286 Reia Anquet and Fabien Girard
BCPs and “Stewardship of Biodiversity”: Eco-Power and
Subject-Making
Studying BCPs through the lens of political ontology uncovers how IPLCs
are torn between different environmental scripts. There is a prevalence of the
present- day scripts (“stewardship of biodiversity” and “small green entrepreneur”) which share the premise that IPLCs are key actors in biodiversity conservation and seek to distribute roles and responsibilities accordingly. This can be
seen as the ideological attraction of most protocols. While this is mostly true,
there are substantial differences between the BCPs that, in turn, inform their
potential political and ontological reach.
The philosophical underpinnings of the “small green entrepreneur”
representation hinge upon instrumental rationality. The rationality of “rational
choice theory” in “commons” theory (Lara, 2015) is the building block of neoclassical economics. This theory posits that economic agents, though “fallible,
norm-adopting individuals who pursue contingent strategies in complex and
uncertain environments” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 185, Singleton, 2017), can voluntarily
develop co-operative social norms, thereby successfully managing common-pool
resources. As adaptable, resilient, and robust institutions depend on a complex
“grammar of institutions” (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2009), there
needs to be a mix of institutional interventions and incentives. These incentives
are vital to “achieve co-operative equilibrium outcomes” (Mosse, 1997, p. 469)
among users of the common-pool resources.
Part of the same theoretical framing pervades the second modern script, that
of the IPLCs as “stewards of biodiversity”, which can at times coalesce into a
mixed script. But references to “nature”, “native”, and “tradition”, which feature prominently in international discourses and environmental laws, change
the way communities are perceived and necessarily how they may perceive
themselves. This is because they change the kind of expectations placed on
IPLCs and the reasons for potential biodiversity local management failure
(see Mosse, 1997, pp. 468–469). In this situation, IPLCs must not progress or
develop or be connected to the global market; they are expected to “remain
the same and not change” (Ulloa, 2005, p. 206). This may imply other types
of managerial interventions, such as harnessing traditions and traditional ways
of life, reviving them
40 when they are on the verge of decline or even, upon
occasions, re-inventing and upholding them “by the force of law” (Mosse,
1997, p. 469).
These interventions are well-accounted for in the literature on CBNRM
(Brosius et al., 1998; Mosse, 1997) and are likely to be replicated in BCP development since both rely on a people-centred approach of conservation. The involvement of local populations is primarily instrumental as they have a greater interest
in the management of resources than the State or distant managers. IPLCs have
profound knowledge of local ecological processes; use cost-effective methods,
and have a stronger social acceptance of bottom-up conservation activities.
BCPs and “Stewardship of Biodiversity”: Eco-Power and
Subject-Making
Studying BCPs through the lens of political ontology uncovers how IPLCs
are torn between different environmental scripts. There is a prevalence of the
present- day scripts (“stewardship of biodiversity” and “small green entrepreneur”) which share the premise that IPLCs are key actors in biodiversity conservation and seek to distribute roles and responsibilities accordingly. This can be
seen as the ideological attraction of most protocols. While this is mostly true,
there are substantial differences between the BCPs that, in turn, inform their
potential political and ontological reach.
The philosophical underpinnings of the “small green entrepreneur”
representation hinge upon instrumental rationality. The rationality of “rational
choice theory” in “commons” theory (Lara, 2015) is the building block of neoclassical economics. This theory posits that economic agents, though “fallible,
norm-adopting individuals who pursue contingent strategies in complex and
uncertain environments” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 185, Singleton, 2017), can voluntarily
develop co-operative social norms, thereby successfully managing common-pool
resources. As adaptable, resilient, and robust institutions depend on a complex
“grammar of institutions” (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2009), there
needs to be a mix of institutional interventions and incentives. These incentives
are vital to “achieve co-operative equilibrium outcomes” (Mosse, 1997, p. 469)
among users of the common-pool resources.
Part of the same theoretical framing pervades the second modern script, that
of the IPLCs as “stewards of biodiversity”, which can at times coalesce into a
mixed script. But references to “nature”, “native”, and “tradition”, which feature prominently in international discourses and environmental laws, change
the way communities are perceived and necessarily how they may perceive
themselves. This is because they change the kind of expectations placed on
IPLCs and the reasons for potential biodiversity local management failure
(see Mosse, 1997, pp. 468–469). In this situation, IPLCs must not progress or
develop or be connected to the global market; they are expected to “remain
the same and not change” (Ulloa, 2005, p. 206). This may imply other types
of managerial interventions, such as harnessing traditions and traditional ways
of life, reviving them
40 when they are on the verge of decline or even, upon
occasions, re-inventing and upholding them “by the force of law” (Mosse,
1997, p. 469).
These interventions are well-accounted for in the literature on CBNRM
(Brosius et al., 1998; Mosse, 1997) and are likely to be replicated in BCP development since both rely on a people-centred approach of conservation. The involvement of local populations is primarily instrumental as they have a greater interest
in the management of resources than the State or distant managers. IPLCs have
profound knowledge of local ecological processes; use cost-effective methods,
and have a stronger social acceptance of bottom-up conservation activities.