requirements. We argue that, by joining such a SCL scheme, a private organisation
essentially adopts a CSR strategy to ensure and prove the responsibility of its
actions. Therefore, in this chapter, we consider that joining a SCL scheme is a
manifestation of a CSR activity. Indeed, private companies have incentives to join
such SCL schemes to prove their responsible behaviour to stakeholders, consumers,
financiers and public legislators (Bracco 2016; Van Gelder and German 2011).
Participation in certification SCL schemes can also reduce the information gap
between producers, consumers and regulators (Scarlat and Dallemand 2011; Bracco
2015; Zezza 2013), receive guidance and support to comply with environmental and
social standards. In fact, SCL schemes aim at managing various stages of regulation
such as agenda-setting, negotiations of standards, implementation and monitoring of
practices and enforcement of principles (Roberts 1992). Process standards that track
the environmental and social conditions under which agricultural commodities
(e.g. food crops, biofuel feedstocks) are produced and/or traded are increasingly
becoming popular (Zezza 2013). They have thus the potential to promote better
production practices, quality and transparency along the entire supply chain of
agricultural commodities (Van Dam et al. 2008, 2010).
However, individual companies and investors have different ‘pressure points’,
which might be used to influence their behaviour in terms of responsibility and the
decision to join voluntary standards and certification schemes (Cotula and Blackmore 2014). Energy policy can be such a leverage point to pressure investors to
adopt responsible practices in order to avoid losing political and financial support
and market access. In fact, the European Commission requires that the biofuels and
feedstocks entering its market meet some environmental and social sustainability
criteria in order to be eligible to receive governmental support and to count towards
the Renewable Energy Directive targets (2009/28/EC, Article 17). For example, in
order to comply with the EU RED requirements, biofuels should reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission by 35% (Art. 17.2) and be produced with feedstock originating from
land with high biodiversity value and high carbon stocks (e.g. peatland) (Art. 17.3-4-5).
In order to verify compliance to these standards, the EU does not rely on a proper
regulatory framework, but follows a principle of double delegation (Zezza 2013).
Compliance with these sustainability criteria is verified through private voluntary
schemes approved by the Commission (Table 4.1), national systems of compliance
that each Member-State is required to develop, or by bilateral or multilateral
agreement with third parties (2009/28/EC, Article 17).
Further to the voluntary schemes approved by the European Commission
(Table 4.1), investors can adopt various other types of SCL schemes such as:
• commodity-specific initiatives (e.g. UTZ),
• schemes addressing forest-related investments (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC); Rainforest Alliance (RA)),
• initiatives related to the financial sector (e.g. the Equator Principles (EP)),
• other relevant governance instruments (e.g. the EU Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS), the United Nations Global Compact, standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)),
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M. Antonelli et al.
essentially adopts a CSR strategy to ensure and prove the responsibility of its
actions. Therefore, in this chapter, we consider that joining a SCL scheme is a
manifestation of a CSR activity. Indeed, private companies have incentives to join
such SCL schemes to prove their responsible behaviour to stakeholders, consumers,
financiers and public legislators (Bracco 2016; Van Gelder and German 2011).
Participation in certification SCL schemes can also reduce the information gap
between producers, consumers and regulators (Scarlat and Dallemand 2011; Bracco
2015; Zezza 2013), receive guidance and support to comply with environmental and
social standards. In fact, SCL schemes aim at managing various stages of regulation
such as agenda-setting, negotiations of standards, implementation and monitoring of
practices and enforcement of principles (Roberts 1992). Process standards that track
the environmental and social conditions under which agricultural commodities
(e.g. food crops, biofuel feedstocks) are produced and/or traded are increasingly
becoming popular (Zezza 2013). They have thus the potential to promote better
production practices, quality and transparency along the entire supply chain of
agricultural commodities (Van Dam et al. 2008, 2010).
However, individual companies and investors have different ‘pressure points’,
which might be used to influence their behaviour in terms of responsibility and the
decision to join voluntary standards and certification schemes (Cotula and Blackmore 2014). Energy policy can be such a leverage point to pressure investors to
adopt responsible practices in order to avoid losing political and financial support
and market access. In fact, the European Commission requires that the biofuels and
feedstocks entering its market meet some environmental and social sustainability
criteria in order to be eligible to receive governmental support and to count towards
the Renewable Energy Directive targets (2009/28/EC, Article 17). For example, in
order to comply with the EU RED requirements, biofuels should reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission by 35% (Art. 17.2) and be produced with feedstock originating from
land with high biodiversity value and high carbon stocks (e.g. peatland) (Art. 17.3-4-5).
In order to verify compliance to these standards, the EU does not rely on a proper
regulatory framework, but follows a principle of double delegation (Zezza 2013).
Compliance with these sustainability criteria is verified through private voluntary
schemes approved by the Commission (Table 4.1), national systems of compliance
that each Member-State is required to develop, or by bilateral or multilateral
agreement with third parties (2009/28/EC, Article 17).
Further to the voluntary schemes approved by the European Commission
(Table 4.1), investors can adopt various other types of SCL schemes such as:
• commodity-specific initiatives (e.g. UTZ),
• schemes addressing forest-related investments (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC); Rainforest Alliance (RA)),
• initiatives related to the financial sector (e.g. the Equator Principles (EP)),
• other relevant governance instruments (e.g. the EU Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS), the United Nations Global Compact, standards from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)),
142
M. Antonelli et al.