of miners’ capacity to
communicate SSM priority areas for capacity-building and incorporate them
into the national governance agenda. Unsustainable SSM practices, rudimentary
infrastructure and transport, lack of energy sources and water, and precarious
administrative structures are areas in which locals need to build their capacity.
Miners agree these challenges are likely to be resolved through capacity-building that target priority areas for sustainable SSM governance (CANAMIL 2015).
10.4.1.2 Governance: Stakeholder Collaboration
At the beginning of the 1990s, the government closed the National Mining Bank
(BANIM). BANIM was accountable for allocating loans to SMM. SSM loans were
paid to BANIM through mineral production and were subsequently exported and
discounted from SSM debt. This banking system became unsustainable as miners
lacked financial planning education to be accountable for debts and revenue management. BANIM was bankrupted and SSM became a high-risk debtor. In response,
the government issued Decree 22862 in 1991 to proceed with BANIM’s closure
(Congreso Nacional de la Republica de Bolivia 1991b). Subsequently, the government proposed the creation of the mining development fund for SSM. The fund was
aimed to provide finance and technical assistance. However, the fund was hesitant
to engage with SSM, and no concrete projects were developed as debt collection
issues remained critical. At that time, SSM was still considered a high-risk debtor.
In addition to poor SSM reputation, SSM marketing and financing systems were
transferred to the private sector. This situation also jeopardized international cooperation’s funding for SSM.
There was no way out for miners, and international and domestic precepts kept
making them accountable for the sustainability of SSM operations. In response,
miners tapped on stakeholder collaboration for capacity-building in priority areas to
secure their only livelihood option. However, there was uncertainty about priority
areas for SSM governance and to what extent they were valuable for miners. Various
focus groups were carried out to better understand miners’ priorities and assist them
in fostering sustainable solutions to become active participants in Bolivia’s resource
governance (CANAMIL 2015).
10 SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
The policy framework shown in Table 10.3 is supported by various institutional stakeholders. Policy analysis and field observations showed there is an
active involvement of key organizations such as the Geological Mining Service
(SERGEOMIN), the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), the National
Service for Minerals Commercialization’s Control and Registration
(SENARECOM), universities, and NGOs. Although miners have initiated collaborative processes with these institutions, they find it difficult to convey their
governance aspirations in a multi-stakeholder scenario. Despite a strong policy
framework, SSM governance is threatened mainly by lack of miners’ capacity to
communicate SSM priority areas for capacity-building and incorporate them
into the national governance agenda. Unsustainable SSM practices, rudimentary
infrastructure and transport, lack of energy sources and water, and precarious
administrative structures are areas in which locals need to build their capacity.
Miners agree these challenges are likely to be resolved through capacity-building that target priority areas for sustainable SSM governance (CANAMIL 2015).
10.4.1.2 Governance: Stakeholder Collaboration
At the beginning of the 1990s, the government closed the National Mining Bank
(BANIM). BANIM was accountable for allocating loans to SMM. SSM loans were
paid to BANIM through mineral production and were subsequently exported and
discounted from SSM debt. This banking system became unsustainable as miners
lacked financial planning education to be accountable for debts and revenue management. BANIM was bankrupted and SSM became a high-risk debtor. In response,
the government issued Decree 22862 in 1991 to proceed with BANIM’s closure
(Congreso Nacional de la Republica de Bolivia 1991b). Subsequently, the government proposed the creation of the mining development fund for SSM. The fund was
aimed to provide finance and technical assistance. However, the fund was hesitant
to engage with SSM, and no concrete projects were developed as debt collection
issues remained critical. At that time, SSM was still considered a high-risk debtor.
In addition to poor SSM reputation, SSM marketing and financing systems were
transferred to the private sector. This situation also jeopardized international cooperation’s funding for SSM.
There was no way out for miners, and international and domestic precepts kept
making them accountable for the sustainability of SSM operations. In response,
miners tapped on stakeholder collaboration for capacity-building in priority areas to
secure their only livelihood option. However, there was uncertainty about priority
areas for SSM governance and to what extent they were valuable for miners. Various
focus groups were carried out to better understand miners’ priorities and assist them
in fostering sustainable solutions to become active participants in Bolivia’s resource
governance (CANAMIL 2015).
10 SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure