594
it has been asserted, the very human conscience (as well as monogamy, dual-parenting, and other qualities, to varying degree).
5
These are huge attribute delineations and accordingly, a genetical principle, or at
least plausible explanation for social and maternal behaviors that, far downstream,
elicit concerns for others closest to us, within our brain-dominated community
orbits. This currency of social concern is fundamental, because such behaviors ultimately get translated into moral forms of activity. Of course, as mentioned in an
earlier chapter regarding the cockroach “quorum” there is no reason to believe that
those trillions of insects do not also make collective, rational choices that stem from
some, heretofore unexamined, eusocial imperatives that align with moral deliberation at the social level.
This “oxytocin portfolio,” as Churchland points out, is not easily measured,
either in blood or in urine, and most inferences as to what is really going on in our
brains come from research on other mammals, mostly primates and rodents, not
insects, or not as yet.
6
Nor does Churchland unequivocally assert the oxytocin data
as definitive. For example, she is quick to ask, “How our 86 billion neurons work
together so that we talk and do fancy math, so that we create symphonies and parliaments, is not known.” But the fact that every “neuron will make about 10,000
connections with other neurons” easily suggests exponential outcomes, summarized by the declaration, “The remarkable fact is that there is no secret structure
unique to the human brain that creates sophisticated social institutions or art or a
moral conscience. Our brain just has more neurons.”
7
Such unabashed arithmetic is not without its counterpoints. For example, Suzana
Herculano-Housel notes that “the so-called overdeveloped human cerebral cortex
holds only 19% of all brain neurons, a fraction that is similar to that found in other
mammals.” In its internal architecture, among that edifice of scaling of the neocortex layers, there may indeed be anatomical efficiency, but the rules for assessing
such architecture are not without the very bias built into those rules favoring selfinquiry.
8
As Frans De Waal writes of “autonomous conscience” and human conscience within the rubrics of known evolutionary theories, “To give the human
conscience a comfortable place within Darwin’s theory without reducing human
feelings and motives to a complete travesty is one of the greatest challenges to biology today.”
9
There is no “comfortable” reign of the human conscience that can be
explained either by evolution or by natural selection. And that is for two reasons.
First, it is not unique. Conscience, were we to search with requisite tools and
5 ibid., Churchland, p. 61.
6 ibid, Churchland, p. 67.
7 ibid., Churchland, p. 178.
8 See “The Human Brain in Numbers: A Linearly Scaled-up Primate Brain,” Suzana HerculanoHousel, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2009; 3:31, November 9, 2009, doi: https://doi.
org/10.3389/neuro.09.031.2009, PMCID: PMC2776484, PMID: 19915731, https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2776484/. Accessed October 13, 2019.
9 Good Natured – The Origins Of Right And Wrong In Humans And Other Animals, by Frans De
Waal, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996, pp. 91–92, 117.
62 The Synecological Conscience
it has been asserted, the very human conscience (as well as monogamy, dual-parenting, and other qualities, to varying degree).
5
These are huge attribute delineations and accordingly, a genetical principle, or at
least plausible explanation for social and maternal behaviors that, far downstream,
elicit concerns for others closest to us, within our brain-dominated community
orbits. This currency of social concern is fundamental, because such behaviors ultimately get translated into moral forms of activity. Of course, as mentioned in an
earlier chapter regarding the cockroach “quorum” there is no reason to believe that
those trillions of insects do not also make collective, rational choices that stem from
some, heretofore unexamined, eusocial imperatives that align with moral deliberation at the social level.
This “oxytocin portfolio,” as Churchland points out, is not easily measured,
either in blood or in urine, and most inferences as to what is really going on in our
brains come from research on other mammals, mostly primates and rodents, not
insects, or not as yet.
6
Nor does Churchland unequivocally assert the oxytocin data
as definitive. For example, she is quick to ask, “How our 86 billion neurons work
together so that we talk and do fancy math, so that we create symphonies and parliaments, is not known.” But the fact that every “neuron will make about 10,000
connections with other neurons” easily suggests exponential outcomes, summarized by the declaration, “The remarkable fact is that there is no secret structure
unique to the human brain that creates sophisticated social institutions or art or a
moral conscience. Our brain just has more neurons.”
7
Such unabashed arithmetic is not without its counterpoints. For example, Suzana
Herculano-Housel notes that “the so-called overdeveloped human cerebral cortex
holds only 19% of all brain neurons, a fraction that is similar to that found in other
mammals.” In its internal architecture, among that edifice of scaling of the neocortex layers, there may indeed be anatomical efficiency, but the rules for assessing
such architecture are not without the very bias built into those rules favoring selfinquiry.
8
As Frans De Waal writes of “autonomous conscience” and human conscience within the rubrics of known evolutionary theories, “To give the human
conscience a comfortable place within Darwin’s theory without reducing human
feelings and motives to a complete travesty is one of the greatest challenges to biology today.”
9
There is no “comfortable” reign of the human conscience that can be
explained either by evolution or by natural selection. And that is for two reasons.
First, it is not unique. Conscience, were we to search with requisite tools and
5 ibid., Churchland, p. 61.
6 ibid, Churchland, p. 67.
7 ibid., Churchland, p. 178.
8 See “The Human Brain in Numbers: A Linearly Scaled-up Primate Brain,” Suzana HerculanoHousel, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2009; 3:31, November 9, 2009, doi: https://doi.
org/10.3389/neuro.09.031.2009, PMCID: PMC2776484, PMID: 19915731, https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2776484/. Accessed October 13, 2019.
9 Good Natured – The Origins Of Right And Wrong In Humans And Other Animals, by Frans De
Waal, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996, pp. 91–92, 117.
62 The Synecological Conscience