20.2.5 Release Applications for Biological Control Agents
A separate process to ensure that the introduction and release of classical biological
agents for alien plants poses an acceptable environmental risk has been highly
efficient (Moran et al. 2005). The levels of risk and protocols followed are based
on international best practice, and largely determined by the research community
itself. As a result, the process for assessing risks of the deliberate release of
biological control agents against various invasive alien plants is very sophisticated
and includes the collection of new data and conducting of experiments under
quarantine over several years (Klein et al. 2011; for more information on biological
control, see Hill et al. 2020, Chap. 19). These experiments include host-specificity
tests to make sure the agent only feeds on or attacks the target species to be
controlled and no other, closely related native plants and crops. All these experiments take place in secure quarantine facilities which reduces the risk of
unintentional release of the species under investigation and allows for the screening
of parasites and pathogens on the potential agent. Permit applications for the release
of biological control agents, including an estimate of the likelihood and consequences of non-target effects and an assessment on the potential benefits of the
introduction, are compiled by a dedicated team of scientists and submitted to the
decision making body (in this case chaired by DALRRD). The applications including the risk assessments are then reviewed by an independent panel of experts similar
to ASRARP, namely the National Biological Control Release Application Review
Committee (Zachariades et al. 2017), and sent for review to international experts.
The record of safety is enviable. Despite South Africa being among the top five
countries globally with regard to the use of weed biological control, no direct
significant non-target effects of weed biological control agents in South Africa
have been detected over the past century (Moran et al. 2005).
20.3 Conclusions
South Africa’s environment and biodiversity need to be protected from the negative
impacts of biological invasions (see Le Maitre et al. 2020, Chap. 15; O’Connor and
van Wilgen 2020, Chap. 16; Zengeya et al. 2020, Chap. 17). Risk analysis can aid
towards reaching this goal insofar as it can help us distinguish the “good” from the
“bad” alien species. Furthermore, there are clear economic benefits that come about
by using risk analyses to underpin management decisions on alien species (e.g.
Keller et al. 2007). This chapter provides guidelines on how to optimise the use of
risk analysis to regulate imports and permitting of alien species and to underpin
decisions regarding their management.
However, risk analyses have limitations. They can provide important information
to prioritise species for management, but risk analyses are not, by themselves,
prioritisation tools. Decisions as to which species to manage, and how, depend on
20 Analysing the Risks Posed by Biological Invasions to South Africa
591
A separate process to ensure that the introduction and release of classical biological
agents for alien plants poses an acceptable environmental risk has been highly
efficient (Moran et al. 2005). The levels of risk and protocols followed are based
on international best practice, and largely determined by the research community
itself. As a result, the process for assessing risks of the deliberate release of
biological control agents against various invasive alien plants is very sophisticated
and includes the collection of new data and conducting of experiments under
quarantine over several years (Klein et al. 2011; for more information on biological
control, see Hill et al. 2020, Chap. 19). These experiments include host-specificity
tests to make sure the agent only feeds on or attacks the target species to be
controlled and no other, closely related native plants and crops. All these experiments take place in secure quarantine facilities which reduces the risk of
unintentional release of the species under investigation and allows for the screening
of parasites and pathogens on the potential agent. Permit applications for the release
of biological control agents, including an estimate of the likelihood and consequences of non-target effects and an assessment on the potential benefits of the
introduction, are compiled by a dedicated team of scientists and submitted to the
decision making body (in this case chaired by DALRRD). The applications including the risk assessments are then reviewed by an independent panel of experts similar
to ASRARP, namely the National Biological Control Release Application Review
Committee (Zachariades et al. 2017), and sent for review to international experts.
The record of safety is enviable. Despite South Africa being among the top five
countries globally with regard to the use of weed biological control, no direct
significant non-target effects of weed biological control agents in South Africa
have been detected over the past century (Moran et al. 2005).
20.3 Conclusions
South Africa’s environment and biodiversity need to be protected from the negative
impacts of biological invasions (see Le Maitre et al. 2020, Chap. 15; O’Connor and
van Wilgen 2020, Chap. 16; Zengeya et al. 2020, Chap. 17). Risk analysis can aid
towards reaching this goal insofar as it can help us distinguish the “good” from the
“bad” alien species. Furthermore, there are clear economic benefits that come about
by using risk analyses to underpin management decisions on alien species (e.g.
Keller et al. 2007). This chapter provides guidelines on how to optimise the use of
risk analysis to regulate imports and permitting of alien species and to underpin
decisions regarding their management.
However, risk analyses have limitations. They can provide important information
to prioritise species for management, but risk analyses are not, by themselves,
prioritisation tools. Decisions as to which species to manage, and how, depend on
20 Analysing the Risks Posed by Biological Invasions to South Africa
591