16 Fabien Girard et al.
(Mgbeoji, 2006; Robinson, 2011), blatant violations of customary law, or seen as
irremediably tainted by power asymmetries. These three themes recurred several
times throughout the travaux préparatoires to the Nagoya Protocol (see Table 1.1,
Annex).
BCPs/CPs emphasise a community’s customary rules and laws and its cultural
heritage, while at the same time making visible and explicit the local norms to be
followed for the negotiations. Hence, they have been heralded as powerful tools
for achieving substantive equity (e.g. a just distribution of benefits taking IPLCs’
perspectives into account) and procedural fairness (e.g. through a process avoiding misunderstanding, allowing enough time and money) in respect of access to
genetic resources and associated TK (Raven, 2006, p. 14). Still in the context of
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, BCPs/CPs have been showcased as useful
instruments to harness the potential of IPLCs in biodiversity conservation.
Following heated debates and strong advocacy from the African Group (via
Namibia’s representation) and active non-profit organisations, CPs were eventually transcribed into the protocol which was signed on 29 October 2010 in
Nagoya (see Art. 12, for example). The concept of BCP/CP itself was introduced
into international negotiations by the active role of Natural Justice, an NGO
based in South Africa which operates globally for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity through the self-determination of IPLCs (Bavikatte &
Jonas, 2009; Bavikatte & Robinson, 2011).
Although BCPs/CPs are new tools, they are commonly presented as things
that have existed since time immemorial. Indeed, for their promoters, BCPs/CPs
are nothing but emanations of these customary rules and procedures through
which a community usually regulates conducts and interactions both within
and outside the community (Shrumm & Jonas, 2012). Some have indeed been
in place for centuries, but it remains difficult to isolate them from their wider
socio-cultural context, embedded as they are in different fields, including religion, personhood, kinship, medicine, agriculture, and so on. They might find an
expression in different media such as songs, dances, carvings, drawings, and oral
traditions, despite the fact that even so translated and mediatised, they may remain
elusive and ungraspable for those who do not belong to these communities. In
sum, drafting a protocol always implies a complex process of translation, all the
more so, given that BCPs/CPs are immersed in global environmental politics
and run a greater risk of uncontrolled equivocations (Blaser, 2009a; Viveiros De
Castro, 2004).
In fact, as the last point indicates, the novelty and distinctiveness of BCPs/CPs
lie in the fact that IPLCs are increasingly engaging with external stakeholders
such as government agencies, international organisations, researchers, NGOs,
and private companies. Engagements with IPLCs, though at times adequate and
in line with communities’ procedures/protocols, priorities, and visions, nevertheless quite often prove to be driven by outsiders’ goals and defined exclusively
according their own terms. As a result, “communities often have to act defensively in response to imposed plans or threats” (Shrumm & Jonas, 2012, p. 13).
(Mgbeoji, 2006; Robinson, 2011), blatant violations of customary law, or seen as
irremediably tainted by power asymmetries. These three themes recurred several
times throughout the travaux préparatoires to the Nagoya Protocol (see Table 1.1,
Annex).
BCPs/CPs emphasise a community’s customary rules and laws and its cultural
heritage, while at the same time making visible and explicit the local norms to be
followed for the negotiations. Hence, they have been heralded as powerful tools
for achieving substantive equity (e.g. a just distribution of benefits taking IPLCs’
perspectives into account) and procedural fairness (e.g. through a process avoiding misunderstanding, allowing enough time and money) in respect of access to
genetic resources and associated TK (Raven, 2006, p. 14). Still in the context of
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, BCPs/CPs have been showcased as useful
instruments to harness the potential of IPLCs in biodiversity conservation.
Following heated debates and strong advocacy from the African Group (via
Namibia’s representation) and active non-profit organisations, CPs were eventually transcribed into the protocol which was signed on 29 October 2010 in
Nagoya (see Art. 12, for example). The concept of BCP/CP itself was introduced
into international negotiations by the active role of Natural Justice, an NGO
based in South Africa which operates globally for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity through the self-determination of IPLCs (Bavikatte &
Jonas, 2009; Bavikatte & Robinson, 2011).
Although BCPs/CPs are new tools, they are commonly presented as things
that have existed since time immemorial. Indeed, for their promoters, BCPs/CPs
are nothing but emanations of these customary rules and procedures through
which a community usually regulates conducts and interactions both within
and outside the community (Shrumm & Jonas, 2012). Some have indeed been
in place for centuries, but it remains difficult to isolate them from their wider
socio-cultural context, embedded as they are in different fields, including religion, personhood, kinship, medicine, agriculture, and so on. They might find an
expression in different media such as songs, dances, carvings, drawings, and oral
traditions, despite the fact that even so translated and mediatised, they may remain
elusive and ungraspable for those who do not belong to these communities. In
sum, drafting a protocol always implies a complex process of translation, all the
more so, given that BCPs/CPs are immersed in global environmental politics
and run a greater risk of uncontrolled equivocations (Blaser, 2009a; Viveiros De
Castro, 2004).
In fact, as the last point indicates, the novelty and distinctiveness of BCPs/CPs
lie in the fact that IPLCs are increasingly engaging with external stakeholders
such as government agencies, international organisations, researchers, NGOs,
and private companies. Engagements with IPLCs, though at times adequate and
in line with communities’ procedures/protocols, priorities, and visions, nevertheless quite often prove to be driven by outsiders’ goals and defined exclusively
according their own terms. As a result, “communities often have to act defensively in response to imposed plans or threats” (Shrumm & Jonas, 2012, p. 13).