174 Giulia Sajeva
should hold the rights found in the biocultural rights basket: both “subjects” are
thus protected through the realization of biocultural rights. The protection of
nature’s interest
29 (to thrive, to continue to be, to evolve) grounds biocultural
rights and justifies (in legal terms) their recognition. Indeed, as Bavikatte (2014,
pp. 142 et seq.) underlines
[t]he demand for biocultural rights does not take as its point of departure
the inherent right of a group or community to flourish, but rather [...] the
ethic of stewardship: it is the ethic of stewardship and not the group per se
that justifies the right.
Biocultural rights stem from the interpretation of environmentally relevant
documents whose ultimate goal is the protection of the intrinsic value of biodiversity, and indigenous peoples and local communities emerge as subjects whose
rights are to be protected because they have preserved ways of life relevant for
biodiversity,
30 not merely because they are holders of intrinsic value as local communities or indigenous peoples. Therefore, biocultural rights may only be claimed by
sustainable indigenous peoples and local communities, binding them to exercise
the rights in their basket in ways that do not harm the environment, but instead
promote its protection.
These implications may not raise any particular concern if we abandon ourselves to the illusion of the noble savage myth (Ellingson, 2001), according to
which indigenous peoples and local communities will always remain pacific
friends of the Earth, regardless of external and internal changes; regardless of the
abundance of the species they traditionally hunt, fish, or domesticate; regardless
of the number of people that makes up a community; and regardless of their
changing desires, aspirations, and needs.
We may take it that most indigenous peoples and local communities are sustainable and desire to remain as such, but we cannot assume that each implementation of their right to self-governance and cultural identity leads to sustainable
outcomes and promotes the conservation of the environment. We shall refrain
from entrapping them into the simplistic and mistaken duality picturing them
either as “intrinsically attuned to nature” noble savages or as fallen angels once
in contact with mainstream society (Berkes, 2001, p. 116).
Therefore, recognizing that indigenous peoples and local communities may or
may not live life fully compatible with the conservation of the environment, and
given that both foundations and interests-holders – indigenous peoples and local
communities; and the environment – have equal standing, biocultural rights not
only hand their holders a set of positive legal positions but also a set of duties
concerning the protection of the environment: as holders of biocultural rights,
indigenous peoples and local communities are required to act as stewards of their
lands and natural resources, and their rights to self-governance and cultural identity are to be exercised in ways that are not detrimental to the conservation of the
environment: each foundation acts as a limit to the other.
31
should hold the rights found in the biocultural rights basket: both “subjects” are
thus protected through the realization of biocultural rights. The protection of
nature’s interest
29 (to thrive, to continue to be, to evolve) grounds biocultural
rights and justifies (in legal terms) their recognition. Indeed, as Bavikatte (2014,
pp. 142 et seq.) underlines
[t]he demand for biocultural rights does not take as its point of departure
the inherent right of a group or community to flourish, but rather [...] the
ethic of stewardship: it is the ethic of stewardship and not the group per se
that justifies the right.
Biocultural rights stem from the interpretation of environmentally relevant
documents whose ultimate goal is the protection of the intrinsic value of biodiversity, and indigenous peoples and local communities emerge as subjects whose
rights are to be protected because they have preserved ways of life relevant for
biodiversity,
30 not merely because they are holders of intrinsic value as local communities or indigenous peoples. Therefore, biocultural rights may only be claimed by
sustainable indigenous peoples and local communities, binding them to exercise
the rights in their basket in ways that do not harm the environment, but instead
promote its protection.
These implications may not raise any particular concern if we abandon ourselves to the illusion of the noble savage myth (Ellingson, 2001), according to
which indigenous peoples and local communities will always remain pacific
friends of the Earth, regardless of external and internal changes; regardless of the
abundance of the species they traditionally hunt, fish, or domesticate; regardless
of the number of people that makes up a community; and regardless of their
changing desires, aspirations, and needs.
We may take it that most indigenous peoples and local communities are sustainable and desire to remain as such, but we cannot assume that each implementation of their right to self-governance and cultural identity leads to sustainable
outcomes and promotes the conservation of the environment. We shall refrain
from entrapping them into the simplistic and mistaken duality picturing them
either as “intrinsically attuned to nature” noble savages or as fallen angels once
in contact with mainstream society (Berkes, 2001, p. 116).
Therefore, recognizing that indigenous peoples and local communities may or
may not live life fully compatible with the conservation of the environment, and
given that both foundations and interests-holders – indigenous peoples and local
communities; and the environment – have equal standing, biocultural rights not
only hand their holders a set of positive legal positions but also a set of duties
concerning the protection of the environment: as holders of biocultural rights,
indigenous peoples and local communities are required to act as stewards of their
lands and natural resources, and their rights to self-governance and cultural identity are to be exercised in ways that are not detrimental to the conservation of the
environment: each foundation acts as a limit to the other.
31