149
6
international action based on the principle of cost-effectiveness and with a large
focus on carbon trade. The win-win discourses on both REDD and climate trade
can be seen as examples of such discourses on specific themes. As the second climate discourse, Adger et al. (2001) identified what we here call a radical climate
discourse that challenges the win-win-discourse, and we find such radical discourses also about REDD and climate trade.
The third climate discourse identified by Adger et al. (2001) expresses scepticism about the existence of serious and human-caused climate change, and provides arguments against the necessity of climate mitigation. This discourse
belongs to the broader group of Prometheus discourses that oppose action to
conserve the environment. This climate sceptic discourse has changed over the
last few years owing to the strengthened evidence of global warming. There are
currently few state leaders who still refuse the idea of serious anthropogenic
climate change. Among the exceptions are the former US President Donald
Trump, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda and Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro.
All three defend their own countries’ economic activities, such as the coal industry in the US and Poland, and expansion of agricultural activities that cause
deforestation in the Amazonas.
6.10 The Case of an Oil-Fed Climate Change Discourse
Let us go back to the early history of climate policy formulation in Norway in
order to understand how the foundation of the present policy was shaped. Hoven
and Lindseth (2004) identified two discourses in Norwegian climate policy debates,
and they called the one that came to dominate ‘thinking globally’. This discourse
is to a large extent in accordance with the international win-win discourse on climate change. They called the other discourse ‘national action’, which had a certain
impact in the early 1990s, but was soon marginalized by ‘thinking globally’.
‘National action’ is more or less in line with the radical climate discourse identified
at the international level, as both emphasize the responsibility of the industrialized
countries in the Global North to reduce their own climate emissions, and both
discourses see climate change as a serious threat, which must be met with substantial mitigation measures.
Towards the end of the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that climate change
constituted a serious global threat. In 1987, the Brundtland Commission recommended that the global consumption of fossil fuels be reduced by 50% over the next
30–40 years. Two years later, Norway with Brundtland as Prime Minister was one
of the first countries to decide a target for reduction of climate emissions. This socalled stabilization target was to stop the growth of CO 2 emissions around year
2000 (Government of Norway 1988–89). However, this aim was soon replaced by a
principle of international cost-effectiveness, which has been central to Norway’s climate policies ever since, and it is based on the combination of two ideas. First, that
climate emissions should be reduced where it is possible to get the largest cuts for
the same amount of money. Second, that reduction of climate emissions is often
likely to be cheaper in other countries, since Norway is one of the most expensive
6.10 · The Case of an Oil-Fed Climate Change Discourse
6
international action based on the principle of cost-effectiveness and with a large
focus on carbon trade. The win-win discourses on both REDD and climate trade
can be seen as examples of such discourses on specific themes. As the second climate discourse, Adger et al. (2001) identified what we here call a radical climate
discourse that challenges the win-win-discourse, and we find such radical discourses also about REDD and climate trade.
The third climate discourse identified by Adger et al. (2001) expresses scepticism about the existence of serious and human-caused climate change, and provides arguments against the necessity of climate mitigation. This discourse
belongs to the broader group of Prometheus discourses that oppose action to
conserve the environment. This climate sceptic discourse has changed over the
last few years owing to the strengthened evidence of global warming. There are
currently few state leaders who still refuse the idea of serious anthropogenic
climate change. Among the exceptions are the former US President Donald
Trump, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda and Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro.
All three defend their own countries’ economic activities, such as the coal industry in the US and Poland, and expansion of agricultural activities that cause
deforestation in the Amazonas.
6.10 The Case of an Oil-Fed Climate Change Discourse
Let us go back to the early history of climate policy formulation in Norway in
order to understand how the foundation of the present policy was shaped. Hoven
and Lindseth (2004) identified two discourses in Norwegian climate policy debates,
and they called the one that came to dominate ‘thinking globally’. This discourse
is to a large extent in accordance with the international win-win discourse on climate change. They called the other discourse ‘national action’, which had a certain
impact in the early 1990s, but was soon marginalized by ‘thinking globally’.
‘National action’ is more or less in line with the radical climate discourse identified
at the international level, as both emphasize the responsibility of the industrialized
countries in the Global North to reduce their own climate emissions, and both
discourses see climate change as a serious threat, which must be met with substantial mitigation measures.
Towards the end of the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that climate change
constituted a serious global threat. In 1987, the Brundtland Commission recommended that the global consumption of fossil fuels be reduced by 50% over the next
30–40 years. Two years later, Norway with Brundtland as Prime Minister was one
of the first countries to decide a target for reduction of climate emissions. This socalled stabilization target was to stop the growth of CO 2 emissions around year
2000 (Government of Norway 1988–89). However, this aim was soon replaced by a
principle of international cost-effectiveness, which has been central to Norway’s climate policies ever since, and it is based on the combination of two ideas. First, that
climate emissions should be reduced where it is possible to get the largest cuts for
the same amount of money. Second, that reduction of climate emissions is often
likely to be cheaper in other countries, since Norway is one of the most expensive
6.10 · The Case of an Oil-Fed Climate Change Discourse