Insure the volume? 173
to manage the wildfire threat. A radiological assessment of two sizeable
wildfires in the CEZ in April and August 2015 found that the (effective) 2
radiation doses were above 1 millisievert (mSv) per year within the borders
of the CEZ, but outside and in the rest of Europe doses were much lower,
‘equivalent to a medical X-ray image at most’ (Evangeliou et al. 2016, n.p.).
For context, 100 mSv per year is the lowest level of exposure at which there
is clear evidence of an increased risk of cancer (IAEA 2014).
In the next section, we examine the lingering consequences of the
Chornobyl disaster in the context of the atmospheric challenges posed by the
rerelease of radioactive fallout by wildfires that, according to local reports,
were ignited by neglectful farmers and/or an arsonist. We interrogate how
the relationship between atmospheric sensing, radioactive air pollution,
wildfires, and volumetric sovereignty renders this ongoing socio-technical
disaster uninsurable.
Sensing air, atmospheres, and radiation
Wildfires are a yearly, common occurrence in Ukraine, mostly because of
farmers (sometimes illegally) burning fields, which get out of control. For
this reason, the smoke that enveloped Kyiv for over a week in April 2020
was not solely from wildfires in the CEZ. The indeterminable origin of the
smoke gave it an eerie quality: Was it or was it not radioactive? This concern preoccupied state agencies and others who decided to check radiation
levels via spectacular acts of atmospheric sensing. These acts involved taking atmospheric measurements in public, including on Kyiv’s main street
Kreshchatyk, which runs through Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence
Square). Kreshchatyk was the location of the May Day Parade in 1986
where Soviet authorities, five days after the Chornobyl disaster, knowingly
exposed members of the public to high levels of radiation as the radioactive cloud enveloped them with particles carried on air currents from the
ChNPP. Attempting to sense radiation today in this symbolic place is a
spectacular and haunting reminder that the Chornobyl disaster continues.
We spoke with a radiation expert, Boris 3 , in December 2020 to determine
the purpose of the testing on Kreshchatyk earlier in the year. He suggested
that the tests were a publicity stunt and that the equipment used was inappropriate for measuring the kind of exposure that might actually be a threat
in this area. Boris told us that microscopic pieces of radioactive material
known as ‘hot particles’ were a cause for concern, and although rare, may be
very dangerous when ingested. The effects of hot particles are controversial
in the scientific community. If ingested, some scientists suggest, these radioactive materials can settle in specific tissue in the body and deliver a concentrated dose of radiation to a small group of cells. He also suggested that the
‘experiments’ were carried out in places where radioisotopes were unlikely
to exist if they had made the atmospheric journey to Kyiv. As with the initial
silence and then denial by the Soviet authorities in 1986, these spectacular
to manage the wildfire threat. A radiological assessment of two sizeable
wildfires in the CEZ in April and August 2015 found that the (effective) 2
radiation doses were above 1 millisievert (mSv) per year within the borders
of the CEZ, but outside and in the rest of Europe doses were much lower,
‘equivalent to a medical X-ray image at most’ (Evangeliou et al. 2016, n.p.).
For context, 100 mSv per year is the lowest level of exposure at which there
is clear evidence of an increased risk of cancer (IAEA 2014).
In the next section, we examine the lingering consequences of the
Chornobyl disaster in the context of the atmospheric challenges posed by the
rerelease of radioactive fallout by wildfires that, according to local reports,
were ignited by neglectful farmers and/or an arsonist. We interrogate how
the relationship between atmospheric sensing, radioactive air pollution,
wildfires, and volumetric sovereignty renders this ongoing socio-technical
disaster uninsurable.
Sensing air, atmospheres, and radiation
Wildfires are a yearly, common occurrence in Ukraine, mostly because of
farmers (sometimes illegally) burning fields, which get out of control. For
this reason, the smoke that enveloped Kyiv for over a week in April 2020
was not solely from wildfires in the CEZ. The indeterminable origin of the
smoke gave it an eerie quality: Was it or was it not radioactive? This concern preoccupied state agencies and others who decided to check radiation
levels via spectacular acts of atmospheric sensing. These acts involved taking atmospheric measurements in public, including on Kyiv’s main street
Kreshchatyk, which runs through Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence
Square). Kreshchatyk was the location of the May Day Parade in 1986
where Soviet authorities, five days after the Chornobyl disaster, knowingly
exposed members of the public to high levels of radiation as the radioactive cloud enveloped them with particles carried on air currents from the
ChNPP. Attempting to sense radiation today in this symbolic place is a
spectacular and haunting reminder that the Chornobyl disaster continues.
We spoke with a radiation expert, Boris 3 , in December 2020 to determine
the purpose of the testing on Kreshchatyk earlier in the year. He suggested
that the tests were a publicity stunt and that the equipment used was inappropriate for measuring the kind of exposure that might actually be a threat
in this area. Boris told us that microscopic pieces of radioactive material
known as ‘hot particles’ were a cause for concern, and although rare, may be
very dangerous when ingested. The effects of hot particles are controversial
in the scientific community. If ingested, some scientists suggest, these radioactive materials can settle in specific tissue in the body and deliver a concentrated dose of radiation to a small group of cells. He also suggested that the
‘experiments’ were carried out in places where radioisotopes were unlikely
to exist if they had made the atmospheric journey to Kyiv. As with the initial
silence and then denial by the Soviet authorities in 1986, these spectacular