The Sovereign Stewards of Biodiversity 279
The “Small Green Entrepreneur” Script
In four out of seven BCPs studied, the main thrust of the community-based
enterprise was to align farming communities and indigenous peoples with the
“Grand Bargain” (Wynberg & Laird, 2009) and sustainable development narratives. Translated and stabilised in the “small green entrepreneurs” script, which
owes much, as will be seen, to Ostrom’s work and the Bloomington school of
political economy, the two narratives inject certain assumptions about the local
“agents” (tastes, competences, motives, aspirations – Akrich, 1992, pp. 207–208)
and define their role within a set “framework of action” (ibid.) mainly geared
towards incentivising biodiversity conservation.
The script is clearly discernible in the BCPs developed in Madagascar
19
and Benin within the framework of the Darwin Initiative-funded project on
the “Mutually supportive implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and Plant
Treaty”.
20 This should not come as a surprise, as there is a blueprint laid out
in the ABS framework of each country to connect BCPs with the intra-state
benefit-sharing mechanism,
21 making clearly the instruments part of the strategy to foster both economic development and biodiversity conservation through
bioprospection.
As much in the reports submitted by Bioversity International to the funding
agency as in the contract holder’s work (Halewood et al., 2021), several references
are made to plant genetic resources as “new commons” (Halewood, 2013). The
theoretical underpinnings have now a long pedigree in studies on plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) in particular. They can be summarised as follows: with their twofold economic attributes of low excludability and
high rivalry, genetic resources embodied in seeds managed by farmers and IPLCs
yield positive externalities, but which are hardly appropriated at the local level
(Cooper et al., 1994; Swanson et al., 1994). Consequently, for farmers and local
communities not to forgo their conservation practices for more lucrative activities (e.g. conversion to elite varieties and monoculture), incentives need to be
developed (Bioversity International, 2018; Correa, 1999). BCPs, in setting up the
conditions for ABS agreements with commercial partners (industry, researchers),
stand as appropriate tools for influencing IPLCs’ behaviour in biodiversity conservation. They are meant to show IPLCs that conserving genetic resources can
pay off. BCPs entrenched in the script of “small green entrepreneurs” remain, of
course, mostly unconcerned with the aspects of biocultural heritage and hardly
touch upon the issue of the ethic of stewardship.
The BCP of the farming communities of Analavory (Madagascar), the BCP
of Ampangalastary (Madagascar), and the BCP of the Municipality of ToriBossito (Benin) alike are prime examples of protocols instrumentally tailored
to attract bioprospectors by giving them clear guidance about how to negotiate ABS agreements and the kind of benefits sought by the communities.
They also set out the procedure whereby the communities can access genetic
materials through the Multilateral System (MLS) of the International Treaty on
The “Small Green Entrepreneur” Script
In four out of seven BCPs studied, the main thrust of the community-based
enterprise was to align farming communities and indigenous peoples with the
“Grand Bargain” (Wynberg & Laird, 2009) and sustainable development narratives. Translated and stabilised in the “small green entrepreneurs” script, which
owes much, as will be seen, to Ostrom’s work and the Bloomington school of
political economy, the two narratives inject certain assumptions about the local
“agents” (tastes, competences, motives, aspirations – Akrich, 1992, pp. 207–208)
and define their role within a set “framework of action” (ibid.) mainly geared
towards incentivising biodiversity conservation.
The script is clearly discernible in the BCPs developed in Madagascar
19
and Benin within the framework of the Darwin Initiative-funded project on
the “Mutually supportive implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and Plant
Treaty”.
20 This should not come as a surprise, as there is a blueprint laid out
in the ABS framework of each country to connect BCPs with the intra-state
benefit-sharing mechanism,
21 making clearly the instruments part of the strategy to foster both economic development and biodiversity conservation through
bioprospection.
As much in the reports submitted by Bioversity International to the funding
agency as in the contract holder’s work (Halewood et al., 2021), several references
are made to plant genetic resources as “new commons” (Halewood, 2013). The
theoretical underpinnings have now a long pedigree in studies on plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) in particular. They can be summarised as follows: with their twofold economic attributes of low excludability and
high rivalry, genetic resources embodied in seeds managed by farmers and IPLCs
yield positive externalities, but which are hardly appropriated at the local level
(Cooper et al., 1994; Swanson et al., 1994). Consequently, for farmers and local
communities not to forgo their conservation practices for more lucrative activities (e.g. conversion to elite varieties and monoculture), incentives need to be
developed (Bioversity International, 2018; Correa, 1999). BCPs, in setting up the
conditions for ABS agreements with commercial partners (industry, researchers),
stand as appropriate tools for influencing IPLCs’ behaviour in biodiversity conservation. They are meant to show IPLCs that conserving genetic resources can
pay off. BCPs entrenched in the script of “small green entrepreneurs” remain, of
course, mostly unconcerned with the aspects of biocultural heritage and hardly
touch upon the issue of the ethic of stewardship.
The BCP of the farming communities of Analavory (Madagascar), the BCP
of Ampangalastary (Madagascar), and the BCP of the Municipality of ToriBossito (Benin) alike are prime examples of protocols instrumentally tailored
to attract bioprospectors by giving them clear guidance about how to negotiate ABS agreements and the kind of benefits sought by the communities.
They also set out the procedure whereby the communities can access genetic
materials through the Multilateral System (MLS) of the International Treaty on