After the flood 71
are hard to mitigate at a property level, and mitigation efforts often involve
major engineering, or retreat. For many people, after a flood there is no
return to business-as-usual, just a growing realisation that their property
will be subject to successive flood events, will lose its resale value, and
that flood insurance may become unaffordable or unavailable. Insurance
that does not enable transformative change to business-as-usual through
adaptation to new normal climate realities can therefore be seen as impeding resilience (O’Hare et al. 2016; de Vet et al. 2019). Community understandings and lived experiences of resilience may also be different to – and
potentially at odds with – insurantial rationalities (Wamsler & Lawson
2011; Adger et al. 2013)
In this chapter, we describe cases of flood and storm damage that
occurred in Hobart, Australia (2018), and Houston, United States (2017).
Using these case studies, we examine the ways in which flood resilience is
discursively and structurally constructed by governments, insurers, and
the public. While these floods took place in very different parts of the
world, with different landscapes, insurance systems and social contexts, we
found some overlap between Hobart and Houston residents’ experiences
of flood insurance, and hence their respective discourses. We investigate
how the experience of insurance (or lack of insurance) affected the resilience
discourse of householders whose homes were flooded. We identify a technocratic discourse of resilience perpetuated by insurers and governments,
which focusses on financial recovery and bounce-back to equilibrium.
Insured householders, however, described their resilience as affected by the
uncertainty created through the insurance experience, and dependent on
their capacity to advocate for their rights in a challenging insurance bureaucracy. The insurance-driven recovery process exposed an uneven landscape
of vulnerability, access to resources, and political power – illustrating insurance’s duality in expediting recovery and amplifying existing disparities. We
find that contrary to the insurance discourses of government and industry,
community resilience is more than financial. We suggest that both insurers
and governments should be mindful of the need for equity and transparency
in order to maintain the social legitimacy of flood insurance.
Weather extremes and insurance in Houston and Hobart
While both are located in western liberal countries, our case studies are in
cities with very different geography, history, development, and riskscapes.
These cities are different in their population and built environment. Hobart
has a largely middle-class, white population of less than 250,000, living in
low-density housing, often close to natural features including forest, creeks,
and coastline. Houston is a massive, sprawling city developed in a low-lying
coastal area. It is one of the most diverse cities in the United States, and its
2.3 million people live in a mix of low- and high-income neighbourhoods,
often segregated along lines of race and ethnicity.
are hard to mitigate at a property level, and mitigation efforts often involve
major engineering, or retreat. For many people, after a flood there is no
return to business-as-usual, just a growing realisation that their property
will be subject to successive flood events, will lose its resale value, and
that flood insurance may become unaffordable or unavailable. Insurance
that does not enable transformative change to business-as-usual through
adaptation to new normal climate realities can therefore be seen as impeding resilience (O’Hare et al. 2016; de Vet et al. 2019). Community understandings and lived experiences of resilience may also be different to – and
potentially at odds with – insurantial rationalities (Wamsler & Lawson
2011; Adger et al. 2013)
In this chapter, we describe cases of flood and storm damage that
occurred in Hobart, Australia (2018), and Houston, United States (2017).
Using these case studies, we examine the ways in which flood resilience is
discursively and structurally constructed by governments, insurers, and
the public. While these floods took place in very different parts of the
world, with different landscapes, insurance systems and social contexts, we
found some overlap between Hobart and Houston residents’ experiences
of flood insurance, and hence their respective discourses. We investigate
how the experience of insurance (or lack of insurance) affected the resilience
discourse of householders whose homes were flooded. We identify a technocratic discourse of resilience perpetuated by insurers and governments,
which focusses on financial recovery and bounce-back to equilibrium.
Insured householders, however, described their resilience as affected by the
uncertainty created through the insurance experience, and dependent on
their capacity to advocate for their rights in a challenging insurance bureaucracy. The insurance-driven recovery process exposed an uneven landscape
of vulnerability, access to resources, and political power – illustrating insurance’s duality in expediting recovery and amplifying existing disparities. We
find that contrary to the insurance discourses of government and industry,
community resilience is more than financial. We suggest that both insurers
and governments should be mindful of the need for equity and transparency
in order to maintain the social legitimacy of flood insurance.
Weather extremes and insurance in Houston and Hobart
While both are located in western liberal countries, our case studies are in
cities with very different geography, history, development, and riskscapes.
These cities are different in their population and built environment. Hobart
has a largely middle-class, white population of less than 250,000, living in
low-density housing, often close to natural features including forest, creeks,
and coastline. Houston is a massive, sprawling city developed in a low-lying
coastal area. It is one of the most diverse cities in the United States, and its
2.3 million people live in a mix of low- and high-income neighbourhoods,
often segregated along lines of race and ethnicity.