Insurance and geoengineering 17
are contested. This is the issue that – counter to insurance’s claims of
Modern rationality and objective foresight – it is not independent of the
future risks it foresees; it helps generate them. To begin with, it can influence people’s other risk-reduction behaviours by dangling a ‘moral hazard.’
The most widespread criticism of insurance is that it ends up substituting
for, rather than complementing or encouraging, people’s efforts to reduce
risk. In the health field, for instance, research suggests that if someone has
health insurance, they are less likely to engage in healthy behaviours (Einav
& Finkelstein 2018). In climate adaptation, insurance can encourage a reactive, incremental, individualistic approach and hamper more collective,
transformational efforts (Wilson et al. 2020).
In the case of geoengineering, opponents argue that more than simply
expressing a lack of confidence in greenhouse gas mitigation, the very possibility of geoengineering may undermine mitigation progress by reassuring society (especially large emitters) that regardless of how half-hearted
their mitigation efforts are, climate change will be kept manageable. As
Parker (2014, p. 7) argues about Solar Radiation Management [SRM]
specifically:
The seductive promise that SRM could be a cheap, quick solution to
climate change is one of the greatest concerns about its development.
It seems inescapable that at least some people will find that the prospect of a techno-fix for global warming—however imperfect—is cause
enough to significantly reduce efforts to curb GHG emissions.
The concern is that geoengineering becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy:
demotivating mitigation, worsening climatic change, increasing urgency,
and thus bolstering its own appeal as a ‘weapon of last resort’ (Lederer &
Kreuter 2018).
Research into geoengineering options wears two hats here. On the one
hand, critics warn that by making geoengineering more technically feasible, research into geoengineering options deepens the moral hazard. On
the other hand, advocates present research as a kind of insurance policy
itself – one that prepares for the possibility that the moral hazard effect
eventuates, climate change worsens, and society turns to the research world
seeking ready-made geoengineering solutions or explanations of what to
avoid (Parker 2014).
That geoengineering interventions are themselves risky is the third main
reason they are contested, and a further illustration of how they shape
the future. Despite the purported rationalism that underpins its insurantial imaginary, geoengineering in practice is highly speculative, to
put it politely. Some initiatives seem more at home in bad science fiction
than good science journals. Here, the ‘What if…?’ stance on the future is
strongly evident. Ideas posited include dumping tonnes of iron into oceans
or spreading crushed rock (e.g. mine tailings) over vast areas to absorb
are contested. This is the issue that – counter to insurance’s claims of
Modern rationality and objective foresight – it is not independent of the
future risks it foresees; it helps generate them. To begin with, it can influence people’s other risk-reduction behaviours by dangling a ‘moral hazard.’
The most widespread criticism of insurance is that it ends up substituting
for, rather than complementing or encouraging, people’s efforts to reduce
risk. In the health field, for instance, research suggests that if someone has
health insurance, they are less likely to engage in healthy behaviours (Einav
& Finkelstein 2018). In climate adaptation, insurance can encourage a reactive, incremental, individualistic approach and hamper more collective,
transformational efforts (Wilson et al. 2020).
In the case of geoengineering, opponents argue that more than simply
expressing a lack of confidence in greenhouse gas mitigation, the very possibility of geoengineering may undermine mitigation progress by reassuring society (especially large emitters) that regardless of how half-hearted
their mitigation efforts are, climate change will be kept manageable. As
Parker (2014, p. 7) argues about Solar Radiation Management [SRM]
specifically:
The seductive promise that SRM could be a cheap, quick solution to
climate change is one of the greatest concerns about its development.
It seems inescapable that at least some people will find that the prospect of a techno-fix for global warming—however imperfect—is cause
enough to significantly reduce efforts to curb GHG emissions.
The concern is that geoengineering becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy:
demotivating mitigation, worsening climatic change, increasing urgency,
and thus bolstering its own appeal as a ‘weapon of last resort’ (Lederer &
Kreuter 2018).
Research into geoengineering options wears two hats here. On the one
hand, critics warn that by making geoengineering more technically feasible, research into geoengineering options deepens the moral hazard. On
the other hand, advocates present research as a kind of insurance policy
itself – one that prepares for the possibility that the moral hazard effect
eventuates, climate change worsens, and society turns to the research world
seeking ready-made geoengineering solutions or explanations of what to
avoid (Parker 2014).
That geoengineering interventions are themselves risky is the third main
reason they are contested, and a further illustration of how they shape
the future. Despite the purported rationalism that underpins its insurantial imaginary, geoengineering in practice is highly speculative, to
put it politely. Some initiatives seem more at home in bad science fiction
than good science journals. Here, the ‘What if…?’ stance on the future is
strongly evident. Ideas posited include dumping tonnes of iron into oceans
or spreading crushed rock (e.g. mine tailings) over vast areas to absorb