51
2
(known as décroissance). During the last few years, there has been increasing interest in degrowth across Europe in particular where it has grown to a movement of
considerable size with large biennial conferences (D’Alisa et al. 2014). According
to Kallis (2017: 10) degrowth is ‘an equitable down-scaling of production and
consumption that increases human well-being and enhances environmental
conditions’.
The southern European version of political ecology is more closely linked to
activism and socio-environmental transformation with closer associations and
engagements with green political parties and not the least with environmental justice principles and organizations (Martinez-Alier 2002). For instance, in France
écologie politique refers to ‘green or ecological politics’ and to the ideology, politics
and advocacy of the green party (Les Verts). As a consequence, a textbook about
‘mainstream’ English-language-based political ecology in French had to use the
English term (Gautier and Benjaminsen 2012) (see also Benjaminsen and Svarstad
2009; Chartier and Rodary 2015).
The southern European version of political ecology is also less deconstructionist and less critical of claims about ‘degradation’, ‘scarcity’ and ‘limits’. For
instance, the publication of the report about Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome
(Meadows et al. 1972) was instrumental in sparking the emergence of both versions of political ecology, but in different ways; in the Anglophone version it led to
a critique of Malthusianism and its lack of social or class analysis in its presentation of environmental crisis scenarios, but in France the report inspired the emergence of décroissance and écologie politique.
In general, southern European political ecology seems to have had a less
problematic relationship to Malthusianism than what has been the case in ‘mainstream’ English-language-based political ecology, although there are exceptions to
this (Martinez-Alier 2002; Kallis 2019).
Kallis (2019) defends degrowth and argues for ‘self-limitation’, which is different from a Malthusian view of limits. He argues that degrowth supporters like him
do not call for limits because the world is running out of resources, but because
they want to end growth in order to stop ecological and social destruction.
A recent debate between political ecologist Paul Robbins (2020b) and degrowth
supporter Erik Gómez-Baggethun (2020) can also be seen to reflect contrasting
positions across this divide between the two directions of political ecology, although
Robbins’ modernist eco-socialist position may be contested also among ‘mainstream’ political ecologists. Robbins points out that political ecology and degrowth
has many commonalities and are compatible to some extent. But there are also
fundamental differences, it seems:
» First and foremost, political ecology continuously and convincingly has made strong
arguments against natural limits. Whether deconstructing carrying capacity …,
undermining the inanity of Malthusianism …, or challenging the political assumptions of planetary boundaries …, political ecological stories have always pointed to
the way scarcity is a construct that is allied with elite power, not emancipatory process. Degrowth’s insistence on the urgency of less, as a discourse, puts it in friction
with political ecology’s rejection of elitist arguments and policies that advocate
forms of self-denial.’ (Robbins 2020b: 3)
2.6 · Écologie Politique, Ecología Política and Degrowth
Précédent

- 67/260

Suivant