48 K Grove
and control of borrowing in a manner that reduces government debt to sustainable levels’ (GCD 2006, p. 4).
I have detailed wider trends in Dominican budgeting elsewhere
(Grove 2021); for now, what matters is that the Dominican government
has adopted an array of EARM techniques since its 2002 IMF SAP to
manage both its financial exposure to more intense disaster events in the
Anthropocene and its exposure to the pressures of neoliberal structural
adjustment lending. Consistent with the WB’s country catastrophe risk
management framework described above, these involve a mix of insurance
and risk management techniques. For example, the GCD has been a member of the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) since
the Facility’s 2007 launch. More recently, it also participated in the Disaster
Vulnerability Reduction Project (DVRP), financed through the WB’s
Climate Investment Fund. Along with providing funding for pre-event risk
mitigation projects, the DVRP allows up to US$1 million to be diverted from
capital projects to finance short- and medium-term response and recovery
efforts (World Bank 2018). The GCD also launched a national disaster contingency fund, the Vulnerability, Risk and Resilience Fund (VRRF). The
VRRF is form of self-insurance that provides funds targeted to long-term
reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives.
The design of the VRRF demonstrates how EARM can paradoxically erode the possibilities for autonomy in the Anthropocene. Each of
the GCD’s pre-Erika GSPS documents included plans and promises for
the creation of a national disaster contingency fund. Alternatively called the
‘National Disaster Contingency Fund,’ ‘Disaster Mitigation Contingency
Fund,’ or ‘Environmental Mitigation Fund,’ the goal was the same: to provide the government with immediate post-disaster liquidity to ‘cover the
costs of repairs and environmental enhancements’ (GCD 2006, p. 84.).
Importantly, each proposal recommended capitalising the fund through the
Public Service Investment Programme (PSIP). The PSIP is a targeted capital
expenditure program focused on developing the island’s critical infrastructure systems, especially roads, bridges, utilities, and telecommunications.
The PSIP is funded through a mix of grants (65–75 per cent, depending on
the year), loans (5–10 per cent), and the government’s own funds (20–25 per
cent). However, the uncertain amount of foreign aid the GCD receives from
year-to-year resists formal rationalisation. In effect, funding the VRRF
through the PSIP would have inhibited the GCD’s ability to prepare like an
insurer, since its financial capacity would always be contingent on donor aid
revenue. In contrast, following Tropical Storm Erika, in 2016 IMF advisors
recommended capitalising the VRRF through the island’s Citizenship By
Investment (CBI) programme (Guerson 2016), a significant source of locally
generated revenue. The government eventually adopted the IMF’s suggestions and capitalised the VRRF through the CBI.
The Fund’s recommendation attempts to responsibilise the GCD on
two fronts. First, it compels the GCD to use its own internally generated
and control of borrowing in a manner that reduces government debt to sustainable levels’ (GCD 2006, p. 4).
I have detailed wider trends in Dominican budgeting elsewhere
(Grove 2021); for now, what matters is that the Dominican government
has adopted an array of EARM techniques since its 2002 IMF SAP to
manage both its financial exposure to more intense disaster events in the
Anthropocene and its exposure to the pressures of neoliberal structural
adjustment lending. Consistent with the WB’s country catastrophe risk
management framework described above, these involve a mix of insurance
and risk management techniques. For example, the GCD has been a member of the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) since
the Facility’s 2007 launch. More recently, it also participated in the Disaster
Vulnerability Reduction Project (DVRP), financed through the WB’s
Climate Investment Fund. Along with providing funding for pre-event risk
mitigation projects, the DVRP allows up to US$1 million to be diverted from
capital projects to finance short- and medium-term response and recovery
efforts (World Bank 2018). The GCD also launched a national disaster contingency fund, the Vulnerability, Risk and Resilience Fund (VRRF). The
VRRF is form of self-insurance that provides funds targeted to long-term
reconstruction and rehabilitation initiatives.
The design of the VRRF demonstrates how EARM can paradoxically erode the possibilities for autonomy in the Anthropocene. Each of
the GCD’s pre-Erika GSPS documents included plans and promises for
the creation of a national disaster contingency fund. Alternatively called the
‘National Disaster Contingency Fund,’ ‘Disaster Mitigation Contingency
Fund,’ or ‘Environmental Mitigation Fund,’ the goal was the same: to provide the government with immediate post-disaster liquidity to ‘cover the
costs of repairs and environmental enhancements’ (GCD 2006, p. 84.).
Importantly, each proposal recommended capitalising the fund through the
Public Service Investment Programme (PSIP). The PSIP is a targeted capital
expenditure program focused on developing the island’s critical infrastructure systems, especially roads, bridges, utilities, and telecommunications.
The PSIP is funded through a mix of grants (65–75 per cent, depending on
the year), loans (5–10 per cent), and the government’s own funds (20–25 per
cent). However, the uncertain amount of foreign aid the GCD receives from
year-to-year resists formal rationalisation. In effect, funding the VRRF
through the PSIP would have inhibited the GCD’s ability to prepare like an
insurer, since its financial capacity would always be contingent on donor aid
revenue. In contrast, following Tropical Storm Erika, in 2016 IMF advisors
recommended capitalising the VRRF through the island’s Citizenship By
Investment (CBI) programme (Guerson 2016), a significant source of locally
generated revenue. The government eventually adopted the IMF’s suggestions and capitalised the VRRF through the CBI.
The Fund’s recommendation attempts to responsibilise the GCD on
two fronts. First, it compels the GCD to use its own internally generated