68 R Elliott
or for flows of resources that make it possible to fortify the landscape with
structural flood protection. The collective character of flood risk and its
effects cannot be designed away in an algorithm or written out of the social
contract between states and citizens.
The aspiration to eliminate cross-subsidies from flood insurance expresses
a fantasy that we can be extricated from the encumbrances of each other and
that, if we were, we would be empowered to manage on our own. Hanging
onto the aspiration, relentlessly seeking it through new iterations of technical and political strategies, prevents us from considering that we might
deal better with the coming floods by leaning into our interdependence, by
expanding our forms of ‘collective mutuality,’ than we will by denying it or
regarding it as only temporarily tolerable.
References
Anonymous 2014, 8 March, ‘Waves of problems’, The Economist 410, 8877, p. 76.
Baker, T 1996, ‘On the genealogy of moral hazard’, Texas Law Review, vol. 75, no. 2,
pp. 237–292.
Baker, T 2002, ‘Containing the promise of insurance: Adverse selection and risk
classification’, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 371–396.
Baker, T & Simon, J eds. 2002, Embracing risk: The changing culture of insurance
and responsibility, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Christophers, B 2019, ‘The allusive market: Insurance of flood risk in neoliberal
Britain’, Economy and Society, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 1–29.
Collier, S.J 2014, ‘Neoliberalism and natural disaster: Insurance as a political technology of catastrophe’, Journal of Cultural Economy, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 273–290.
Committee on the Affordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums
2015, Affordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums – Report 1.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Elliott, R 2017, ‘Who pays for the next wave? The American welfare state and
responsibility for flood risk’, Politics & Society, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 415–440.
Elliott, R 2021, Underwater: Loss, flood insurance, and the moral economy of climate
change in the United States, New York: Columbia University Press.
FEMA 2021a, Risk Rating 2.0: Equity in Action, viewed 29 April 2021,
Rating%202.0%20enables%20FEMA,and%20decreases%20are%20both%20
equitable.&text=Because%20Risk%20Rating%202.0%20considers,a%20
property’s%20unique%20flood%20risk>.
FEMA 2021b, Risk Rating 2.0 is Equity in Action: Fact Sheet (April 2021), Federal
Emergency Management Agency, viewed 23 April 2021,
Flood Re 2018, Our Vision: Securing a Future of Affordable Flood Insurance,
Horn, D.P 2021, ‘National Flood Insurance Program: The Current Rating Structure
and Risk Rating 2.0.’ Congressional Research Service, R45999.
Kiviat, B 2019, ‘The moral limits of predictive practices: The case of credit-based
insurance scores’, American Sociological Review, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 1134–1158.
or for flows of resources that make it possible to fortify the landscape with
structural flood protection. The collective character of flood risk and its
effects cannot be designed away in an algorithm or written out of the social
contract between states and citizens.
The aspiration to eliminate cross-subsidies from flood insurance expresses
a fantasy that we can be extricated from the encumbrances of each other and
that, if we were, we would be empowered to manage on our own. Hanging
onto the aspiration, relentlessly seeking it through new iterations of technical and political strategies, prevents us from considering that we might
deal better with the coming floods by leaning into our interdependence, by
expanding our forms of ‘collective mutuality,’ than we will by denying it or
regarding it as only temporarily tolerable.
References
Anonymous 2014, 8 March, ‘Waves of problems’, The Economist 410, 8877, p. 76.
Baker, T 1996, ‘On the genealogy of moral hazard’, Texas Law Review, vol. 75, no. 2,
pp. 237–292.
Baker, T 2002, ‘Containing the promise of insurance: Adverse selection and risk
classification’, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 371–396.
Baker, T & Simon, J eds. 2002, Embracing risk: The changing culture of insurance
and responsibility, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Christophers, B 2019, ‘The allusive market: Insurance of flood risk in neoliberal
Britain’, Economy and Society, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 1–29.
Collier, S.J 2014, ‘Neoliberalism and natural disaster: Insurance as a political technology of catastrophe’, Journal of Cultural Economy, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 273–290.
Committee on the Affordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums
2015, Affordability of National Flood Insurance Program Premiums – Report 1.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Elliott, R 2017, ‘Who pays for the next wave? The American welfare state and
responsibility for flood risk’, Politics & Society, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 415–440.
Elliott, R 2021, Underwater: Loss, flood insurance, and the moral economy of climate
change in the United States, New York: Columbia University Press.
FEMA 2021a, Risk Rating 2.0: Equity in Action, viewed 29 April 2021,
Rating%202.0%20enables%20FEMA,and%20decreases%20are%20both%20
equitable.&text=Because%20Risk%20Rating%202.0%20considers,a%20
property’s%20unique%20flood%20risk>.
FEMA 2021b, Risk Rating 2.0 is Equity in Action: Fact Sheet (April 2021), Federal
Emergency Management Agency, viewed 23 April 2021,
Flood Re 2018, Our Vision: Securing a Future of Affordable Flood Insurance,
Horn, D.P 2021, ‘National Flood Insurance Program: The Current Rating Structure
and Risk Rating 2.0.’ Congressional Research Service, R45999.
Kiviat, B 2019, ‘The moral limits of predictive practices: The case of credit-based
insurance scores’, American Sociological Review, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 1134–1158.