66
such lofty plausibility: His every observation, however detailed, was steeped in a
foreknowledge of inconceivability. Thoreau provided us a pivotal framework for
understanding paradox, where minutiae are swept away by principles and, simultaneously, vice versa. One could also see this dynamic in ancient Asiatic contexts,
whether Jain, Hindu, or Buddhist schools of Yoga, for example.
The history of skepticism is thoroughly adulterated by the very cornerstones of
fallacious thought and action. First-order logic, existential quantification, rational
connectives, a syntax containing symbols, categorical propositions, major and
minor premises, and the conclusive moral syllogisms that may result are all subject
to abstraction and emptiness. Such fallacy-embroidered, calculus-inducing strategies are merely parallel depictions of arguments, affirmations, appeals and denials,
correlations and equivocations, inferences predicated on arbitrary causations—cum
hoc ergo propter hoc; post hoc ergo propter hoc—with, and/or after this, therefore
this, and so on. In other words, the history of logic, in the face of skepticism, and
underscored by ecological vagaries, is as dense with human confusion as is that
span of known paradoxes. The gradations of truth and falsity values, as implicated
by levels of non-confidence—the burden of skeptically undermined reasoning, lie
within the nature of the references, projections, and conclusions. A fallacy incites
little reason to be overwrought. Whereas a paradox can describe something seriously wrong, and simultaneously wanting for any conceivable solution. Such want
intimates endless turning points. Which is not to simply turn dismissive, but to
acknowledge that human perception of it is a variable independent of time. It can
take the span of multiple generations before an apprehension of any ethical consensus, for example, is united.
The fallacy of bifurcation, or of the false dilemma, is a case in point. The world
is neither all green nor all blue. There are myriad other propositions that neither
conform to, nor should abide by, the assertion that an axiom is either this or that.
The premise is wrong. The assertion is wrong. The axiom is also wrong. But to
declare something is wrong also invokes fact-value distinctions that can be described
as moralistic, or informationally fallacious. Those, in turn, are subject to a massive
critique in the form of a shortcoming known as “proof by assertion.” Or of “proving
too much.” In other words, there is nothing that human consciousness, in good faith,
can communicate without falling subject to material consequences that are mental
in nature and easily prone to every sophistry. The so-called “Nirvana Fallacy” is the
ultimate reductionist problem for those concerned with fallacious thinking: If it is
not perfect, then it is inaccurate, the equivalent, by degree, of an irrational number.
Every fallacy can be described by a regression analysis: Independent variables,
two or more, acting upon a single dependent variable. The crux of such a tool is the
second-order resulting line, through-story, interpretive outcome. Semantics, flimsy
comparisons, rhetorical randomness, aimless objections, unclear circumstances,
flawed suppositions, all shape interpolations that are no more definitive than random acts of collusion or re-assessment. Art conservation, attribution, provenance
M. Elwes, G. Bell And Sons, Ltd., London, 1912, pp.259–260.
8 Paradoxical Frontiers
such lofty plausibility: His every observation, however detailed, was steeped in a
foreknowledge of inconceivability. Thoreau provided us a pivotal framework for
understanding paradox, where minutiae are swept away by principles and, simultaneously, vice versa. One could also see this dynamic in ancient Asiatic contexts,
whether Jain, Hindu, or Buddhist schools of Yoga, for example.
The history of skepticism is thoroughly adulterated by the very cornerstones of
fallacious thought and action. First-order logic, existential quantification, rational
connectives, a syntax containing symbols, categorical propositions, major and
minor premises, and the conclusive moral syllogisms that may result are all subject
to abstraction and emptiness. Such fallacy-embroidered, calculus-inducing strategies are merely parallel depictions of arguments, affirmations, appeals and denials,
correlations and equivocations, inferences predicated on arbitrary causations—cum
hoc ergo propter hoc; post hoc ergo propter hoc—with, and/or after this, therefore
this, and so on. In other words, the history of logic, in the face of skepticism, and
underscored by ecological vagaries, is as dense with human confusion as is that
span of known paradoxes. The gradations of truth and falsity values, as implicated
by levels of non-confidence—the burden of skeptically undermined reasoning, lie
within the nature of the references, projections, and conclusions. A fallacy incites
little reason to be overwrought. Whereas a paradox can describe something seriously wrong, and simultaneously wanting for any conceivable solution. Such want
intimates endless turning points. Which is not to simply turn dismissive, but to
acknowledge that human perception of it is a variable independent of time. It can
take the span of multiple generations before an apprehension of any ethical consensus, for example, is united.
The fallacy of bifurcation, or of the false dilemma, is a case in point. The world
is neither all green nor all blue. There are myriad other propositions that neither
conform to, nor should abide by, the assertion that an axiom is either this or that.
The premise is wrong. The assertion is wrong. The axiom is also wrong. But to
declare something is wrong also invokes fact-value distinctions that can be described
as moralistic, or informationally fallacious. Those, in turn, are subject to a massive
critique in the form of a shortcoming known as “proof by assertion.” Or of “proving
too much.” In other words, there is nothing that human consciousness, in good faith,
can communicate without falling subject to material consequences that are mental
in nature and easily prone to every sophistry. The so-called “Nirvana Fallacy” is the
ultimate reductionist problem for those concerned with fallacious thinking: If it is
not perfect, then it is inaccurate, the equivalent, by degree, of an irrational number.
Every fallacy can be described by a regression analysis: Independent variables,
two or more, acting upon a single dependent variable. The crux of such a tool is the
second-order resulting line, through-story, interpretive outcome. Semantics, flimsy
comparisons, rhetorical randomness, aimless objections, unclear circumstances,
flawed suppositions, all shape interpolations that are no more definitive than random acts of collusion or re-assessment. Art conservation, attribution, provenance
M. Elwes, G. Bell And Sons, Ltd., London, 1912, pp.259–260.
8 Paradoxical Frontiers