244 Fabien Girard and Manohisoa Rakotondrabe
“guardians” or “stewards” of biodiversity and to the foundations being laid for
the implementation of community or local PIC (Morgera et al., 2014, p. 145)
and procedures for benefit sharing with IPLCs (Morgera et al., 2014, p. 117)
being incorporated into domestic legislation. The ground-breaking nature of the
Nagoya Protocol in this respect is indisputable. However, the true extent of its
provisions only emerges against the background of the recent “rediscovery” of
the pivotal role of IPCLs and farmers/peasants in the breeding, maintenance and
improvement of plant varieties and agricultural ecosystems, after many decades
of their innovative agency being downplayed and their local practices around
biodiversity conservation being made invisible (Bonneuil, 2019, p. 12). There
is now much debate about the “socio-natural” (Watts & Scales, 2015) or “biocultural” dimension of landraces and folk varieties, which certainly frames the
current questions around the role of IPLCs in biodiversity maintenance in the
context of political ontology (Demeulenaere, 2014).
Within this new framework, therefore, community PIC is not only about
guaranteeing genuine involvement and “true” consent from IPLCs every time a bioprospector wishes to access their genetic resources and/or TK. It is also about making
sure that consent is obtained and potential benefit sharing arrangements are negotiated following culturally appropriate procedures which are capable of offsetting
power asymmetries and, most importantly, of securing “the m arket-inalienability”
(Bavikatte et al., 2010, p. 316) of certain aspects of the community’s heritage (i.e.
all that which should be kept extra commercium, outside the realm of private rights,
such as language, traditional rules regulating the exchange of goods, and sacred sites)
(Banerjee, 2003, p. 144; Hughes & Lamont, 2018, p. 162). BCPs, enshrined in the
Nagoya Protocol as “community protocols” (Arts. 12.1, 12.3(a) and 21(i)), have been
heralded as ground-breaking tools to achieve this goal.
10
As the introductory chapter of this book recalls, BCPs were probably born
out of the “indigenous protocols” and “cultural protocols” (Bannister, 2009;
Gray, 2004) developed in Australia and Canada as ethical instruments to protect
indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. While there are still some doubts as to
how these cultural protocols morphed into ABS-related instruments, both share
common characteristics. Significantly, cultural protocols and BCPs both build
on “procedures” or “protocols” – commonly referred to as ancient, traditional
or immemorial – through which a community manages its resources and defines
and regulates access to them within and outside the community (see Bannister,
2009, p. 288). As written documents, BCPs strive, if only partially, to codify
these internal norms and procedures (Tobin, 2013, p. 142), with a view to providing clear guidance to would-be bioprospectors on the terms of the negotiations for accessing their resources and TK (Shrumm & Jonas, 2012, p. 13).
As a result, BCPs are generally featured as technical tools that enable “a
community to prepare in advance for negotiations of an ABS arrangement”
(Morgera & Tsioumani, 2010, p. 157) and to set up internal benefit sharing
mechanisms, thereby preventing any intracommunity conflicts (ibid., p. 158)
that may follow monetary and non-monetary arrangements with bioprospectors.
“guardians” or “stewards” of biodiversity and to the foundations being laid for
the implementation of community or local PIC (Morgera et al., 2014, p. 145)
and procedures for benefit sharing with IPLCs (Morgera et al., 2014, p. 117)
being incorporated into domestic legislation. The ground-breaking nature of the
Nagoya Protocol in this respect is indisputable. However, the true extent of its
provisions only emerges against the background of the recent “rediscovery” of
the pivotal role of IPCLs and farmers/peasants in the breeding, maintenance and
improvement of plant varieties and agricultural ecosystems, after many decades
of their innovative agency being downplayed and their local practices around
biodiversity conservation being made invisible (Bonneuil, 2019, p. 12). There
is now much debate about the “socio-natural” (Watts & Scales, 2015) or “biocultural” dimension of landraces and folk varieties, which certainly frames the
current questions around the role of IPLCs in biodiversity maintenance in the
context of political ontology (Demeulenaere, 2014).
Within this new framework, therefore, community PIC is not only about
guaranteeing genuine involvement and “true” consent from IPLCs every time a bioprospector wishes to access their genetic resources and/or TK. It is also about making
sure that consent is obtained and potential benefit sharing arrangements are negotiated following culturally appropriate procedures which are capable of offsetting
power asymmetries and, most importantly, of securing “the m arket-inalienability”
(Bavikatte et al., 2010, p. 316) of certain aspects of the community’s heritage (i.e.
all that which should be kept extra commercium, outside the realm of private rights,
such as language, traditional rules regulating the exchange of goods, and sacred sites)
(Banerjee, 2003, p. 144; Hughes & Lamont, 2018, p. 162). BCPs, enshrined in the
Nagoya Protocol as “community protocols” (Arts. 12.1, 12.3(a) and 21(i)), have been
heralded as ground-breaking tools to achieve this goal.
10
As the introductory chapter of this book recalls, BCPs were probably born
out of the “indigenous protocols” and “cultural protocols” (Bannister, 2009;
Gray, 2004) developed in Australia and Canada as ethical instruments to protect
indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. While there are still some doubts as to
how these cultural protocols morphed into ABS-related instruments, both share
common characteristics. Significantly, cultural protocols and BCPs both build
on “procedures” or “protocols” – commonly referred to as ancient, traditional
or immemorial – through which a community manages its resources and defines
and regulates access to them within and outside the community (see Bannister,
2009, p. 288). As written documents, BCPs strive, if only partially, to codify
these internal norms and procedures (Tobin, 2013, p. 142), with a view to providing clear guidance to would-be bioprospectors on the terms of the negotiations for accessing their resources and TK (Shrumm & Jonas, 2012, p. 13).
As a result, BCPs are generally featured as technical tools that enable “a
community to prepare in advance for negotiations of an ABS arrangement”
(Morgera & Tsioumani, 2010, p. 157) and to set up internal benefit sharing
mechanisms, thereby preventing any intracommunity conflicts (ibid., p. 158)
that may follow monetary and non-monetary arrangements with bioprospectors.