158 N Osbaldiston
invest our trust in. As noted above, our understandings of risk perception
have shifted to include thinking through emotions as an additional variable.
‘Probability judgements,’ writes Slovic et al. (2005, p. 36), can be influenced
by, if not determined through, ‘readily available affective’ impressions which
require far less ‘complex or mental resources.’ This consideration is one of
the criticisms that is levelled at Giddens (1990) and Beck’s (1992) interpretation of risk and reflexivity. Specifically, the argument suggests that ‘lay
actors,’ while ‘rational,’ experience their worlds through emotions, bodies,
and symbols (Mythen 2005, p. 144). Frames of ‘risk reference’ need to be
expanded in our analysis as individuals will select from a wide range of factors in their decision-making than is often presented in theories of risk and
reflexivity (Mythen 2005, p. 144).
In recent times, sociology has engaged with this further by rethinking
reflexivity in relation to how people process feelings. Holmes (2010, 2015),
for instance, argues that our era is defined by uncertainty requiring us to
place some trust in expertise. She suggests that ‘trust […] is often necessarily based largely on emotions, on feelings about things and activities, or an
aesthetic – a liking for a person, persons or thing’ (Holmes 2010, p. 143).
In other words, we do not simply rely on cognition to interpret our social
worlds, and importantly, on who we place our trust in. Rather;
reflexivity is not simply a rational calculation of the amount of satisfaction an aspect or way of life brings, but it is infused with feelings
about how it fits (or does not) with others and what they think, feel and
do. Reflexivity is emotional and comparative and relies on interpreting
emotions.
(Holmes 2010, p. 148, italics added)
Importantly, these emotions do not emerge in isolation. They are derived
through our interactions and relations with others.
Emotions are done in interaction with others; they involve bodies, thought,
talk, and action. Feelings make embodied social selves and selves and lives
are made within the social constraints of place and time. It is crucial to
attempt to better understand these emotional reflexive practices within a
sociological context (Holmes 2010, p. 149).
Not only do our relations with others manifest certain types of emotions
that then colour our decision-making, but our positions in the social world
also inform certain emotional responses to different events. Burkitt (2012,
p. 466) makes this point when he supposes that if we were caught ‘being
dishonest by someone we highly regard as a person of integrity, we will feel
doubly ashamed.’ The judgement of others is as important as the actual
event that precedes it.
Thus, context matters. In understanding insurance through emotional
reflexivity, the emotions one feels towards insurers, social peers, the geography of the area, and past experiences of natural disasters perhaps all have a
invest our trust in. As noted above, our understandings of risk perception
have shifted to include thinking through emotions as an additional variable.
‘Probability judgements,’ writes Slovic et al. (2005, p. 36), can be influenced
by, if not determined through, ‘readily available affective’ impressions which
require far less ‘complex or mental resources.’ This consideration is one of
the criticisms that is levelled at Giddens (1990) and Beck’s (1992) interpretation of risk and reflexivity. Specifically, the argument suggests that ‘lay
actors,’ while ‘rational,’ experience their worlds through emotions, bodies,
and symbols (Mythen 2005, p. 144). Frames of ‘risk reference’ need to be
expanded in our analysis as individuals will select from a wide range of factors in their decision-making than is often presented in theories of risk and
reflexivity (Mythen 2005, p. 144).
In recent times, sociology has engaged with this further by rethinking
reflexivity in relation to how people process feelings. Holmes (2010, 2015),
for instance, argues that our era is defined by uncertainty requiring us to
place some trust in expertise. She suggests that ‘trust […] is often necessarily based largely on emotions, on feelings about things and activities, or an
aesthetic – a liking for a person, persons or thing’ (Holmes 2010, p. 143).
In other words, we do not simply rely on cognition to interpret our social
worlds, and importantly, on who we place our trust in. Rather;
reflexivity is not simply a rational calculation of the amount of satisfaction an aspect or way of life brings, but it is infused with feelings
about how it fits (or does not) with others and what they think, feel and
do. Reflexivity is emotional and comparative and relies on interpreting
emotions.
(Holmes 2010, p. 148, italics added)
Importantly, these emotions do not emerge in isolation. They are derived
through our interactions and relations with others.
Emotions are done in interaction with others; they involve bodies, thought,
talk, and action. Feelings make embodied social selves and selves and lives
are made within the social constraints of place and time. It is crucial to
attempt to better understand these emotional reflexive practices within a
sociological context (Holmes 2010, p. 149).
Not only do our relations with others manifest certain types of emotions
that then colour our decision-making, but our positions in the social world
also inform certain emotional responses to different events. Burkitt (2012,
p. 466) makes this point when he supposes that if we were caught ‘being
dishonest by someone we highly regard as a person of integrity, we will feel
doubly ashamed.’ The judgement of others is as important as the actual
event that precedes it.
Thus, context matters. In understanding insurance through emotional
reflexivity, the emotions one feels towards insurers, social peers, the geography of the area, and past experiences of natural disasters perhaps all have a