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integrity, and an intercropping or rotation of nitrogen-fixing legumes to help maintain soil fertility.
Today, this set of practices is commonly known as conservation agriculture
(CA), promoted in various forms in agricultural areas across the world. In settings
where goals extend beyond erosion control to the regulatory and habitat services
provided by forests, the principles of CA may be tied with those of agroforestry, in
what has been called “Conservation Agriculture with Trees” (CAWT). The request
on land users may also be simply to refrain from cropping entirely.
However beneficial CA or CAWT might be for the landscape, encouraging farmers to practice them can be difficult as “[Actions] that are optimal for farmers are not
necessarily consistent with their societies’ interests” (Montgomery 2007; p.237).
In particular, though practicing CA can bring benefits to farmers in the mid- to
long-term, it brings more costs and risks in the short term, as weeding efforts
increase, crop residues spread out on plots are no longer available for burning or as
forage for animals, and hardpans of long-tilled, compacted soils get waterlogged
and damage crops. Under such conditions, an incentive is often necessary for the
short term to encourage farmers to try; where preserving or restoring ecosystem
services requires farmers to cultivate less (or no) land, the need to provide an incentive is even clearer and may be needed in perpetuity.
Such incentives may take the form of subsidies or other support from government agencies (Pannell et al. 2006), though these programs often have limited life
spans, and it is common to see farmers stop the encouraged practice once incentives
stop flowing (Andersson and D’Souza 2014). Ideally, a party or parties are willing
to pay farmers to keep up their practices indefinitely, and where this is the case (and
that willingness can be channeled effectively), there is potential for payments for
ecosystem services (PES) program.
It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a detailed examination of payment for
ecosystem services. However, there are a few key metrics of what kind of agricultural systems might be good candidates:
First and foremost, agricultural systems where changes in the practices of one group
of resource users would make an economic difference in the lives of some other
group of individuals or firms; to the extent that those affected would be willing
to pay for the change; where those being paid are among the poorer members of
society; PES has the greatest potential to contribute toward both ecosystem services provision and poverty alleviation.
Second, agricultural systems where payments from buyers can be easily pooled, and
where payments to providers can be easily distributed, so that transaction costs
do not overwhelm the potential gains from trade.
In the case of erosion control services, smallholder fishers benefiting from
improved aquatic habitats might not be able to pay much for the service, nor would
it be easy to pool any payments they might be able to make; on the other hand, beneficiaries of electricity from a hydropower provider (a direct beneficiary of erosion
control services) have their payments pooled through the billing process (Bell et al.
2016); to the extent that farmers are accessible as groups through cooperatives or
N. Matthews et al.
integrity, and an intercropping or rotation of nitrogen-fixing legumes to help maintain soil fertility.
Today, this set of practices is commonly known as conservation agriculture
(CA), promoted in various forms in agricultural areas across the world. In settings
where goals extend beyond erosion control to the regulatory and habitat services
provided by forests, the principles of CA may be tied with those of agroforestry, in
what has been called “Conservation Agriculture with Trees” (CAWT). The request
on land users may also be simply to refrain from cropping entirely.
However beneficial CA or CAWT might be for the landscape, encouraging farmers to practice them can be difficult as “[Actions] that are optimal for farmers are not
necessarily consistent with their societies’ interests” (Montgomery 2007; p.237).
In particular, though practicing CA can bring benefits to farmers in the mid- to
long-term, it brings more costs and risks in the short term, as weeding efforts
increase, crop residues spread out on plots are no longer available for burning or as
forage for animals, and hardpans of long-tilled, compacted soils get waterlogged
and damage crops. Under such conditions, an incentive is often necessary for the
short term to encourage farmers to try; where preserving or restoring ecosystem
services requires farmers to cultivate less (or no) land, the need to provide an incentive is even clearer and may be needed in perpetuity.
Such incentives may take the form of subsidies or other support from government agencies (Pannell et al. 2006), though these programs often have limited life
spans, and it is common to see farmers stop the encouraged practice once incentives
stop flowing (Andersson and D’Souza 2014). Ideally, a party or parties are willing
to pay farmers to keep up their practices indefinitely, and where this is the case (and
that willingness can be channeled effectively), there is potential for payments for
ecosystem services (PES) program.
It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a detailed examination of payment for
ecosystem services. However, there are a few key metrics of what kind of agricultural systems might be good candidates:
First and foremost, agricultural systems where changes in the practices of one group
of resource users would make an economic difference in the lives of some other
group of individuals or firms; to the extent that those affected would be willing
to pay for the change; where those being paid are among the poorer members of
society; PES has the greatest potential to contribute toward both ecosystem services provision and poverty alleviation.
Second, agricultural systems where payments from buyers can be easily pooled, and
where payments to providers can be easily distributed, so that transaction costs
do not overwhelm the potential gains from trade.
In the case of erosion control services, smallholder fishers benefiting from
improved aquatic habitats might not be able to pay much for the service, nor would
it be easy to pool any payments they might be able to make; on the other hand, beneficiaries of electricity from a hydropower provider (a direct beneficiary of erosion
control services) have their payments pooled through the billing process (Bell et al.
2016); to the extent that farmers are accessible as groups through cooperatives or
N. Matthews et al.